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An Abstract of

THE IMPORTANCE OF DIAGNOSIS IN IMPLEMENTING
SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
FIVE CASE STUDIES
by

Sylvia I. Carter
Directed by:

Kenneth H. Blanchard

Today the crisis of leadership pervades our institutions.

An

organization’s survival or failure depends greatly on its leadership.

Accelerating technological changes and growing sophistication of our

work forces have created new demands on today’s leaders.

Those

responsible for organizational growth and prosperity need new models
to help them understand the complex nature of leadership.
The Life Cycle Theory (LCT) of leadership formulated by Paul

Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard is a model which attempts to identify
some of the major elements in the leadership function and organize

them into a framework for diagnosing the appropriate leadership style
for a given situation.

The purpose of this study is to test the

usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic framework for

effective leadership by applying it to five published case studies of

organizational change acknowledged for their success or failure.
The Life Cycle Theory is based on the Ohio State leadership
leadership
studies which identified two fundamental dimensions of
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behavior, and concluded that "initiating
structure" and "consideration
for People" are not mutually exclusive,
but that a leader may exhibit

both behaviors in varying degrees.

These two behaviors were plotted
on

two separate axis, forming a grid which
contains four basic leader
styles.

Hersey and Blanchard renamed the two leadership
behaviors "task"
and "relationships" behaviors.
grid.

They added a "maturity continuum" to the

This continuum refers to subordinates task relevant
maturity.

In order to diagnose a subordinate's level of "maturity",
a leader must

take into account

1)

their achievement motivation, 2) their willingness

and ability to perform the task,
experience.

3)

their task relevant education and/or

Once a leader has determined the subordinate's level of

"maturity" according to these variables, he or she, can select the

leadership style most appropriate to the subordinates’ needs.
A summary of each case precedes a final analysis.

Each phase

of the case, before, during and after change, is analyzed according to
the analytic framework to discover if the style of leadership used by
the key leader was appropriate for the particular situation.

Anatomy o f Educational Inno vatio n by L. Smith and p. Keith

examines the unsuccessful attempt to create an open school.

Behind the

Front Page by C. Argyris chronicles failure in a major American newspaper.

Making Waves In Foggy Bottom by A. Marrow described successful

and unsuccessful change in the State Department.

Organizational Change:

The Effect of Successful Leadership by H. Guest describes how an auto-

mobile assembly plant was brought from last to first place in its
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division.

Management

fry

Participation by A. Marrow, D. Bowers and

S. Seashore describes successful change in the
garment industry.

In conclusion, five issues emerge from the study:
1.

Leaders of successful change programs showed
flexibility of style.

2.

In cases of unsuccessful change, inadequate
technical systems were not improved; attention
was paid only to human systems.

3.

The T-Group approach to organizational change
was extremely unsuccessful.

4.

Successful change was always preceded by
recognition of organizational crisis, which
brought to the fore an awareness and acceptance
of inappropriate leadership. In unsuccessful
cases, crisis either did not exist, or was not
acknowledged.

5.

As a diagnostic model, the Life Cycle Theory is
subject to much individual interpretation. Its
ultimate usefulness depends on the diagnostic
skills of the practitioner.

While the Life Cycle Theory provides a useful framework for

diagnosing appropriate leadership in a given situation, it is still in
its initial stages of development and needs further research to provide
a more accurate measurement of "maturity'’

.

In the last analysis, the

Life Cycle Theory is a forerunner in the field of situational leadership.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Leadership is a principal cause of organizational survival or
failure.

Today, the crisis of leadership is becoming ever more serious

in our governmental, industrial, and educational institutions.

This

study offers a particular perspective on leadership that might provide
some help to those responsible for organizational growth and prosperity.
The relatively new practice of assisting organizations in their
growth, called Organizational Development (OD)

,

began to develop in the

early thirties, and has grown greatly over the last decade.

Hersey and

Blanchard (1975) define it as:

—

planned change an effort to increase the overall
effectiveness of an organization or organizational
unit [p. 14].
human systems,
Although an organization is composed of technical and
the human system
traditionally OD practitioners have tended to emphasize
change.
and the human relations approach when attempting

This approach however, has had its difficulties.

In a 1967

attempts at organizational change,
study of successful and unsuccessful
issues common to the successes
Buchanan was unable to find any crucial

and failures.

reasons for this was that
He concluded that one of the

to OD
represented "a similar people approach
all ten cases he studied
[p. 66]."

concerned that the emphasis on
Schein and Bennis (1965) are

2

a cohesive, leaderless democracy.

They feel that as a result of lab-

oratory training, people should be able to choose with greater
knowledge
what forms or practice might be most appropriate; for example, that

under certain conditions, "autocracy might be more appropriate
[p. 329]."
Many practitioners, such as Margulies and Raia (1972) have begun
to call for a greater variety of approaches to OD.

Finding that in

actual practice, "most practitioners tend to focus on the personal-

cultural subsystems, and merely pay lip service to technological and

administrative changes [p. 477]," they suggest that OD techniques
developed to date show an over-emphasis on the human aspect.

If OD is

truly to use a system approach to organizational effectiveness and
change, then, they state, the practitioner must make an effort to make

use of alternative change strategies.

Ultimately, interventions to

bring about organizational change will be concerned with the style of

leadership directing the change(s) in the organization.

As the

theoreticians above have argued, leadership should vary according to
the unique needs of each organization.

Hersey and Blanchard (1972) have built on existing situational

approaches to leadership in developing the Life Cycle Theory of leadership.

This method is used as a diagnostic tool in organizational

development.

A brief background of the Life Cycle Theory follows.

The

according to
Ohio State Leadership studies (1945) described leadership

two dimensions of initiating structure and consideration.

From these

Managerial Grid which
studies, Blake and Mouton (1964) developed their
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describes five types of leadership styles based on. ’concern for

and. 'concern for production'.

people.’

The Tri-Dimensional Leadership Effec-

tiveness model as described by Hersey and Blanchard (1972), grows out of
these previous studies.

In the Tri-Dimensional model, leader style is

related to an effectiveness dimension.

The Life Cycle Theory of leader-

ship is an outgrowth of the Tri-Dimensional model.

This situational

theory attempts to relate task behavior and relationship behavior of the
leader, and maturity level of the followers.

In so doing, the theory

attempts to provide a leader with some understanding of the relationships between an effective style of leadership and the level of maturity

of his or her followers.

While Life Cycle Theory emphasizes appropriate

leader behavior, Hersey and Blanchard have also used this theory as a

framework to integrate many of the motivational and change theories
available in the literature.

Purpose of the Study

This study will attempt to determine the usefulness of Hersey
and Blanchard's Life Cycle Theory of leadership as a diagnostic method
for determining the most appropriate leadership style in a given

organizational situation.

In order to accomplish this,

five cases of

and
organizational change taken from the literature, both successful

analytic
unsuccessful, will be described and analyzed according to an

framework.

the Life
This framework will contain all of the variables of

situational leadership
Cycle Theory and some variables from related

theories.

the Life Cycle Theory
In each case, we will attempt to see if

leader's attempt at change.
accounts for the success or failure of the
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Significance of the Study
1.

tions.

There is a need for a situational
approach in OD interven-

Hopefully this study will examine the Life
Cycle Theory as one

useful situational approach.
2.

Case studies are an important tool in furthering
the

development of the field of organizational development
research.

As

Giaquinta and Bernstein (1971) observe, case studies
provide an in depth
observation of the efforts to institute planned change.

As such they

are useful to the future efforts of OD practitioners.
3.

It is important to continue research in the field of

organizational change.

As Schein and Bennis (1965) note,

In some organizational change programs a great deal
of attention is being paid to research, but not
enough research is yet being done [p. 323].

In particular, it is important to investigate the applicability of any

diagnostic framework; thus the examination of the Life Cycle Theory

which will be undertaken in this study.
4.

The length of a case description and analysis has been

deliberately limited to around twenty pages each in order to provide a
set of cases of practical usefulness to the practitioner in classroom

or workshop settings.

It is the hope of the writer that this study

will be used in the field, to make this theory "come alive" for people.

Delimitations of the Study

1.

Because the writer will be dealing with already recorded

case studies, knowledge of the interventions will be second hand.

5

Each case study written contains the
personal biases of the

2.

author of the case, as well as the writer of
this study.

Schmuck and

Miles (1971) note the problem arising from this
method of case writing:
Most OD practitioners are not researchers: they
do not
systematically evaluate the outcome of interventions
except in informal ways
Most OD consultants collect
information from clients in the manner of an 'artistic
clinician' [p. 231].

Buchanan, after his study of a number of OD interventions, noted
that

the information required to determine crucial issues in OD interventions

was often not included in case reports because of what the writer was

willing to reveal about his or her own work, or because of what the
organization would allow the writer to record.
The Life Cycle Theory of leadership has not yet been fully

3.

researched.

As a result, one cannot claim that it encompasses the

total spectrum of organizational problems.
4.

All of the dimensions of the Life Cycle Theory have not yet

been defined through research and operationalized.

Hence the practi-

tioner must use subjective judgment to utilize the Life Cycle model.

Organization of the Study

This study will be divided into seven chapters.

chapter introduces the study.

The present

Chapter two will outline a background of

leadership theory, tracing the development of two theoretical schools of
thought:

one, that there is one best style of leadership in all situa-

tions, and two, that leadership is relative to the situation.

Chapter

three will describe the Life Cycle Theory of leadership, a situational

theory which postulates a method for diagnosing the situation so that
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the most appropriate leadership style
can be selected.

Chapter four

develops an analytic framework which is used
to analyze the cases under
consideration.

Chapter five describes and analyzes two
unsuccessful

cases, and one mixed success case of
organizational change:

Case

1:

Education

Anatomy of Educational Innovation, hy
Louis M. Smith and Pat M. Keith. This
case describes an unsuccessful attempt
to create an open school.

Case

2:

Business

Behind the Front Page, by Chris Argyris.
This case describes Argyris' unsuccessful three year attempt to bring about a
participative management system in a
major U. S. newspaper.

Case

3:

Government

Making Waves In Foggy Bottom, by Alfred
J. Marrow.
This case describes two
unsuccessful attempts, and one successful attempt to reorganize the United
States Department of State.

Chapter six describes and analyzes two successful cases or organizational
change:

Case

4:

Business

Organizational Change: The Effect of
Successful LeadershiD. bv Robert Guest.
This case describes how a plant manager
brought an automobile assembly plant
from last to first place in its
division.

Case 5:

Business

Management bv Participation bv Alfred J.
Marrow, David G. Bowers, and Stanley E.
Seashore. This case describes how the
Harwood company brought the Weldon
company from failure to success.
.
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CHAPTER

II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

Applied behavioral scientists have been of two minds concerning
leadership.

One school of thought, the older, has held that leadership

is absolute, and that there is one best style of leadership in all

circumstances.

Beginning in the early thirties, the generally humanis-

tic and democratically oriented practitioners beloning to this school

emphasized interpersonal relations and democratic leadership as the key
to improving organizations.

The other newer school of thought which

began in the forties, and has gained momentum over the last decade,

holds that leadership is relative to the situation.

Practitioners in

this school argue for a systems approach to Organizational Development

with an emphasis on situational leadership.
This chapter will be divided into two parts.

Since chronolog-

on the
ically writers who view leadership as absolute, dependent solely
as
characteristics of the leader, preceed those who view leadership

that fall under
relative, Part One will outline some of the concepts

the category of leadership as absolute.

Part Two will describe some of

the concepts of situational leadership.

This order is summarized in

the following flow chart.

(See Figure 1.)
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LEADERSHIP ABSOLUTE

LEADERSHIP SITUATIONAL

Traditional
Leadership Theory
To 1900

Human Relations
Leadership Theory
1930

White and Lippitt
Autocratic - Democratic Laissez-Faire Leadership

Hemphill
Leadership depends on
Group

Fleishman and Harris
Human Relations Training
in Industry

Fiedler
Contingency
Theory

Likert
Participative Management

Lawrence and Lorsch
Integration - Differentiation
Theory

Blake and Mouton
Managerial Grid

Lowin and Craig
Farris and Lim
Leadership depends on Followers

1940

Korrnan

Criticism
of Fiedler

1950

I960

Figure 1.

Theory Flow Chart for Chapter Two
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This chapter has three purposes.

The brief history of leader-

ship theory presented here will show
the development of leadership

theory and approaches to Organizational
Development to the present.
Today, behavioral science practitioners
are calling for a greater

variety of approaches to OD.

There is a growing need for emphasis on

the particular situation in order to determine
what type of intervention
to use to bring about organizational change.

This chapter will also show the derivation of the
Life Cycle

Theory of leadership.

The Life Cycle Theory, to be fully described in

Chapter Three, is a situational leadership theory which attempts
to
provide a method for diagnosing the situation in an organization so
that a leader can select a leadership style suitable to the needs of

the situation.

This situational theory will be the primary one used to

analyze the cases under consideration in this paper.

Finally, this

chapter will generally provide a theoretical reference for the analyses

of the cases to be presented in this study.

Part One - Leadership As Absolute

Introduction
The concepts of leadership summarized in this section will be

those which are concerned with leadership as absolute; that there is
one best style of leadership which exists independently and which is

always appropriate.

Those believing in a best approach divide them-

selves generally into two schools:

relations approach to leadership.

the traditional and the human
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Leadership is inextricably linked to social systems.

The tradi-

tional approach to leadership which will be described first, was
the

outcome of an autocratic social system that has been extant in the

western world to the time of the industrial revolution.

The human

relations approach to leadership which will be considered next was the

outcome of a democratic-technocratic social system which began with the
industrial revolution and continues today.

Some of the aspects of these

two social systems relevant to the concepts of leadership they produced
are presented in figure

2.

Classical-Traditional
Concept of Leadership

!

1

Human Relations
Concept of Leadership

autocratic social system:
Greek times to industrial
revolution

democrat ic-technocratic
industrial
social system:
revolution to present

society based on class
structure
King-serf
Pope-laity
master-servant
boss-indentured worker

"classless” society

leaders ruled by power,
status, position, wealth,
independent of
education:
followers

leaders rule through
power, status, position
wealth, education
through support of
followers

leaders have control of
life support systems of
hence leaders
followers
unconcerned with socioemotional needs of followers

followers control own
life support systems:
hence leaders concerned
with socio-emotional
needs of followers

:

Figure

2.

Leadership
Traditional and Human Relations Concepts of
Compared to Two Social Systems
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Traditional Leadership Theory
For all recorded history leadership
has been a subject of
concern.

In the western world, from the
Greco-Roman era, leadership

was the province of the male citizen
who, by virtue of sex, status,
education and wealth, held responsibility for
governing.

This hierar-

chical system continued basically unchanged
through the industrial

revolution in Europe and America.

Leaders were men whose leadership

positions were determined by birth and wealth.
Traditional leadership theory, derived from a hierarchical
social system, holds that an organization, whether military,
religious,

educational or industrial, functions best when headed by a strong
and
authoritative leader.

As Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) describe, this

type of leader provides his followers with a detailed description of

their role and function, establishes limited and prescribed communications channels, and directly oversees no more than five or six immediate subordinates.

(See figure 3»)

In this type of organization,

influence is highest at the top, and decreases to none at the lowest
levels.

Departmentalization is viewed positively; the more of it the

better, as it contributes to easier coordination.

resolved by superiors.

Conflicts are

Authority and responsibility rest with the

supreme head, whose influence derives from his position, control of

rewards and punishments, and superior knowledge.
Because of the responsibility and importance of the leadership

position in this heirarchical system, much time was spent in teaching
the sons of priviledged classes the skills and characteristics

considered necessary to good leadership.

And the literature of leader-
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ship, from Cicero to the
193Q’s, largely reflected this
attitude.

Gibb (1959) has summarized the traits
or characteristics of the good
leader which were to be sought for and
emulated. There have been many
hours spent in researching the
characteristics of successful leaders.
However, as Hemphill (1949) points out,
while the results have yielded
a mass of data on the personal qualities
of leaders in many specific

situations, personal qualities common to all
leaders have not been
found.

Figure

3.

Traditional Leadership and Organizational Pattern
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H icnar) Relati ons Leadership
Theory

With the advent of compulsory
mass education, the abolition
of
Child labor, the rise of the
unions with attendant
labor-management
conflicts, the waste of human
resources in industry, and a
rise in

worker apathy and boredom because
of mass production, industry
sought
new ways to achieve high production
output in the face of rapid
change
The efforts of Elton Mayo,
Roethlisberger and Dickson in the
early 30's
to improve production at the
Hawthorne plant of Western Electric,

marked the beginning of the human
relations approach to leadership in
industry.
In Mayo’s 1933 study, the working
conditions of the women who

assembled telephone relays were gradually
Improved; scheduled rest
periods, company lunches and shorter work
weeks were implemented.

As

each of these innovations was introduced,
production in this experimental group increased.

Finally, the researchers removed all of the

improvements, expecting production to drop.
high.

However it rose to a new

The researchers concluded that because of the attention
devoted

to them, these workers felt they were an important part of the
company.

They had developed feelings of affiliation, competence and pride.

Hence

when the improvements in working conditions were removed, they felt the
company was ”in trouble" and made an extra effort in production.
This study signaled the need for management to study and under-

stand relationships among people.

As Hersey and Blanchard (1972) note,

in these studies at the Hawthorne plant and the many that followed, the

most significant factor affecting organizational productivity was found
to be the interpersonal relationships developed on the job.

This led
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to an emphasis on the human
relations approach as the best
style of
leadership. The main tenets of
this approach, as summarized
by

Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) are:
1.

that the participation of the lower
echelons is
secured in solving organizational
problems.

2.

that more openness and trust is fostered
among
individuals and groups in the organization.

In contrast to the traditional approach,
the human relations movement

advocates low structure organizations with widely
shared influence

among members, open confronting methods of
conflict resolution, and a
high state of integration.

A Comparison of the Traditiona l and Human Relations
Approaches

Extensive studies of these two approaches to leadership have
resulted in general agreement among researchers that leadership
concepts
tend to sort themselves into two general categories.

As Bowers and

Seashore (1966) state, one category is concerned with people, and the
other with getting the job done.

The following chart (see figure

)

attempts to summarize the titles for each of these two categories, and
the functions of each of the two types of leaders as seen by several

theoreticians.

The theoreticians include:

Bales (1965), Bowers and

Seashore (1966), Borgatte (I960), Gibb (1959), Homans (1950), Kretch
and Crutchfield (1948), Carter (1954), Leary (1959), Longabaugh (1966),

Shepherd (1964), and Thibaut and Kelly (1959).

A key to the authors

of each title is given under the chart.
After the Mayo study, much time was devoted to comparing these
two types of leadership in an attempt to determine which was the "best".
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In general, the ensuing studies
tended to favor the democratic
people-

oriented approach.

This value judgment may be observed
in the

definitions of traditional leadership in
figure

4.

Several studies

will now be reviewed which show the
development of the research
supporting the viewpoint of the human relations
approach as the best

method

Human Relations Approach to Leade rship:

White and Lippitt

.

The Best Method

Ralph White and Ronald Lippitt (1943)

studied the effects of three leadership styles

—

autocratic, democratic

and la i ??ez-faire -- in a boys' recreational club, and concluded
that a
democratic leadership style was best.

They found that the autocratic

style often created hostility, aggression, including a tendency to
scapegoat, latent discontent, more dependence on the leader and less

individuality

,

and a submissive group cohesiveness characterized by a

"we're all in the same boat" attitude.

The laissez-faire style resulted

in less and poorer work done and was more characterized by play.

The

democratic style created more group-mindedness and more friendliness.

Although the quantity of work was slightly greater under the autocratic
style, work motivation and originality was stronger under the democratic
style.

These findings led White and Lippitt to support the democratic

leadership style as best.
in leadership research.

For the next ten years, this view predominated
It was not until the early fifties that doubts

were raised about the universal applicability of the human relations

approach as the best method of leadership.
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titles
TITLES
Classical q,Ai.)
or
Authoritarian (G)
or
Task Orient.^ (B&S)
or

Hyman Relating
i

Instr unentai-Adam-.i vp (b)
or
Power (L)
or
A.ttainment/Achipvpm p n t

or
Democrat c (C)
or
People Orient (B&S)
or
Integrative-Exnrefr p yr> (b)
or
Interpers onal Affiliate ( L )
or
Sociability (c)

(c)

)

FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONS
goal oriented

production oriented

emphasizes high performance
goals
initiates structure

provides for organizational needs

emphasizes management skills

directs group in solving
problems

represents group in dealing
with outside groups or
situations
introduces new ideas

group oriented

employee oriented
emphasizes group supportive
relationships
initiates consideration

provides for individual needs

emphasizes human relations
skills
assists group in solving
problems
group represents itself
in dealing with outside
groups or situations

encourages new ideas from
group members

has key position in decision making

shares decision making

copes with and exercises
power over social and
physical environment maintains external system

maintains group's inner/
internal system - maintains solidarity among
group members

maintains segregation within
group - sees that communication
between members is kept to a
minimum except insofar as it is
through leader and focussed on
leader

seeks to reinforce and
encourage interpersonal
contacts and communication between group members

emphasizes obedience,
focussed particularly on
leader

seeks to spread responsibility
throughout group and avoid
hierarchical structure, special
priviledge and status

creates and exploits group needs
which create dependence on leader

encourages interdependence

mechanistic

organic

rational emphasis

emotional emphasis

CODE
B - Bales
B&S - Bowers and Seashore
C - Carter

Figure

G - Gibb
L - Leary
L&L - Lawrence and Lorsch

A Comparison of Traditional and Human Relations Approaches to
Leadership
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Eleishrcan and Harris.
1

.

2.

In order to discover:

if the effects of human
relations training were
permanent

how the effects of human relations
training are
influenced by actual work situations

3.

industry

CtiV6neSS ° f hUman relations traini
ng in

Edwin Fleishman, Edwin Harris and
Harold Burtt (1955) conducted a
leadership training program for first line
foremen at International Harvester.
These researchers emerged from their
study skeptical about the human
relations approach to leadership.

Fleishman and Harris’ findings had significant
implications for

advocates of the human relations approach to
leadership.

They discovered

that although there was a general increase in
consideration attitudes on
the part of the foremen immediately after training,
once back at the

plant, there was a significant tendency for the trained
group to be lower
in consideration behavior, and higher in task orientation
than the fore-

men who had not attended the course.
They also discovered that day to day climate was more important
in influencing a foreman's leadership style than the leadership training

program, and concluded that specific training in human relations is

wasted unless the environment in the plant is also strong in human
relations.

Because of this finding, they recommended that behavioral

scientists begin working with leadership attitudes at the top of the

organization so that a favorable leadership climate will spread downward
through the organization.
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Further, they discovered a
conflict between leadership
styles
preferred by bosses for production
efficiency and effective leadership
styles as inferred from the worker's
behavior.
In production oriented
divisions, supervisors saw proficient
foremen as tending toward being

authoritarian.

This leadership style however, was
accompanied by more

absenteeism, accidents, grievances, and
employee turnover.

The workers

however, tended not to like working for
authoritarian foremen and

preferred foremen with a people-oriented
leadership style.

On the

basis of this finding, Fleishman and Harris
questioned the assumption
that good morale leads to increased production.

After their study, Fleishman and Harris doubted
the universal

effectiveness of the purely human relations leadership
style, and seemed
to be reaching toward a best style that would combine
the task oriented

(traditional) approach and the relationships oriented (human relations)

approach.

Perhaps, they suggested, a foreman or supervisor who can be

both high in task and high in consideration may be able to reconcile this
conflict; however, more research, they concluded, would be needed to

clarify this.

Such research was in fact being conducted at the Institute

for Social Research at the University of Michigan, during the same period

of time in which Fleishman and Harris were conducting their study.
Likert

.

In 1947 the Institute for Social Research at the

University of Michigan began investigations into the field of leadership
to discover what organizational structures, principles, and methods of

leadership result in "the best performance."

For fourteen years Director

Rensis Likert and his colleagues investigated the factors correlating to
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high productivity and the
factors correcting to low
productivity
figure 5.)

(See

In 1961 Likert found that
productivity depends not on
employee
morale, but on how well supervisors
perform their leadership function.

He also found that effective
managers are characterized by
cooperative,
people-oriented attitudes, and an ability
to create a situation in which
employees establish high performance
goals for themselves. His basic
components of effective leadership were:
1.

human relations orientation

2.

ability to bring about compatability of
organizational and individual goals

3*

ability to create high performance goals.

Likert (1961) incorporated these findings
into four systems of
management:
3)

1) exploitive authoritative, 2)

benevolent authoritative,

consultative, and 4) participative group.

He posited that system

four, Participative Management, is the most effective.

System One:

Exploitive Authoritative

This management system assumes that labor is largely a
market commodity, with time freely sold and purchased.
It conceives of the manager's job as consisting of
dfiC i siQn direction and surveillance relies primarily
upon coercion as a motivating force, and makes little or
no provision for the effects of human emotion and interdependence. As a result, communication in this system is
sluggish, largely downward in direction, and frequently
distorted. Goals are established and decisions made by
top management only, based upon fragmentary, often
inaccurate and inadequate information. This produces
disparity between the desires and interests of the
members and the goals of the organization. For these
reasons, only high levels of the organization feel any
real responsibility for the attainment of established
objectives. Their reliance upon coercion as a motivating
force leads to an almost total absence of cooperative
>

,

T
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High Productivity

supervisor is employee
oriented; concentrates on
building work group with
high performance goals
reasonable pressure

LOW Product ivit-y

supervisor concentrates
on task and production

unreasonable pressure
conflict between employees
and supervisors

supervisor makes objectives
clear to subordinates, and
gives them freedom to do job
excessively routine job
favorable attitude of
employees to supervisor,
working conditions, compensation and work itself.

employees free to set own
work pace, but onlv in
situation of frequent contact
and interaction between
employee, colleagues and
supervisor

manager skilled in using
group methods to create
employee motivation
goals of work group consistent with goals of
organization

goals of work groups counter
to goals of organization

work groups have high
peer-group loyalty
good communication between
employees, and employees
and supervisors

Figure 5.

poor communication between
employees and employees
and supervisors

Likert's Factors Correlating to High and Low Productivity
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k n<j mutual infl uence and
to a quite low true
ahiTT?v
? superiors to
jabiiity of
exercise control in the work
Uatl n,
SSatiSfaCtion is P reval ent, with sub? ,
J^
i
servient
attitudes
toward superiors, hostility toward
peers, and contempt for subordinates.
Performance is
usually mediocre, with high costs,
excessive absence,
and substantial manpower turnover.
Quality is maintained
only by extensive surveillance and
a great deal of
rework [p. 223-233].
4.

—Benevolent

System Two:

Authori ta t vp

This management system assumes that labor
is a market
commodity but an imperfect one: Once purchased,
it is
susceptible to periodic emotional and interpersonal
interferences". Consequently, to decision direction
anc* -SUrveillanCQ it adds a fourth managerial
duty:
expurging the annoying affect of subordinate members.
This fact permits some small amount of upward and
lateral communication, although most is downward,
and
sizeable distortion usually exists. Policies are
established and basic decisions made by upper management,
some times with opportunity for comment from subordinate
supervisory levels. Some minor implementation decisions
may be made at lower levels, but only within the carefully prescribed limits set by the top echelon.
Managerial personnel, therefore, usually feel responsibility for attaining the assigned objectives, whereas rankand-file members usually feel little or none. Very
little cooperative teamwork exists, and superiors at
lower echelons are able to exercise only moderate true
control in the work situation. Attitudes toward
superiors are subservient, and hostility is prevalent
toward peers, but the absence of open contempt toward
subordinates makes dissatisfaction less intense.
Performance may be fair to good, although high costs,
absence, and manpower turnover frequently occur [p. 223,

,

2333.

Sy.stem Three:

Cons ultative

This management system does not assume labor to be a
market commodity. It still reserves to the manager the
tasks of decision and direction but removes surveillance
as a major function. Little recourse to coercion occurs.
In their places recognition of the frequently disruptive
effects of human emotion is expanded to include employee
involvement through consultation. This practice encourages
a moderate amount of valid upward communication, although
lateral communication is limited by the prevalence of man,

,
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n ther than group, decision-making.
!

Comnunlcation
is, therefore, usually
accurate and only occasionallv
th ls ’ bPOad
are
made
^de at
a'tihe
the top, but specific
f
objectives to implement
these policies are entrusted to
lower managers for
consuitatiye decision-making. For all
these reasons a
substantial proportion of the members
of the organization

feel responsibie for attaining
established objectives,
and the system makes use of most
positive motivational
orces, except those which would
otherwise arise from
group processes. Some dissatisfaction
may exist, but
normally satisfaction is moderately high,
with only some
degree of hostility expressed toward peers,
some
condescension toward subordinates. Performance
is
ordinarily good; costs, absence, and turnover
moderate;
and quality problems no cause for major
concern [p. 223^33 J •

Sygtem Fopp:

Participative Group

This management system assumes that employees are
essential parts of an organizational structure which
has been built at great cost and necessarily maintained
with the same attention and care given more tangible
assets.
It conceives of decision as a process, rather
than a prerogative, with the manager's responsibility
consisting, not of himself deciding, but of making
sure that the best possible decisions result. In this
light, he focuses his efforts upon building an overlapping structure of cohesive, highly motivated,
participative groups, coordinated by multiple memberships.
Within this highly coordinated and motivated
system, characterized by high mutual confidence and
trust, communication is adequate, rapid and accurate.
Because goals are established and decisions made with
the participation of all those affected, objectives
are comparatively closely aligned with the needs and
interests of all members, and all motivational forces
push in the direction of obtaining the established
objectives. The closely knit system in addition
permits superiors and subordinates alike to exercise
great control over the work situation. Employees at
all levels are highly satisfied, but without
complacency, and feel great reciprocal respect and
trust.
Performance is very good; costs absence and
turnover are low; and high quality is the natural
concern of all [p. 223-2331.
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Likert's conclusions place him in
the camp of those who advocate
a best style of leadership. His
system of Participative Management
suggests that he supports the democratic,
human relations approach as
the best method of management, although
he notes this as an ideal.

Likert seems to suggest that before attaining
the ideal of system four

Participative Management, the manager would
have to practice a certain

amount of task-oriented leadership behavior
in order to bring about
compatability of organizational and individual
goals.

However, it

remained for researchers Blake and Mouton to make
the final step towards

stating that the best style of leadership was one
that combined a high

concern for task and a high concern for people.
B la ke and Mouton *

While Likert was carrying out his studies at

the University of Michigan, Robert Blake and Jane Mouton were
researching types of leadership styles at the University of Texas.

Drawing

upon the work of John Hemphill (1949), and the work of other Ohio State

University researchers, in 1964 they published the "Management Grid",
a theoretical model which supports "team" leadership (high concern for

task and high concern for people) as the best style of leadership.

Rather than seeing leadership as an either-or proposition,

either authoritarian or democratic, they plotted concern for production
on one axis, and concern for people on another.

(See figure 6.)

was expressed in a nine point scale from low (1) to high (9).

Each

The

manner in which the two concerns intertwine would define a leader's
style.

They concentrated on analyzing the assumptions of a leader at

each of the four corners (the extremes) and at the mid-point.
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High

9

8

1-9 Management
Country Club
Leader

9-9 Management
Team
Leader

7
6

5-5 Management
Middle of the Hoad Leader

5
4
3

2

Low

1

1-1 Management
Impoverished
Leader

9-1 Management

Autocratic
Leader

1

7

Low

9

High

Figure

Ihe

8

9-1 Style:

6.

The Management Grid

Nice guys finigh iaafc

A leader assumes that

.

people are instruments of production; he heavily
emphasizes tasks and
job requirements, one to one relationships with
his subordinates,
obedience, supresses conflict and minimizes human
relations.
The

3.-9

—

Style:

Nj.ce

guv's don't fight

.

A "big brother" leader

who encourages people to work; he expects them, because of
loyalty and
acceptance, to turn out some work to avoid trouble; empliasizes the group

as the key unit; encourages friendliness and harmony.

—Dor^t make waves

T h£.. i-1 Style:

.

The leader exerts minimum

effort, shows little concern for production or people, passes blame

along, carries messages between layers of the organization, and rarely

initiates criticism except for self defense.
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5-5 StYl»:

Let's yotP on

it

.

The leader seeks to maintain

balance; emphasizes people as
much as production, communicates
with
subordinates but censors information;
tends to develop two counterbalancing systems— formal and informal;
holds meetings to hear suggestions and convey to people a sense
that they have a hand in making

decisions.

Ihe

9 ~ 9 st yl e:

—

Lfi.t'9

get involved.

The leader utilizes the

capacities of himself and subordinates for
creative thinking and
problem-solving; uses goal setting; exhibits a
high concern for people

and production; involves those responsible in
work planning and
execution; emphasizes the organization as the key
unit; creates

commitment in subordinates to have a stake in the
outcome through
interdependent effort.
Blake and Mouton began their book with a statement that
seems
to imply a situational approach to leadership; however, their
concluding

remarks show a resounding preference for the 9-9 style which places
them with those who promote "a best style".

Managerial styles based on 9-1 (direction with
compliance), 5-5 (conformity with compromise),
1-9 (security and comfort through convenience),
1-1 (acquiescence and complacency, or ’clever’
but corrupt facades) are, at best, second best.
Actually they are quite unacceptable, long term.
In comparison with 9-9* s condition of candid
communication based on conviction and commitment
which results in creativity, other bases for work
relations seem to fall short.... 9-9 defines a
trend leading to maturity and relationships among
men toward which production organizations seem to
be evolving [p. 318].
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Concl usion:

No On^ Best Shy ]

As we have seen, the study of
leadership passed through several
stages.

First it was studied as qualities
in individuals.

Many
writers stressed specific qualities
in an individual's behavior which

could be identified as leadership.

This focus was in keeping with the

views of leadership stemming from earliest
times, that leaders are born,
not made, and must therefore possess special
qualities in common.

At

the same time, society held the traditional
view that the best style of

leadership was paternalistic, task oriented, and
authoritative.
After it had been proven that there were no qualities,
characteristics, or traits common to all successful leaders,
many

writers attempted to establish leadership as a behavioral
continuum
from autocratic to democratic.

Beginning in the 30' s, theoreticians

supported the democratic or human relations approach as the best style

of leadership.
However, research began to show that leadership was not an

either-or proposition.

When the task leader showed high scores on task

attitudes and behaviors, he or she did not always score low on socioemotional attitudes and behaviors.

This indicated that task and

relationships behaviors were probably independent variables; not two
ends of one continuum, but two separate factors entirely.

A leader

could be high in both, low in both, or high in one and low in the
other.

Based on this, some researchers, such as Blake and Mouton,

suggested that the best leader was high on both the task and relationships scales.
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However, other
theoreticians who adopted
a more relativistic
viewpoint, began to
conclude that leadership
was not an independent
entity, existing on its
own.
It was, on the co„t
ra ry, linked to the
followers and the situation
in which th*
he leader was operating.
In 1949
Hemphill had stated:

support

thecontenti™lSlL^cteSst^ftralt3)

St
r
3
sit2?Ion
t

T
maTL at"m rtoX
sSS

related
V r

“

SOme way t0

\he1ScLr:i^S“ gat0 3
e a
luded °° nCe ™ ing
wtet^ctorrarrrel^ted
reiated t0
to what
wh^t “£;
leader [p. 10],

'’

behaviors of the

Some researchers, such as
Hemphill, came to the conclusion
that
there was no one -best style"
of leadership, but rather
that leadership
is situational in nature.
The nature of the followers,
and the environment in which the leader and
followers are interacting, become
important
factors in the study of leadership.
Part Two of this chapter will show
the development of situational
leadership theory, by presenting a
brief

chronological description of the work of
some key situational theorists.
Part Two - Leadership As Situational

Introduction
In an autocratic society, the leader's
ability to influence

rested upon the leader, by virtue of "divine right",
birth, or money.
In a democratic society leadership becomes "a
function of the leader’s

personality and the social system in interaction (Gibb,
1959,

p.

917)."

Followers become important because of their influence upon decision
making, an influence they did not possess in an autocratic society.
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In a democratic system, the
leader must accomplish objectives

not only through people, but with
people.

Leadership thus becomes a

process in which the leader attempts
to influence others to achieve

certain goals (Gibb, 1959; Hersey 4
Blanchard, 1972).

Since people are

different, by virtue of education, ability
and personality, no ana

leadership style will be effective in influencing
all people.

Thus a

leadership style must be considered as it relates
to the situation at
hand.

As Gibb (1959) states:
It is important for the use we can make of
our
resources and of our groups that we recognize

authoritarianism and democracy as poles of a
continuum neither of which is wholly good or
wholly bad, but which represent extremes of a
variable "leadership technique" that should be
adapted to all the elements of the situation
[p. 911].

Faced with a new field to explore

—

the situation

cians turned their attention to new questions:

—

theoreti-

what were the important

factors in the situation that had a bearing on leadership style?

What

was the relationship between effective leadership style and the
situation?

How could this be determined?

It was to these, and related

questions, that the following researchers in situational leadership

addressed themselves.

Hemphill

:

Leadership Depends Upon the Group Situation

John Hemphill, one of the early researchers of situational
leadership, carried out his investigations during the 40' s at Ohio

State University.

His studies were among the first of a number to

become known as the Ohio State Leadership Studies.

Blake and Mouton,

who have been previously discussed, drew heavily upon his research.
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Hemphill was not concerned with
discovering which leadership
style was best
authoritarian, democratic or some
point in between
but with what causes a leader
to be seen as excellent,
fair or poor.
Starting with the hypothesis that
the leader is inextricably bound
to

-

-

the group situation, Hemphill
focussed his investigations on the
relationship between leader behavior
and group situation.

Hemphill first devised a questionnaire
that would describe a

group according to fifteen dimensions
on a scale of one to nine.

He

then developed a questionnaire by which
group members could judge the

adequacy of the leader’s behavior as "high"
(excellent or good), or
"low" (fair or poor).

His assumption was that if there was a
high

degree of correspondence between the behavior
demanded by the group

situation and the leader’s behavior, then the leader
would be judged to
be excellent.

But if there was no correspondence, the leader would
be

judged to be poor.

Hemphill's assumption was borne out.

After analysing 500

questionnaires, he found that leaders were seen as effective or ineffective, adequate or inadequate, depending on the nature of the group.

Hemphill was one of the first to open the doors to future research into
the nature of the relationship between leader behavior and the situation.

A Contingency Theory of Leadership

Fiedler:

The research of Fred Fiedler at the University of Illinois has
spanned more than fifteen years.

In his early work, Fiedler and his

associates attempted to identify the factors underlying group effectiveness.

The results of this early research (1958) showed that group

Performance could not be
predicted on tne
the basis °f
of leadership
„
alone,
only when three other
factors were considered:
,

1-

the group's socio-metric
structure

2.

the leader-keyman
relationship

3.

the demands of the
task

Fiedler-S later research
investigated the relationship
between
the leader s attributes,
group performance and
the situation. The
basic hypothesis underlying
his research was that
the leadership style
required for effective group
perforce depended upon the degree
to
Which the group situation
was favorable or
unfavorable to the leader.
In order to test his
hypothesis, he developed the
Contingency

Model of leadership (Fiedler,
1964

,

p.

164 ).

(See figure 7.)

The three factors influencing
the situation are arranged
along the
horizontal axis of the model,
from conditions which are
favorable for
the leader (1) to conditions
which are very unfavorable
for the leader
(8).
Fiedler had identified six factors
in a situation likely to
affect a leader’s influence on a
group:

1

‘

t e eader ’ s
orp 4the group

i

j^sonal relations with members

2-

the mwer and authority which the
leader’s
position provides

3*

the degree of structure in the task
the relative abilities of the leader and
the

members
5.

the member’s mo ti vat inn

6.

the extent to which the group is operating
under conditions of external stress
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In his investigations
Fiedler found that the first
three of these factors
were the most important situational
variables. The vertical axis
of the
model measures the leader's
attributes, from the active,
controlling,

high task leader (Low LPC) to the
passive, permissive, high relationihips
leader (High LPC). It also shows group
performance.

Through the use of this model, Fiedler
concluded that:

1) a

high task leader is associated with high
group performance when the

situation is either highly favorable or
unfavorable to the leader, and
2) a more lenient or high relationships
leader is associated with high

group performance when the situation is moderately
favorable or

moderately unfavorable.
In the light of these results, Fiedler
(1967) suggested that

leadership training should focus on giving an individual
methods to
diagnose their group- task situation, and adapt the situation to
their

particular style of leadership.

Fiedler argued that matching the

situation to the individual would be more successful than trying to
train a person to develop a flexible leadership style and adapt their
style to the situation.

Criticism of Fiedler’s theory

.

Fiedler's work has inspired

many researchers to replicate and attempt to verify his studies, and
many to criticize his theories.

Korman (1971) criticised the fact that

Fiedler's research was carried out in laboratory environments only
remotely relevant to those of organizations.
the contingency approach in general

—

He expressed doubt about

"While intuitively appealing, it

has yet to be shown to be of value in the study of organizational leader-
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ship [p. 129]"

— and

took issue with Fiedler's "static" contingency

approach which Korman felt did not take into consideration
the possible
value of changing people to fit the situation.
While Hemphill focussed on the leader in relation to the group,

and Fiedler on the relationships of leadership style and situation to

group performance, Lawrence and Lorsch concentrated on the organization
in relation to the situation.

LavirenQe and Lorsch:

A Systems Approach to Organizational Effectiveness

The research of Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch (1967) attempted
to answer the question "What organizational characteristics are

required to deal effectively with external market and technological

conditions"?

After studying ten organizations intensively, they

concluded that in order to be effective in today's rapidly changing
society, 1) an organization has to be able to successfully integrate

the functions of many different departments within it, and 2) must have

many different leaders to carry out different roles.
Each department of an organization will have a different
structure, interpersonal orientation, time orientation and goal orientation.

Each department must relate inwardly to the other departments of

the organization and the management of the organization, and outwardly

to the social environment in which the organization operates.

These

complex relationships of integration and differentiation are illustrated
in the following chart.*

(See figure B.)

Planning
*Chart developed by J. Ferrie, Department of Educational
Massachusetts.
and Management, University of
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Lawrence and Lorsch also concluded
that multiple leadership
will
be required in an organization
today; many leaders will be
responsible
for decisions of -great consequence".
As well, several different
leadership roles will be required: the
innovative, risk-taking leader,
the
traditional routine leader, the integrator,
and at the top, the formulators.

The formula tors are the most
important leaders who will need

integrative creative capacities in order
to formulate "frameworks of
purpose" to "guide the efforts of the
parts of the organization".

The management style required for
organizational effectiveness
in any area depends on many factors:

the department of the organization,

its structure, its interpersonal orientation,
its time orientation, its

goal orientation, and its degree of certainty.

Lorsch and Sheldon (1972)

conclude that no one management style is appropriate to
all situations:
What style of management will facilitate subsystem
performance depends on the other inputs to the
system [p. 169 ].
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Fjjrris and Lim:

The Followers Affect Leader Behavior

Some researchers examined leadership as being determined by the
followers.

Aaron Lowin and James Craig (1968) conducted a laboratory

study to test the hypothesis that group productivity influences leadership style.

They found that fourteen out of sixteen "supervisors"

behaved in a high task, low relationships style when faced with a non-

productive "employee", and twelve out of sixteen "supervisors" behaved
in a high relationships low task style when faced with a highly

productive "employee"
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Figure 8. Differentiation - Integration Chart
KEY
1 -

Structure (a) span of control
(b) number of levels to a shared superior
(c) tine span of review
(d) specificity of review
(e) importance of formal rules
(f) criteria for evaluation

2 - Interpersonal Orientation (a) primary concern for task
(b) primary concern for social

relationships
5 of total time used working on
activities affeetin; organisation's profits
within, a specific time period.

3.- Time Orientation Estimate of

4

5

'

/SSftrJ

- Goal Orientation criteria which managers night consider in making
decisions relevant to product and process
innovation.

_ Certain. tv (a) rate of change of conditions over time in
subenvirorment
(b) certainty of information about conditions in the
subenvironnent at any particular time
(c) rate of feedback

S-/
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Following the same line of investigation,
George Farris and

Francis Lim (1969) found that leaders
who were told their groups were
highly productive were perceived as
behaving in a high relationships
style, more so than leaders who were told
their groups were low

producing.

Both of these studies re-confirmed that leadership
style and
follower behavior are inter-dependent, and raised the
possibility that

leadership style is a consequence of follower performance.

Conclusions:

— eadership

is Situational

Researchers who began with the assumption that effective leadership is relative to the situation spent much time attempting to

determine what the important factors in the situation were that had a
bearing on leadership.
advanced.

A wealth of situational factors have been

For Hemphill, it was the nature of the group and the nature

of the leader.

For Fiedler, it was the nature of the leader, the

leader-man ber relations, the leader's power and authority, the nature

of the task, the abilities of the leader and the members, the members'
motivation, and the amount of environmental stress.

For Lawrence and

Lorsch, it was all of these, plus the structure of any department in
the organization, its interpersonal orientation, time orientation, goal

orientation, and the relationship of the organization to its environment.

For Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, it was the productivity of

the followers.

These many situational factors can be contained in

three general categories:

"leader", "follower" and "other" (including

the organization, the environment, time, task, superiors and associates).
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While there has been general agreement
on key situational
factors, there are many different
theories as to what the relationship
is between effective leadership and
the situation.

several hypotheses;

Hemphill advanced

Fiedler suggests his Contingency Theory;
Lawrence

and Lorsch put forward their Integration-Differentiation
Theory.

The

Life Cycle Theory of Leadership, to be described
in Chapter Three, is
a situational theory which suggests that the
relationship between

effective leadership and the situation lies in adapting
leader style to
follower "maturity".
This chapter has presented a brief overview of leadership
theory, showing the development of the two main streams of thought within this body of theory:

school.

the one best style school, and the situational

In so doing, this chapter has provided a background for the

Life Cycle Theory, and a theoretical reference for the analyses of the
cases to be presented in this paper.
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CHAPTER

III

THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY OF LEADERSHIP

Introduction

This chapter will describe the Life Cycle
Theory of leadership.

Chapter Four will compare the Life Cycle Theory
to the previously
discussed situational leadership theories of Hemphill,
Lowin and Craig,

Farris and Lim, Fiedler, and Lawrence and Lorsch.

Through this compar-

ison, the components of the analytic framework will be
selected.

will be used to analyze the cases presented in this paper.

They

The analytic

framework will encompass all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory,

and some additional variables from related situational concepts.

Through applying this analytic framework to the cases under consideration, we hope to demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the

Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method for determining the most

appropriate leadership style in any given organizational situation.

The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model

The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972)
is an outgrowth of the Ohio State Leadership Studies.

The various

theories contributing to the Life Cycle Theory are illustrated in
figure

9.

The work of Hemphill, Blake and Mouton, and the Ohio State

Leadership Studies have already been described.

This section will
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Figure

9.

Derivations of the Life Cycle Theory
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Leadership Studies have already been
described.

This section will

briefly describe the Tri-Dimensional
Leader Effectiveness Model
(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972) and the
theories of Reddin, Argyris, and
McClelland as they contribute to the
Life Cycle Theory.
The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness
Model formulated by

Hersey and Blanchard (1972) is based
upon the Ohio State Leadership

Studies and the work of William Reddin
(1967).

The Ohio State

University researchers identified two fundamental
dimensions of leader
behavior:

"initiating structure" and "consideration".

These were

defined by Fleishman and Peters (1962) as follows:

Initiating Structure (S) reflects the extent to which
an individual is likely to define and structure his
role and those of his subordinates toward goal attainment [p. 130],

Cons ide ration (C): reflects the extent to which an
individual is likely to have job relationships characterized by mutual trust, respect for subordinates'
ideas, and consideration of their feelings [p. 130].

Results of these studies showed that leadership was not univariate but
bivariate.

Thus, the researchers plotted "initiating structure" and

"consideration" behavior on two separate axis at midpoint, they

created four quadrants which showed four combinations of "initiating
structure" and "consideration" behavior.

See figure 10.

The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model uses the Ohio

State Leadership quadrants (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p.74), two axis
"task behavior" (for "initiating structure") and "relationships
behavior" (for "consideration").

Hersey and Blanchard (1972) define

"task" and "relationships" behavior as follows:

High

High
Consideration
and
Low
Structure

High
Structure
and
High
Consideration

Low
Structure
and
Low
Consideration

High
Structure
and
Low
Consideration

Consideration

Low

Initiating Structure

Figure 10

Ohio State Leadership Quadrants

High
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Task Behavior. The extent to which a leader
is
likely to organize and define the roles of
individuals
and group members by explaining what activities
members are to do as well as when, where and how
tasks are to be accomplished.
It is further characterized by the extent to which the leader defines
patterns of organization, formalizes channels of
communication and specifies ways of getting jobs
accomplished [p. 83].
Relationships Behavior
The extent to which the leader
develops personal relationships between him or herself
and individuals or group members; the amount of
socioemotional support and psychological strokes
provided by the leader for members, as well as the
extent to which the leader engages in interpersonal
communication and facilitating behaviors [p. 83].
.

The four quadrants of the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model
(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p. 82) are illustrated in figure 11.

Attempting to integrate the concepts of leader style with the

situational demands of a specific environment, Hersey and Blanchard

added an effectiveness dimension to the two dimensional model shown in
figure 11 and created the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model

(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p. 84) illustrated in figure 12.

In doing

so, they drew upon the 3-D Management Theory of William J. Reddin

(1967) whom, they state, "was the first to add an effectiveness

dimension to the task and relationships dimensions of earlier models
[p. 83]."

Hersey and Blanchard define a leader's style as "the

behavior pattern he exhibits when he is involved in directing the

activities of others [p. 82]."

If a leader's style is appropriate to

a given situation, they term it effective.
it ineffective.

If inappropriate, they term

The effectiveness dimension is not however, an either-

or situation, but one, they believe, that should be represented as a
continuum, since effectiveness is a matter ot degree.
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High

High Relationships
and
Low Task

High Task
and
High Relationships

Low Task
and
Low Relationships

High Task
and
Low Relationships

Behavior

Relationships

Bow

Task Behavior

Figure 11.

The Four Basic Leader Behavior
Styles of the Tri-Dimensional
Leader Effectiveness Model

High
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Model

Effectiveness

Leader

ional

Tri-Dimens

The

12.

Figure
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The Tri-Dimensional Leader
Effectiveness Model combines the Ohio
State Leadership concepts and Reddin’
s effectiveness concept into
one

situational model.

However, there are differences between
the Leader

Effectiveness Model and Reddin’ s Model.

Unlike the Managerial Grid (a

two dimensional Model), the Tri-Dimensional
Model does not depict a

single ideal leadership style as being appropriate
in all situations,
but suggests that any leadership style is
effective or ineffective

depending on whether it is appropriate or inappropriate
to the situation.

Hersey and Blanchard (1969) further explain that the
Leader Effectiveness Model is behavioral, does not contain value laden labels,
is

concerned with leadership, and emphasizes both intervening and output
variables, while Reddin' s Model is attitudinal, contains evaluative
labels, is concerned with management, and emphasizes only output

variables.

The Maturity Continuum in the Life Cycle Model

If effective leadership depends upon a leader behaving appro-

priately in a given situation, the question becomes 'how can a leader
judge the situation so as to know which leadership style to use'?

The

Life Cycle Theory of Leadership attempts to address this problem by

adding a maturity continuum to the Tri-Dimensional Model.

In so doing,

Hersey and Blanchard attempt to relate task behavior, relationships
behavior and maturity, in order "to provide a leader with some understanding of the relationships between an effective style of leadership

and the level of maturity of his followers [p. 134]".

Maturity of the

followers is shown on the continuum
drawn below the four quadrants.
This continuum, proceeding from
low to high maturity, right
to left,
is divided into three sections:

below average maturity on the
right,

average maturity in the centre, and
above average maturity on the left.
Figure 13 illustrates Hersey and
Blanchard's Life Cycle Theory of
Leadership Model (1972,

p.

135).

Argyris’ Definition of Maturity

In defining maturity, Hersey and Blanchard
drew upon the

theories of Chris Argyris (1957) and David C. McClelland
(1953, 1961,
1965, 1966).

Argyris’ developmental stages leading to maturity, and

McClelland's theory of achievement motivation will be briefly
described,
and related to the maturity continuum in Life Cycle Theory.

Argyris (1957, p. 49) describes seven developmental trends of
people in North American culture.

He states that human beings in our

culture tend to develop:
1.

from a state of passivity as infants to a state
of activity as adults

2.

from a state of dependence upon others as
infants, to a state of relative independence
as adults

3.

from being capable of behaving only in a few
ways as an infant, to being capable of
behaving in many different ways as an adult

4.

from having erratic, casual, shallow, quicklydropped interests as an infant, to having deeper
interests as an adult

5.

from having a short time perspective as an
infant, to a much longer time perspective as
an adult
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Effective Styles

High

Low

4-

Task Behavior

j^High

\

Mature

above
average

Figure 13*

average

below
average

Life Cycle Theory of Leadership Model

Immature
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6.

from being in a subordinate
position in the
family and society as an infant,
to aspiring
to occupy an equal and/ or
superordinate
position relative to their peers

7.

from a lack of awareness of self as
an infant
to an awareness of and control over
self as

an

adult.

These are seven dimensions of the growth of
the individual towards
self-actualization.

He further notes that when an individual
is

expressing needs related to the adult end of each
developmental
continua

,

that individual is approaching maturity.

McClelland's Defin ition of Achievement Motivation

David C. McClelland (1953, 1961, 1965, 1966) has identified
seven characteristics of people with high "n Ach" (needs to achieve).
Risk-Taking.

In the area of risk-taking, those with high

achievement motivation take moderate, calculated risks, not high or
low risks.

As well, the goals they set are moderately difficult, but

potentially achievable (McClelland, 1966,

p.

212).

The attraction of

the moderately risky situation for the person with high n Ach is that
the outcome depends more clearly on the person's skill.

The greater preference that subjects with high n Ach
have for situations involving moderate risk in all
likelihood appears only when they have some chance
of influencing the outcome through their own skills
and abilities (McClelland, 1961, p. 214).

Creative Problem Solving

.

Highly achievement motivated people

do not do well at routine jobs, but prefer "nonroutine tasks that

require some degree of personal initiative, or even inventiveness for

solution (McClelland, 1961, p. 216)".

Such people are always setting

49

challenges for themselves, tasks
that make them stretch
themselves a
little (McClelland, 1966, p.
259).
Argyrls too, mentions the search
for challenge in connection with
his fourth developmental stage
of
shallow, quickly-dropped interests to
deeper interests.

Expanding on

this stage, he notes that
the mature state is characterized by
an endless series
where the reward comes from doing
something for its own sake (Argyris,
1957, p. 50).

01 challenges

,

Positive _Attitude

.

McClelland discovered that people with high

n Ach tend to have a positive even
overconfident attitude toward the

probability of their being successful, even when there
are no facts to
justify their estimates.

(McClelland, 1961, p. 222).

He feels that

this attitude is based upon the person's conviction
that "he can modify
the outcome of an uncertain situation by his own personal
achievements
[p. 224]."

Goals.

People with high n Ach "think ahead" more.

They tend

to deal more often with the remote future (McClelland, 1961, p.
237).

Once set upon accomplishing a goal, McClelland found that those who are
highly motivated to achieve will work just as hard for a group goal as

an individual goal.

Public recognition is not the key motivating

factor, but rather
the achievement satisfaction arises from having
initiated the action that is successful, rather
than from public recognition for an individual
accomplishment [McClelland, 1961, p. 226].

Personal Accomplishment

.

People with high n Ach appear to work

harder only when there is a chance that personal efforts will make a

difference in the outcome (McClelland, 1961,

p.

226).

Personal achieve-
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incentive to the person who
is highly

achieved

motivated.

This incentive becomes stronger
when "winning" at the task
can be interpreted as a
personal achievement
(McClelland, 1961,

F eedback

.

p.

216).

People, who are highly motivated
to achieve, prefer

to work in situations in which
they get concrete feedback
on how well
they are doing.
A business executive, or
salesman would be in such a

situation; a teacher would not,
(McClelland, 1966, p. 259).

McClelland

found that those with high n Ach
perform significantly better when they

have positive and definite feedback on
how well they are doing.

-oney

*

Pe °P!e with high n Ach cannot be
motivated by money

alone; in fact, they have been found by
McClelland not to be much

influenced by money rewards (McClelland,
1961,

p.

235).

Money is the

measure of success, and those who are highly
achievement motivated
want it primarily as a symbol of higher achievement.
Given the theory developed by Argyris and McClelland above,

Hersey and Blanchard (1972) formulate a definition of maturity.

Their

definition however, is restricted to task relevant subordinate
behaviors, and is defined as being a function of the following

variables:
1.

achievement motivation

2.

the willingness and ability to take
responsibility

3.

task relevant education and experience of
an individual or a group [p. 134].

In this definition, age may be a factor, but it is not directly

related to maturity as used in Life Cycle Theory.

Figure 14 illustrates

the relationship between Argyris’ description of maturity, McClellands'
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ARGYRIS

McClelland

CHARACTERISTICS OF MATURE
PEOPLE
1

.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATED PEOPLE

active
independent
capable of behaving in
deep interests
long time perspective
occupies equal or
superordinate position
relative to peers
awareness and control
over self

1

.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

take moderate, calculated
risks
positive, even overconfident attitudes to
success
prefer concrete feedback
on how well they are doing
prefer nonroutine,
challenging jobs
deal with long term goals
motivated by personal

achievement
money a measure of success,
not a motivator in itself

HERSEY AND BLANCHARD

DEFINITION OF MATURITY
1

Figure 14.

.

achievement motivation

2.

willingness and ability
to take responsibility

3.

task relevant education
and experience of an
individual or a group

Relationship Between Argyris' Maturity
Characteristics, McClelland's Characteristics
of the Achievement Motivated Person, and Hersey
and Blanchard's Definition of Maturity

achievement motivation theory, and
Hersey and Blancterd's
definition
of maturity.

Reviewing again briefly the Life Cycle
Theory of Leadership

Model (figure 13), we recall that this
model attempts to relate task
behavior, relationships behavior and maturity
of followers.

We have

reviewed the derivation and development of
the four quadrants in the
model.

These represent four combinations of task and
relationships

behavior:
1.

Quadrant One:

high task - low relationships

2.

Quadrant Two:

high task - high relationships

3*

Quadrant Three:

4.

Quadrant Four:

high relationships - low task
low task - low relationships

As well, the derivation and components of the continuum

representing the maturity of the followers has been discussed.

The

continuum is generally divided into above average, average, and below

average maturity, in order to provide some bench marks for degree of
maturity.

Maturity is defined as achievement motivation, the willing-

ness and ability to take responsibility, and task relevant education

and experience.
The curve superimposed over the four quadrants is a graphic

illustration of distribution of leader styles.

Hersey and Blanchard

suggest that the majority of leader styles fall within quadrants two
and three; that is, most people practice a leadership style falling
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between quadrant two, bigb
relationships - high task,
and quadrant
three, high relationships
- low task, while
fewer people practice
leader styles at the extreme
of the curve: quadrat
one, high task low relationships, and
quadrant four, low task low relationships.
Life Cycle Theory postulates
that when working with
people of
below average maturity in
relation to a particular task
in a particular
situation, a high task - low
relationships style (quadrant
one) has
the best probability of
success.
In dealing with people
of average
maturity, the high task, high
relationships style (q^drant two)
and
the high relationships, low
task style (quadrant three)
appear to be
most appropriate. Quadrant four,
the low task, low relationships

style has the highest probability
of success with people of above
average maturity.
Based on the inconsistancies in the
theory and research on

leadership evident in the previous chapter,
Hersey and Blanchard have
formulated a position which attempts to
explain and account for these
inconsistancies.

Ihey draw examples from a variety of
situations,

including parent-child relationships, a military
setting in the far
north, teacher-student relationships in a college
setting,

administrator-trustee relationships, and administrator- faculty
relationships, to illustrate their thesis that effective leadership
style varies

with the maturity of the followers.
As a child matures, it is appropriate for the parent to increase

socioemotional support and decrease structure; research personnel working
on the DEW line responded poorly to a high task-low relationships leader-
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ship style— a low task-low relationships
style would have been more
appropriate for them in light of their
education and experience. So
too, unstructured programs do not
succeed universally with all students;

for those with clear goals and objectives,
they are advantageous.

For

students who lack self-direction and ability
to structure their own work
schedule, a low-task-low relationships teaching
style can be detrimental.

With these, and other examples, Hersey and Blanchard
support
their contention that structured task behavior is
appropriate for working with people of below average maturity.

If one's followers progress

from below average to the above average maturity, a leader's
behavior
should move through (2) high task-high relationships,
(3) high relationshi ps-low task, to (4) low task-low relationships.

Indeed, a leader can

assist followers in maturity development by changing leader behavior in
this sequence.
In order to determine the appropriate leader style in a given

situation, the practitioner must first have the diagnostic ability to

assess the maturity level of his or her followers.

This is followed

by marking the assessed maturity level on the maturity continuum of the

Life Cycle Model, and drawing a vertical line from this point to
intersect with the style curve,

(figure 15)

The point of intersection

with the curve will fall within one of the four quadrants, and indicate
the appropriate leader style for that situation.

on two assumptions:

This process is based

that the practitioner has diagnostic skills, and

flexibility of leadership style.

As Hersey and Blanchard emphasize:
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Immature

Mature

above
average

Figure 15.

average

Determining Appropriate Leader Style

below
average

The importance of a leader’s diagnostic
ahilii-.y
cannot be overemphasized. .Yet even
with good
diagnostic skills, a leader may still
not be
effective unless he can adapt his leader
personality (style) to meet the demands of
his
environment [p. 133],
.
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CHAPTER

IV

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter will develop a framework
which will be used to

analyze the cases under consideration.

In order to develop this

analytic framework, two steps have already
been taken.

First, in

Chapter Two, a brief history of leadership theory
has been presented,
showing the evolution of situational leadership
theory.

Secondly, in

Chapter Three, the Life Cycle Theory of leadership has
been described,
demonstrating its development from, and relationship to,
existing
theory.

In this chapter, a comparison will be made between the
Life

Cycle Theory and the situational theories previously discussed.

From

this comparison, the components of the analytic framework will be
selected.

In Chapters Five and Six this analytic framework will be

applied to the cases under consideration in this paper.

It is hoped

that this application will demonstrate the usefulness and applicability

of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic tool for determining the most
appropriate leadership style in any given situation.

Content of the Analytic Framework

The framework (see figure 16) consists of three basic sections:
1

.

2.
3.

Leader
Followers
Other factors in the situation
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Each section contains a number
of sub-categories taken from
the Life
Cycle Theory and related situational
theories.

Since the purpose of this study
is to demonstrate the usefulness
of the Life Cycle Theory as a
diagnostic method, parts A and B of
the
analytic framework include all of the
variables of the Life Cycle Theory.
Part C of the framework includes some
situational variables which,

although not specifically stated in the Life
Cycle Theory, are included
by Hersey and Blanchard in their
discussion of leader effectiveness.

For them, a leader must diagnose not only the
needs of the followers,
but also the needs of the situation, in order
to determine the most

appropriate leader style.
An effective leader is able to adapt his
style of leader behavior to the needs of
situation and the followers [p. 80].

They illustrate this concept in the formula, effectiveness is
a
function of the leader, followers, and the situation.

E=f(l,f,s).

The

function of leader has been defined as being divided into task and

relationships behaviors.

The function of followers has been defined as

task relevant maturity, divided into achievement motivation, willingness and ability to take responsibility, and task relevant education

and experience.

The above are the two variables included in the Life

Cycle Theory.
Using the term 'environment’ and 'leadership situation' inter-

changeably, Hersey and Blanchard (1972,

p.

109) view the leadership

situation as being made up of:
1.
2.

leader's personality (style) and expectations
followers' personalities (styles) and
expectations
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Framework
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expectations
5.

6.
7.

8.

PerSOnallt y '^yles) and
expec tations
job demands
amount of follower interaction
time

They suggest that this is
only a partial list, and
that
specific organizations may
have additional
vanabies that are unique to
themselves
which must be evaluated before
determining
6
effectiveness [p. 121].
Variables three through eight in
the above list are not
incorporated in the Life Cycle Theory
per se, but are part of the
general leadership si tuation which
Hersey and Blanchard (1972,
p. 80)
include as a function of leader
effectiveness. As such, these variables
of the situation will also be
considered in the following discussion.
This chapter then, will compare the
variables of the Life Cycle

Theory delineated above, and the variables
of the situation described
by Hersey and Blanchard, to those
variables presented by the major

situational theorists in Chapter Two.

The assumption here is that

there is a substantial agreement among all these
various theories.

This comparison will provide the criteria for the
analytic framework.
The following situational theorists reviewed in Chapter
Two will
be included in the comparison:
1.
2.
3*
4.

5.

Hemphill
Lowin and Craig
Farris and Lim
Fiedler
Lawrence and Lorsch
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While this writer has made every
attempt to include all of the
situational factors mentioned by the
writers cited above, and to compare
them to definitions used in the Life
Cycle Theory, it must be acknowledged that because of the different use
of language, and the differing

degrees of comprehensiveness of each writer,
all of these comparisons
can only be approximate.

Format of the Analytic Framework

This comparison of theories will be divided into
three sections,

each focusing on one of the three variables which are
postulated to

account for leader effectiveness:
situation.

the leader, the followers, and the

Each of these three sections will be accompanied by a chart

which will attempt to illustrate the comparisons.

Because of the amount

of detail in the definition of the leader, the leader chart has been
expanded into two; one dealing with task behaviors, and the other with
relationships behaviors of the leader.
In each of the charts, the variable of leader, followers, and

situation as defined by Hersey and Blanchard appears in the centre of
the page.

Surrounding it are the related dimensions set forth by the

situational theorists listed above.
Each of the variables as defined by Hersey and Blanchard is
shown in a circle divided into two parts:

the upper portion gives the

name of the variable and general title for the definition, and the
lower portion gives the detailed definition of that variable.
Some of the theorists to be compared give a general reference
to a variable; such as,

’the leader:

initiating structure behavior',
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or -the leader:

consideration behavior’, and do not
give any details

or further definitions for that
variable.

Where this is the case, an

arrow has been drawn connecting the
reference of the writer being cited
to the upper portion of the central
circle. This indicates a general
comparison to the variable under consideration.

Where writers have

given detailed definitions of a variable, an
arrow has been drawn
connecting to the lower portion of the central
circle.

This indicates

a comparison between specific definitions
of writers.

Leader

T ask Behavior (figure 17).

House, and Lowin and Craig divide

leadership generally into two broad categories of behavior, corresponding to the task and relationships behaviors described in Life Cycle

Theory.

House (1971) divides leader behavior into high initiating

structure behavior and high consideration behavior, and suggests when

each will be successful according to the nature of the task.

Lowin and

Craig (1968) measured three aspects of supervisory behavior:

closeness

of supervision, initiating structure and consideration for the subordinate, in relation to subordinates’ competence.

For the purposes of

this comparison, closeness of supervision and initiating structure have
been combined under the heading 'initiating structure'.
Fiedler, Farris and Lim, and Hemphill divide leadership into two

broad categories, and elaborate on the behaviors in each category.

Fiedler (1958) described two types of leaders:

one distant, rejecting

to those whom he considers to be potentially poor co-workers, and who

tends to judge the personalities of others in the light of their ability
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Comparisons

Behavior

Task

Leader

17.

Figure

64

to do their job.

The other type of leader has
relatively greater feel-

ings of closeness, acceptance and
warmth, even to those with whom
he
cannot work, and would be less willing
to reject a person just
because
he cannot perform in a team situation.
In his later work (1964),

Fiedler continued to explore the relationships
between group performance
and leader attributes such as human
relations orientation, close interpersonal relations, and permissive accepting
attitudes.

In his

Leadership Contingency Model (1964) he divided
leader behavior into two
types which bear resemblance to his 1958 leader
descriptions.

Measured

by Fiedler's Least Preferred Co-Worker questionnaire,
one type of leader

(high LPC)

,

permissive and passive, is relationships oriented.

The

other (low LPC), controlling and active, is task oriented.
Farris and Lim (1969) investigated the relationship between
leader behavior and subordinates' performance.

They had leaders rated

according to Bowers and Seashore's (1966) four aspects of leadership
behavior:

support, interaction facilitation, goal emphasis, and work

facilitation.
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

Within these four categories, they measured a leader's:

sensitivity
giving of recognition
trust
stressing a feeling of price in the group
allowing freedom
encouraging speaking out
emphasizing teamwork
degree of punitiveness
pressure for performance
maintaining of performance standards
communication

In the above list, one through seven seem to relate to relationship

behavior, eight can refer both to task and relationships behavior, and

nine to eleven seem to relate to task behavior.
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Hemphill (1949), in his study of the
relationships between
successful leader behavior and the
characteristics of group situations,

developed six general descriptions of leader
behavior:
1*
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

^ leader exhibits behavior that advances
the
purpose of the group
indicates competence in administrative
functions
inspires members to greater activity
sets the pace for the group
enables the individual to feel secure in
his place in the group
does not serve his own interests

One through four in the above list fall under task behavior,
while five
and six are a part of relationships behavior.

Relationships Behavior (figure 18).

House (1971), and Lowin and

Craig’s (1968) second broad category of leader behavior - consideration

behavior - is compared to the relationships behavior of Life Cycle
Theory.

Fiedler’s (1964) other extreme of leader behavior - high L.P.C.,

permissive and passive - is compared to the definition of relationships

%
behavior in Life Cycle Theory.
As well, Farris and Lim's (1969) previously noted list of

leader behaviors including sensitivity, giving of recognition, trust,
stressing a feeling of pride in the group, allowing freedom, encouraging
speaking out, emphasizing teamwork, and being non-punitive are shown

compared to the definition of relationships behavior of Life Cycle

Theory
As mentioned above, Hemphill (1949), in his general descriptions

of leader behavior, included enabling the group member to feel secure in
his place in the group and not serving his own interests.
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Behavior

Relationships

Leader

18.

Figure
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As Hemphill explored his
hypothesis that the behavior
of a
leader which results in being
recognized as a good leader
may also make

group membership a pleasant,
satisfying experience, and foster
unity
and cohesiveness, he tested several
leadership betaviors. His purpose
was to see under what conditions
a leader acting in this way
would be
seen as effective or inadequate in the
eyes of the group. These tested
behaviors included:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5*

quickness of, confidence in, and keeping
to
decisions
control of emotions
being authoritative
showing obligation to the group
acting as a member of the group

While number one above appears to relate to
task, or initiating
structure behavior, two to five in the above list seem
to relate to

relationships or consideration behavior, in that they would
affect the
relationships between the leader and group members.
When tested, all of the behaviors in the above list were

verified as being situationally effective.

Control of emotions was

tested as the degree to which a leader maintains emotional control over

him or herself, even loses control of emotions.

Emotionality was seen

as influencing the reactions of the group to the leader.

Authoritative

behavior was shown to have an impact on leader-member relationships,

either improving or destroying the attitude to the leader, depending
upon the nature of the group.

Leader obligation is the extent to which

a leader will risk his or her personal welfare for the group.

Again,

this behavior influenced the relationships between leader and group,

either positively or negatively, depending on the type of group.
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Finally, membership is the extent
to which a leader becomes a
member
of the group, as opposed to seeking
socioemotional support outside it.

Whether a leader prefers the company of
superiors, rather than the
group, will affect leader member relations
positively or negatively,

depending upon the nature of the group.
Po sition Power and Personal Power

.

Before leaving the discus-

sion of leader behavior, a word must be said about
position power and
personal power, two aspects of leadership that cannot
be ignored.

Position power (figure 19), is mentioned by Hemphill,
Fiedler, and

Hersey and Blanchard as a variable affecting leadership
effectiveness.
It has been placed here as a separate item, for unlike
task and

relationships behaviors which are within the control of a leader, the
power derived from position is outside the control of the leader.

He

or she cannot act to create this power within themselves} it is inherent
in the position, not in him or herself.

HERSEY & BLANCHARD

LEADER FUNCTIONS
POSITION POWER OF LEADER

HEMPHILL & OHIO STATE
STUDIES

FIEDLER
POWER & AUTHORITY

PRESTIGE OF LEADER

IN

LEADER POSITION

Figure 19.

Leader Position Power Comparisons
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Harder to define is personal
power.

References to personal

power are not abundant in the
writings of the situational
theorists
being compared in this section.
In their analysis of five
types of
power, French and Raven (1959)
describe "referent power [p. 28]"
as
power based on the follower’s
identification with the leader. They

define identification as the follower's
"feeling of oneness [p. 29]"
with the leader, or "a desire for such an
identity [p. 29]." Thus
because of attraction to the leader, the
follower will desire close

association, and the leader will have the ability
to influence the
follower without attempting to do so.

French and Raven suggest as

a further hypothesis that the more the follower
is attracted to the

leader, the broader the range of the leaders referent
power will be.

However, after describing French and Raven's study,
Cartwright (1965)

concludes that "little is known about the determinants of the
range

of referent power [p. 29]."
French and Raven's definition of referent power seems to echo
Redl's (19^2) description of how a leader influences a group or person.

According to Redl, when a relationship exists between a person and a

group which is characterized by love of the central person by the group
members, then the group or followers will attempt to incorporate the

personality of the central person into their ego ideal; that is, they
will wish to become the kind of person he or she is (Gibb, 1959,

p. 881).

Hersey and Blanchard (1972) describe both Etzioni's and

Machiavelli's concept of personal power.

According to Etzioni, it

accrues to a leader who derives his or her power from followers.
(1959) restates this as occurring when the leader's authority is

Gibb
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spontaneously accorded him or her by
fellow group members, the
followers.
For Machiavelli, personal power
comes from a relationship built
on love.

Fiedler (1958) described two attributes
that a leader must have,
concurrently, and the first is that the
leader must be acceptable to his
or her followers.

acceptance [p.

Fiedler defines that operationally as
"sociometric

1)3]."

This is of such importance that without
it, group

performance cannot be predicted.
It is conceivable that a leader could
pratice all the relation-

ships behaviors previously discussed, and still
have little personal
power.

There seems to be an additional element to personal
power which

is not explained in the definitions of relationships
behavior.

Machiavelli associated personal power with lovej others associate
it

with charisma.

Allowing it to evade behavioral definition, it seems

clear that personal power is associated with the relationship between
leader and followers, and must be considered in any analysis of leadership.

Followers

Fiedler, Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, Secord and Bachman

and Hemphill all describe the followers as a variable affecting leadership.

(See figure 20).

Fiedler (1964) lists six situational factors

likely to affect a leader’s influence:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

personal relations with group members
the power and authority provided by the
leader's position
the degree of structure in the task
the relative abilities of the leader
and the group members
members' motivation
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the extent to which the group
is
operating under conditions of
external
stress.

Of these six factors, four the relative abilities of
group members,
and five - members' motivation,
are factors relating to the
followers.
In their 1968 study of how
managerial style can be affected by

subordinate productivity, Lowin and Craig
set up a laboratory situation
in which 'subordinates' were to perform
their jobs in a highly productive and non-productive manner; that is,
they acted as competent and

incompetent employees.

Thus in this experiment, Lowin and Craig
defined

followers in terms of their productivity.

Farris and Lim (1969) investigated how performance
of sub-

ordinates affects leadership.

In this experiment, leaders were told

that their group was high performing, or low performing.

As in Lowin

and Craig's study, followers were described in terms of
their

productivity.

Although Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, and Fiedler, all

discuss followers as a situational variable, none details characteristics of followers to Hemphill's extent.

In order to investigate the

characteristics of group situations as they are related to leader
behavior, Hemphill (1949) developed fifteen dimensions by which he

measured and described groups:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

size
viscidity (morale)
homogeneity
flexibility (how formal or informal)
permeability
polarization (group's purpose: single or diverse)
stability
intimacy
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HemDhill
.degree of dependence
.degree of participation
.degree of petency
.position
.autonomy
.stability
.type of purpose-single or
diverse (polarization)
.flexibility (decree of formality

Figure 20.

.size
.homogeneity
.permeability
.degree of control
.degree of satisfaction
(hedonic tone)
.degree of intimacy
.morale (viscidity)

Followers Comparison of Variables
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9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15 .

autonomy
control
position
potency
hedonic tone (satisfaction)
participation
dependence

Three of Hemphill's group dimensions refer exclusively
to
interpersonal relations among the followers:

1)

degree of satisfaction

(hedonic tone), 2) degree of intimacy, and
3) morale (viscidity).

These

dimensions, all relating to feelings among the followers, are not

included in the definition of maturity in Life Cycle Theory.

They

suggest that a further exploration (beyond the scope of this paper)
into member relations might discover another important variable

influencing leader effectiveness.

Situation

For the theorists being compared in part two of this chapter,
the situation is a key variable in effective leadership.
21).

(See figure

In Management of Organizational Behavior (1972), Hersey and

Blanchard describe eight variables in the situation, previously listed
in this paper, and suggest there may be many more.

From their list, we

have discussed so far the leader and the followers, the variables in the

Life Cycle Theory.

However, according to Hersey and Blanchard, the

situation also includes superiors, associates, the organization, job
demands, and time.

They point out that to be effective, a leader must

diagnose not only the followers, but also the needs of the situation.
Superiors, associates, and the organization are focused on by

Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in their study of organizational effective-
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Fiedler
.degree of complexity
of task
.extent to which group
operating under conditions
of external stress

Lawrence & Lorsoh

factors in the environment
-rate of change
-certainty of information about conditions
-rate of feedback
organizational structure in each dept .:
-span of control
-number of levels to a shared supervisor
-time span of review
-importance of formal review
-importance of formal rules
-criteria for evaluation
. inter personal
orientation of each dept .:
-concern for task
-concern for social relationships
time orientation of each dept
..goal orientation of each dept.
•

:

•

,

.

Figure 21.

.

Situation Comparison of Variables
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ness.

They outline four factors influencing
the organization.

With

respect to each department in the organization
they consider:
1.
2.
3*
4.

its
its
its
its

structure
interpersonal orientation
time orientation
goal orientation.

Lawrence and Lorsch also discuss the environment as
an influence upon
the situation.

Gibb (1959) mentions this as one of his five categories

of behavioral determinants in the situation and describes it
as "the
characteristics of the total culture in which the group exists and from

which the members come [p. 901]."
In Fiedler's (1964) list of six situational factors likely to

influence a leader, previously cited in this paper, two factors not
referring to the leader or the followers are:
1.
2.

the degree of structure in the task
the extent to which the group is operating
under conditions of external stress.

As Lawrence and Lorsch, Gibb and Fiedler consider situational

variables other than the leader and the followers, the following emerge

as commonly mentioned:
1.
2.
3.

the organization
the environment and stress in the environment
the nature of the task.

Summary of the Analytic Framework

In order to arrive at the final analytic framework, this section

will summarize what has been said by the situational theorists discussed
in this chapter.

All theorists reviewed agree on the behavior of the

leader as one key variable in effective leadership, and divide leader
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behavior into two categories.
1)

Using Life Cycle Theory terms,
these are

task behavior and 2) relationships
behavior.

As well, five theorists

cite personal power and position
power as important variables in
leadership.

All of the theorists reviewed agreed
that the followers are

another key variable in effective leadership.

The definition of

followers according to Life Cycle Theory
is supported.

In addition,

four writers include productivity in their
description of followers.

One theorist discussed interpersonal relations
among followers as
important in describing the followers.

This may be summarized as

morale
Ten writers agreed on the situation as a variable in
effective
leadership.
situation.

Most included the leader and followers as variables in the
Out of the many situational variables mentioned, those

frequently described which will be included in this framework are:

the

organization, including superiors and associates, the task (job), the
environment, and time.
Not all writers defined these aspects of the situation operationally.

Therefore each of these situational variables will be defined

according to different theorists.

For the variable of the organization

Lawrence and Lorsch's definition will be utilized.

The variable of

superiors and associates will be defined according to leadership style
using the Life Cycle Theory of leadership, and personal and position
power.

The variable of the task or job will be defined according to

Fiedler’s degree of complexity.

The variable of time will be defined

.
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according to Lawrence and Lorsch as
short term or long term.

The

variable of the environment will be
defined according to Fiedler in
terms of degree of stress. The final
framework is presented in figure 16
Methodology for the Study

1.

For each of the five cases to be considered
in this study,

first a brief account of the case will be given.

This account will be

a precis of approximately twenty pages drawn by
the writer from the

original published case source.

This account will be presented in three

stages, so divided by the writer:
A.

Before change

B.

During change

C.

After change

2.

An analysis of the case will follow the account.

The

analysis will be divided into three stages corresponding to the three
stages in the account of the case:
A.

Before change

B.

During change

C.

After change

Each of the three parts of the analytic framework
followers and the situation
analysis.

—

—

the leader, the

will be applied to each stage in the

Given the information available in the case description, the

writer will attempt to classify the data according to the categories
in the analytic framework.

Through this classification, the writer

will attempt to diagnose the nature of the situation, leadership style

of the key leaders in the case, and level of follower maturity, in each
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stage of the ease.

The appropriateness of the
leadership style to the
follower maturity and situation
will be determined using
the Life Cycle
Model
3.

Each analysis will conclude with
a siranary of the factors

which, in the writer's opinion,
contributed to the success or
failure
of the attempted change effort in
each case. This summary will be
made
in the light of the analytic
framework, with particular reference
to
the Life Cycle Theory.
4.

After presenting and analyzing five
case studies, the

writer will present her conclusions on:
A.

the usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory
as a
diagnostic method for determining the most
appropriate leadership style in any situation

B.

any patterns in leadership styles for the
successful and unsuccessful cases.
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CHAPTER

V

UNSUCCESSFUL AND MIXED SUCCESS CASE
STUDIES

—Creating an Onen

C ase One:

Snhnni

Background

This case is taken from Anatomy of
Educational Innovation by

Louis M. Smith and Pat M. Keith (1971).

In the early sixties, a

uniquely designed elementary school building was
constructed in the
Ohio River valley.

In keeping with its architecture, the school
was to

pioneer a new, innovative program of open education.

Louis Smith and

Pat Keith, funded by The United States Office of
Education, undertook

as a research project the study of the development of the school.
foci included!

Their

the development of the faculty social system, the

teachers’ innovations in education, the development of the pupils’

social system, the influence process, what and how cliques are formed,

and the Principal's decision-making role.
At the invitation of the Superintendent, the Curriculum Director

and the Principal, Smith and Keith spent one year in the school as
observers.

Their copious "on the scene" observation notes were

supplemented by informal interviews, verbatim accounts of meetings,
and intensive analysis of school records.

Both were "in the building"

at all times; from the beginning of the teachers' summer preparatory

workshop to the June close of the first academic year.

What follows is

a precis of their chronicle of a failed attempt in innovative education.

80

Before Change
The Area

Kensington school was built in the early
1960's in a lower

middle class white suburban district outside a
large deteriorating
metropolitan area in the Ohio river valley.
grown several times over

,

The Milford district,

was peopled with new arrivals who wanted

their children to have a better education than they.

The parents

projected aspirations for their children that were higher than the

district wide ability tests indicated were feasible.

The District

The Milford district's reputation as a community that fought

over its school program had been gained through its record of bond

and tax problems, squabbles in firing, rehiring and then retiring the
previous superintendent.

The district also sought outside funds

continuously.

Educational Leaders

In public schools, the community elects the school board

which in turn hires a superintendent who is responsible for staffing
the schools.

(See figure 22).

The prior superintendent had been

articulate and bright, a "comer", who held strong interests in developing a unique, novel and ultra contemporary educational program in the

Milford district.

Steven Spanman, the present superintendent, had

intentions of national leadership by Milford.

While the board and
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SCHOOL BOARD

Elected by
public

SUPERINTENDENT
Steven Spanraan
DEPUTY SUPERINTEND]
and
CURRICULUM DIRECT(
Jerl Cohen

Hired by
School Board
Hired by
Superintendent

PRINCIPAL OF KENSIN(
Eugene Shelby

Figure 22.

Structure of Educational Leadership in Milford
District

central office staff supported Spanman in the majority
of decisions,
they were split over the grand design for Milford and
the specific

program at Kensington; the old guard viewed Kensington with
suspicion.
Spanman, deputy superintendent and curriculum directly Jerl
Cohen, and Eugene Shelby, principal of Kensington, were friends and

intimate colleagues.

Shelby was not a part of the old guard group of

elementary school principals in the district; in fact, they viewed him
as a deviant newcomer.

An observer noted that "Spanman, Eugene and

Jerl are the in-group or ruling clique of the school".

All three had

a strong desire to have an impact on American education.

Though apart from the district patrons, Spanman, Cohen and
Shelby assumed the district to be ready for change.

The populace,

only partly aware of the changes underway, circulated a number of halftruths about Kensington, which remained uncorrected, for Spanman,

Cohen and Shelby felt that parents would not understand what they were
trying to do.
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Kensington’s Fo rmal Dnot-nino

The formal doctrine of Kensington
developed out of two docunents:
the Maodate, issued by the
superintendent, and the Insti fitinn^i p 1a „

developed from the Mandate by the
principal.

The Mandate was first

presented by Spanman to the total school
faculty during the summer workshop preceding the beginning of school.
Said Spanman:
We want adults who have developed
effective
language techniques, life-long habits
of
continuous learning and values which guide
them as individuals and as members of
society.
To accomplish this,
We are looking for ways of re-organizing
the
curriculum.... The curriculum (will be)
determined by the needs of the pupils
The faculty will do this
The faculty is
the curriculum.
He continued, stating that the school should
have varied lengths of time
in the school day, no bells, pupils coming and
going at will, be open to
two, three and four year olds, have a completely individualized
program,

and operate on a twelve month schedule.

Further, Kensington was to be a

"protected subculture" which "will protect good teachers from being
influenced by group norms".

Spanman concluded his remarks with "A man's

reach should exceed his grasp or else what's a heaven for?"
The Institutional Plan was the design of the school according to
the principal.

Its three goals, as presented to visiting reporters,

educators and parents were:
1.
2.

To assist pupils to become fully functioning
mature human beings.
To meet the needs of individual differences
by providing a differentiated program.
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3.

To provide the skills,
structures and understandings which will enable
pupils to identifv
1 fy
worthwhile goals for themselves.

The doctrine treated issues on
an abstract level and did
not define
terms operationally.

Organization of the Snhnni

Figure 23 shows the organization of
Kensington according to
Shelby’s plan.

According to the Institutional Plan,

INDEPENDENT STUDY DIVISION

Principal

Language Arts
Specialist

Academic
Counselor

Secretary
Instructional
Materials Specialist

Academic
Counselor

Science
Specialist

Library Clerk

Math
Specialist

Audio Visual
Technician

Social Studies
Specialist

Physical Education
Specialist

Academic
Counselor

T ransition Division

Teacher

Teacher

Creative Arts
Specialist

Teacher

90 Pupils

Counselor
(one-fourth time)

Basic Skills Division
3

Teachers

3

Teachers

Teacher Aid
V'

V

Instructional
Clerk

90

90

Pupils

Pupils

Kindegarten

Figure 23.

Kensington's Organization
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1.

an interactive process;
there
set curriculum. Shelby
believed
ttet since
sinl learning
?
that
results only from experience
one can only structure the
environment
the experience is likely
to occur.
.

sSto?’

2.

Kensington was to place primary
emphasis on process
development as opposed to content
development.

3.

e
iZ ti0n 0f individua lized
learning was
tn
ino?fU fteam teaching,
o include
ungradedness and total
democratic pupil-teaching decision
making.
<-

4.

The organization of the school
was to depend
on the program.

Aware, and skeptical of classical
management theory, Shelby told an

observer that at Kensington "span of
control" and "unit of authority"

were being deliberately violated, and he
was interested in the
consequences of this.

Jargon

Along with the doctrine, a jargon arose.

One teacher,

complaining she felt brainwashed, said that when she was
finished with
the year, there were three words she would never use
again:

tualize", "fully functioning", and "process".

"Concep-

An observer noted:

The program of the school is so clouded with cliches
and razzle-dazzle that it is very difficult to see
clearly what will happen to the children.

The Building

For the first time in the United States, such a program was to
be implemented with a corresponding new uniquely designed building.
(See figure 24).

The building won an award for architectural design,

and was much visited.
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1.
4.

7.
10.

Covered play shelter
Childrens' Theatre
Curriculum Center
Laboratory Suites
(101-120)

Figure 24.

2.
5.
8.

Stage
Projection Room
Aquarium

3.
6.

9.

Administrative suite
Acting Tower
Perception Core

Floor Plan of Kensington School
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It was described in the
document from the Architectural
Design Institute
as follows:

fact a prototype of evolutionary
progress is
educational growth. It is a facility
offering
facility and speed, mobility and
flexibility to
a nongraded, organic, fluid approach
to inquiry.

The Teachers

Shelby hired a teaching staff he felt would be
compatible with
the school doctrine.

In general the twenty-one faculty were:

1.

New to the district

So they could be trained more easily
in new procedures.

2.

Inexperienced

Seven had no experience; two more than
twenty years; the rest less than five
years

3.

Very able intellectually

Three had completed all but their
doctoral dissertations.

4.

Politically liberal

One of the central office staff said,
"Not a Republican in the group".

According to an observer, they seemed an unusual group:

young, more

than a little bit bright, enthusiastic, with an excitement about

teaching "even though they are not very specific and clear about this
yet".

During the first few days of the summer workshop they had high

morale, and an aura of 'We can do it and what we're doing is important'.
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The S ummer Workshop

A summer workshop was
held for the faculty between
August 10 and

September 8.

For the first week, primarily
through Shelby's efforts,

National Training Laboratories
conducted T-group training.

Because of

his past experiences in similar
programs, Shelby thought his decision
was "intuitively good", and that he
"could build a rationale after the
fact about it". The purposes of the
T-groups were to plan for the

coming year, to enable the faculty to
"begin to become a group", "to
get to know one another, and to learn to
work together".
During the T-group week the principal
introduced his Institutional Plan.

It was presented as a given, and he
indicated that a

serious problem would arise if personal goals
were radically different
from the plan.

He was most reluctant to depart from the
plan and

create new and different structures with the staff.

One of the

observers commented:
Eugene's comments came like a blast a lunch yesterday.
His feelings and continual reiteration of the plan
raised some skepticism in a few of the people.

This week was characterized by revelations of self, revelations

about salary, and some intense development of empathy.

Teachers'

reactions to the T-groups subsequently appeared in The Bulletin:

Although a group development laboratory is never
a comfortable thing to participate in, it should
prove helpful to us as we work together during
the year. .
.

We will not deny the frustration of the experience,
but undoubtedly it will prove to have been most
profitable as we work together toward our goal
this year.
.

.
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According to an observer, the
T-groups highlighted and legitimized
high
emotionality, self-revelation, and
decision making by consensus. Interpersonal communication was of the
utmost importance .

minimum of concentration on nuts and
bolts issues.

There was a
These effects were

felt all year long.
At the beginning of the second week,
the principal chaired a

total staff meeting at which he stated
that for the remainder of the

workshop, the faculty were to meet in their
teams as they deemed

necessary to prepare for school opening.

In addition, the faculty

were to indicate which of eight committees they
would like to be on,
fill out daily logs, and to be on individual schedules
with the

principal.

During this period, difficulties in the team and committee

meetings arose.

One teacher noted that when the principal was not in

the group, it made tremendous progress.

Another teacher expressed

irritation at the railroading of items, the inability of anybody to
get anything done in the committee, and the number of committees she

was on (three).

She said, "If things don’t straighten out very soon,

I'll pack up my bag and go home".

None of the committees produced any

authoritative position papers.
At the end of the third week

teacher on the ISD team, was fired.

.

Bill Kirkham, an experienced

The stated reasons were that his

point of view was too different and that he blocked the smooth

functioning of the team.

The apparent group decision was made at an

Independent Study Division (I.S.D.) team meeting.
put forward for why this happened:

Various reasons were
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1.

2.
3.

The outside consultant who
was working with
this team had behaved
inappropriately.
A scapegoating because
of the team's failure
ure
to progress.
Bill's curriculum ideas were
a threat to the
principal.

This episode increased distrust,
fear and guilt in the ISD team.
In t he final week two parent
meetings were held.

One was a

large protest meeting over the book
and fee assessment that had been
levied against each pupil. In the
second meeting, the principal and
faculty sought to explain the program.
questions:

doing?

The parents asked specific

How do the teachers know what the
individual children are

How do the children get instruction in
spelling?

What happens

to the children if these two years turn
out to be a failure?

They

were concerned, confused and hostile over the
promotion, grading, and
report cards.

In short, the parents were divided into a
small loyal

group and a large opposed group.

During Change

Opening Dav

When the summer workshop ended on September 8, the opening day

of school, the staff were still making organizational plans.

Because

the new building was not finished, the three divisions were given

temporary quarters in three nearby schools.
ISD Division

.

The 210 students in the Independent Studies

Division gathered on the first day in the Milford High gym.
observations were recorded during the day:

These
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MorriiDg.
Children arrive well dressed
and well
seriibhed - parents angry over
lack of bus
schedule - noise level rising temperature
rising - humidity increasing -

only David's
group reading - teachers and kids
milling
about - some horseplay - some
students sit at
tables and gaze about - kids in
David's group
sitting like chained muted animals
as David
Pyifig to conduct a T— group —
noise high observer about to get a headache.

Noon.
Tremendous amount of listless behavior one teacher left her group because the
students
would not do anything - a few of the older
and
brighter kids seem able to handle freedom
and
are working on their log sheets.

Four.

Staff seems exhausted.

Four-thirty pm . Kids lined up for buses - no
one knows when or where they will come - they
arrive at 4:45 pm. - kids passive.
After the first day the teachers realized that it was
possible
that the children in ISD would not be able to work in
an individualized,

independent program.

Many of the students could not write, and there-

fore could not fill in their daily log, even with supervision.

As the

teachers had not agreed upon a uniform method for signing up for learning groups, many children were unable to schedule instruction.

At the

close of day two, two ISD teachers decided on a self-contained area.

Transition Division

.

The 90 students in the Transition Division

were housed in one large room and two classrooms in Milford Junior High.
An observer noted that on the first day "nothing went right".

Some of

the students arrived before 9 am. and the buses did not come until 5 pm.

leaving a very tired staff.

The teachers described the noise as "chaos".

At the end of the first day, they decided to go toward more traditional

teaching methods, and assigned 30 students to each team member while
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noting that this was contrary to the
Kensington philosophy, which none
of them was sure would work anyway.
Bas ic Skills Division

.

The 180 students and six teachers
in

Basic Skills were located in Hillside
Elementary School.

Because of

disagreements during the summer workshop, the
teachers had already
split into a team of four and a team of two.

The team of four had

a difficult time holding the childrens’
interest the first day.

Very

tired and confused, they met at the end of the day
and commented that
the lack of structure actually bound them a great deal,
inhibiting

their freedom.

The team of two, composed of one very experienced teacher,

and one new teacher, presented an academically— oriented and traditional
program the first day.

An observer noted that "It will be interesting

if this team works the smoothest and most efficiently".

October Developments

The teachers coped with long bus waits, with a lack of materials

and facilities, with a high noise level which caused some teachers to
get whistles, with attempting to get to know about 200 students each,

with a majority of children who were unable to devise and carry out
individual work plans, with great demands on their time, and with teaching a variety of subjects though hired for two areas of competency.

Team teaching was affected.

Experienced teachers said they

could provide more individual pupil decision making in a self-contained

classroom where their behavior was not contingent upon their (inexperienced) teaching peers.

At a team level, there were no norms except
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for the lack of rules.

Risks were high, for when
one did act, his or

her assumptions and actions
were subject to team scrutiny.
To act at
all came to be identified with
a lack of concern for the
team, and to
risk being charged with directiveness.

Many teachers were discouraged.

Sick of the dust, dirt,

confusion, lack of order and noise,
two members of Basic Skills were
thinking of quitting at mid-term.
One said, "Almost everybody is

giving serious thought about not coming
back next year".
There was reluctance to tell the principal.

As one teacher

put it, "It's his baby, and you can't
tell a person that his baby is
no good".

On his part, the principal told an
observer that he was

troubled by the sterile programs being offered
in some classes, by
personal anxiety, by his relationship with an outside
consultant, and
by feelings of "general apprehension and anxiousness".

Further, he

felt that some of the staff did not appreciate the
freedom he had given
them, and that some teachers were inadequate.

November:

The New Building

The building had won an award for "Imaginative architecture

leading to intriguing design
and functional...."

This building is flexible, free flowing

Differences between the ideal, as described in the

architect's design, and the real, as experienced by the teachers and
students, developed.

These differences caused new problems for the

teachers to cope with.
The Teacher Work Center (see figure 24) became an informal

gathering place for teachers and office personnel to

liave lunch,

drink
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coffee and talk, and for staff and
community meetings.

The Perception

£org, for student study, became used
as extra teaching space and a
hallway, as the building had no corridors.

Lavatories were individual,

and became gathering places and playgrounds
for the children.

Teachers

had continual problems keeping the students
out of them.

The classrooms, called Learning Laboratory
Suites

,

were twenty

open spaces separated by moveable dividers and
equipped with overhead
projectors.

Because of the emphasis on "process curriculum",
no teacher

would admit to having a prepared set of transparencies.

As well, time

and energy restrictions caused teachers to move to blackboard
use.
The ampi theatre-1 ike Physical Education Shelter

,

substituting

for a gymnasium, was to be surrounded by shrubbery, warmed by infra-red

heaters, and used by students for physical education, and the community
for concerts.

Because the shrubbery was never planted, the wind blew

rain, snow and dirt into the area.

California, were totally inadequate.

because of the new grass.

The heating units, designed for
The field could not be used

Thus the planned physical education program

could not be carried out.
Because the Satellite Kitchens were too small, hot food had to
be brought in daily from other schools.

There were no lunchrooms.

As

a result, classroom spaces were used for eating, and litter and garbage

accumulated.

The open Administrative Suite afforded no privacy to the

principal, secretary, nurse and speech teacher who all worked there.

The Auditorium was never used instructionally; on several occasions it

was used by large parent groups.
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The

~lIdrens

'

Theatre was a large open space
surrounded by

three acting areas, two joined by a
bridge which crossed a life science
stream.

This area was carpeted, as was the whole
school.

According to

the observers, the theatre was the most
successful and creative part of

the school.

Through the efforts of the teachers, many
productions took

place.

December:

The Rules

In response to the discipline problems just after the
move,

parental pressure, and his own feelings of anxiety, the principal
issued two sets of rules.

The first set, on December 8th, contained

35 rules relating to general policies and operating procedures.

of the rules covered:

Some

where and when lunch would be served, the use

of permission slips to go home for lunch, and to enter the Perception
Core, when pupils should arrive at school, where the students should

walk in the school, how the teachers were to write reports about misbehavior and keep records of chronic misbehavior which were to be given
to the principal.

The second set of ten administrative regulations appeared

December 14th.

Some of the rules covered:

not keeping children after

school without the consent of the parents, not allowing children outside
the building unless the teacher had given permission, making requests

for custodial help to the office instead of the custodian, the use of

permanent passes to the Perception Core for consistently conscientious
students, and limitations on the use of AV equipment to three office
personnel.
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The staff reacted to these
rules with hostility,
particularly
those who most closely identified
with early versions of the
formal
doctrine. The rules were perceived
both as a retreat from
Kensington's
doctrine, and as coming from the
principal.
An observer noted a lack

Of spirit in the overall staff.

The dejected teachers appeared
to have

lost any faith they previously had in
a democratically functioning
staff.

When asked if the staff were consulted,
one teacher said:
Yes, we were consulted, and we told
him (the
principal) what we did not want. After
we
told him this, he left it in anyway.

She did not hide her feelings that this
had been a fake democratic

approach by the principal.
Christmas holidays found the faculty tired, frustrated
and ill.
The majority took full vacations away from the area.

An observer noted

that this would leave little time for planning for the
next semester
and "should put them in the soup all spring".

January;

Publicity and Reorganization

After Christmas, many reporters and observers visited the
school.

Kensington also achieved prominence as the major plank in the

Milford school district’s bid for private and federal funds to support
the curriculum reorganization project.

enthusiasm and euphoria in the staff.

All of this created excitement,
An observer noted,

"Everyone

is kind of high".

However, behind the scenes, problems continued.

Clerical

problems were severe; parents were dissatisfied; teachers spent long
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hours producing instructional materials;
supplies frequently ran out;
the lack of textbooks began to be felt.
On January 9th, in response to parental
reaction, the principal

initiated a change to a series of self-contained
classrooms in the ISD
Division.
made.
talked.

The principal chaired the meeting at which
this decision was

According to the transcripts of that meeting, members
hardly
After the meeting was over, The Bulletin announced that
as of

February 1st, the ISD Division would consist of five academic
advisors
who would be totally responsible for 40 pupils each.

Co-operative

teaching would be encouraged, but on an informal basis.

Teacher re-

actions varied:
I'm quite opposed. I don't like the large
group instruction and it doesn't fit what
I want to do.
I'm in agreement.
anyway.

This is more what I wanted

I see it as a necessary step.

April and Mav Developments

In April and May, the district was in the throes of a tax

campaign which failed.

Following this, scapegoats were sought;

Kensington was a plausible possibility.

The superintendent had

problems with growing board opposition, lack of teacher support, and
trouble with central office staff with whom he had only had a couple

of general meetings in the last three years.

At a May meeting, the

parents said they did not understand what the school was trying to do.
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The teachers expressed various frustrations.

One of the

teachers with 28 years of experience said she felt she
had been a total
failure during the year, and for that reason decided not
to return.

This sentiment was echoed by other experienced teachers.

Another

teacher, looking back, said he felt problems had been aided by the T-

groups which ironically had caused some of the difficulties they were
trying to overcome.

The Final Staff Meeting

On May 24th, the principal set the agenda and chaired a meeting
for the next year’s staff.

were present.
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Eight of the old staff and two new staff

The principal outlined the situation for the coming year:

40% reduction in custodial budget
reduction of two teacher aides
interns turned down by the board, one of whom
said people were tired of everything going to
Kensington
materials budget cut from $10,000 to $2,500
plans for a two week summer workshop contingent
on foundation support which the principal
thought was not probable.

Discussion ensued about the pupils, curriculum, other schools,
and record keeping.

decision was made.

Doubts were raised about pupil grouping; no
The principal stated that:

Curriculum development will have to be done
locally. My own feeling is that next year we
should emphasize local need. The other goals
require additional financial and human resources.
We must be realistic.
Along with this, visits to other schools were discussed.

The principal

in
broadened this to "improving relationships with the other schools
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the district".

Formalized record keeping was
raised; though the

principal tried for a motion on
the subject, none was
forthcoming.
decision was made.

No

After Change

The Principal

The principal left in the middle of
the second year.

A going

away party, "quite an emotional undertaking"
according to an observer,

was held for him in February.

At the party, the principal stated that

the school would not be so tied up with local
control in the future.
In his eyes, the reasons for the difficulties
were public opinion in

the community, and the lack of resources to carry
out the task.

According to a teacher

,

the "villian" was the district which wouldn't

support the idea the school was trying to convey.

With Shelby's

departure, the administration chose a conservative successor.

The Faculty

With a new principal, policy shifts occurred in the school,

causing a continued faculty turnover.

Almost all the teachers who

came in the second year left before the third year.

more traditional.

New faculty were

Classes became pretty much self-contained.

Educational Leaders

Two years after Kensington began, the school board changed.
The curriculum director left after the first year.

The superintendent
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resigned after a year-s leave of
absence, to be replaced with
a more
conservative successor. Kensington
was now, both in philosophy
and
action, part of "the old Milford".

Analysis of Case Onp

The natural tendency of all systems is
toward
disorder, or entropy. .. .There is no escaping
the need for some system of control in
organizations, including participative organizations...
to forestall the inevitable deterioration
into
randomness.
Arnold S. Tannenbaum
Control in Organizations

Before Change

The Situation

Ideal—structure of

the organization .

tion did not yet exist; it was to be created.

organization as it was supposed to be.

In this case, the organiza-

Let us look then, at the

In general terms, this school

was to be a completely participative organization, akin to Likert’s
(1961) system four organization:
1.

2.

3.

Motivational forces arise from group processes.
Group participates in setting goals, improving
methods, and appraising progress toward goals.
Strongly favorable attitudes toward implementing organizational goals.
Favorable cooperative attitudes throughout the
organization with mutual trust and confidence.
High job satisfaction.
Communication flows freely vertically, and
horizontally.

100
4
-

5.

SSeTail^?

intera ° ti0n and

Decision making widely shared.
Widespread
responsibility for the control
process.

The principal said that "span
of control" and "unit of
authority" were
to be deliberately violated in
this school. There were to
be no

department heads, but teaching teams.
review were to exist.
mentioned.

Neither formal rules nor formal

Review and criteria for evaluation
were not

There was to be total democratic
teacher-pupil decision

making
In terms of interpersonal orientation,
there was to be a high

concern for social relationships.

The summer T-groups were to socialize

the staff to this behavior.

The Mandate and Institutional Plan set forth
many general goals
for the school which might be summarized as:

to produce a "fully

functioning pupil", able to work independently, who will
become a
"fully functioning" mature human being.

The means to attain this end

were to be left completely up to the teacher and the individual
student.

Each student was to develop his or her own program; there was to be no
set curriculum.

Ideal task.

With a freely developing curriculum, the task of

the various teachers would be ambiguous (no set methods), highly varied

(each student would have an individual program), and highly interdepend-

ent (total democratic teacher-pupil decision making and team teaching).

Ideal environment

.

The rate of change in the environment was

slow, marked by the re-election of the school board every two years.

Information about conditions in the environment would be certain,
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through the central office, the
principals in the district,
and the
parents.
Rate of feedback to the school
would be high, through the
parents. However, this was not
to affect Kensington which
was to be a
"protected subculture". The teachers
would thus not be affected by
"group norms" from the environment.
Any stress in the environment
was
not to affect the teachers and
students.

What a System Fou r Organization Nppd.^

According to Lawrence and Lorsch
(1967), this type of organization requires a high degree of integration.

Likert himself (1961)

posits system four, participative management,
as an "ideal".

In order

to achieve it, an organization will need:
1.

a leader who can create a situation in which
members establish high performance goals for
themselves

2.

good communications

3.

an atmosphere free of hostility, fear,
distrust, unreasonable pressure, conflict
between employees and supervisors

4.

machinery to handle conflict

5.

personnel skilled in group process

6.

a work group with high confidence, trust,

loyalty and co-operative motivation.
The leaders who created Kensington attempted to achieve these

conditions by providing:
1.

a one month summer workshop with T-groups

for the total staff
2.

a system of team teaching
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complete freedom to the teachers in creatine
K
the curriculum

4.

democratic decision making

5.

a specially designed open building; a

"protected" environment.

Yet in spite of all these things, the creation of this
open school
failed completely.

How did it happen?

To clarify this, let us look

more closely at the various groups of people involved.
Real environment

.

The Milford district generally held

traditional attitudes toward schooling.

Half of the school board,

hslf of the central office staff, and all of the elementary school
principals were described as "old guard".

The previous superintendent

who had ideas of developing an ultra contemporary educational program
had been fired, rehired and retired.

The district was active in educational affairs.

The central

office sought outside funds continuously, as for example, the curriculum

reorganization project.

Parents fought over bond and tax problems.

They frequently held meetings at which they protested over actions of

which they did not approve, as in the case of the student fees levied
by Kensington, and the matter of the previous superintendent.

Ambitious

for their children, the parents were actively involved in school affairs.

Principal's Superiors and Associates

.

Close friends and

colleagues, the superintendent, Steven Spanman, deputy superintendent

and curriculum director Jerl Cohen, and principal Eugene Shelby worked
together to bring about the dream of Kensington.

Spanman wrote the

Mandate for the school; Cohen sought a foundation grant to support the
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project, and Shelby designed the school in
his Institutional Plan,

derived from the Mandate.

All three had a strong desire to have
an

impact on American education.
In working together they looked more to
each other for guidance

and support than to their constituencies.

Spanman held only two meet-

ings with his central office staff in three
years.

his time at Kensington.

Cohen spent most of

Shelby did not become part of the powerful

group of elementary school principals in the district.
they viewed him as a deviant newcomer.

As a result,

An observer commented that

these three men were the "ruling clique" of the school.

All three

largely ignored the parents whom they felt "would not understand
what
they (were) trying to do".
They seemed to want to create an isolated educational utopia
a "protected subenvironment", in spite of the fact that Kensington was

a public school in a traditional and insistent environment.

These

factors prevented integration and communication between the organization

and its environment.

The Followers:

An organization cannot ignore its environment.

The Teachers

Achievement motivation

.

The twenty-one teachers were described

by an observer as young, excited about teaching, and "more than a little

bit bright".

Three had all but their doctoral dissertations completed.

Upwardly mobile, most had "places they wanted to go and things they
wanted to do professionally beyond Kensington school".

Enthusiastic

about the school, they began the summer workshop with an attitude of
"We can do it and what we’re doing is important".

According to McClelland -s theory,
they would be highly achievement motivated people. They
preferred a non-routine job
that required
personal initiative and inventiveness;
they had a positive, confident
attitude toward the probability of their
being successful at Kensington;
they were thinking ahead, and had
goals for the future; they were
not

motivated by money, but by the ideal of
Kensington and teaching.

Only

through their personal efforts would the
goals of the school be achieved.

While teaching at Kensington might appear a
high risk to some, it may
have appeared initially to them to be a moderately
difficult but potentially achievable task.

McClelland does not believe that a teacher is

in a situation where he or she gets concrete
feedback on how well he or
she is doing.

Those who have been teachers might disagree.

In all,

this group exhibited many characteristics of high n Ach.

Their willingness to take responsibility was evident in their
eagerness, enthusiasm, excitement and espousal of the Kensington
doctrine.

They were willing, though not "very specific and clear"

about what that entailed.

Although their educational level was high,

their task relevant experience

,

and their ability to take responsibility

in this type of teaching situation was low.

Only two had more than

twenty years experience; seven had no experience at all and the rest
less than five years experience in traditional schools.

According to Life Cycle Theory, their "maturity" level at the

beginning of the summer workshop would be low to average.
25).

(See figure

This indicates that the appropriate leadership style for this

group initially would be high task and high relationships.
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T he Principal;

—During

the Summer Workshop

The Mandate had declared that
Kensington would be a nonstructured, open school.

The school’s organization was to
follow its

program, and its program was to develop
spontaneously.

The principal

reinforced this in his Institutional Plan in
which he stated that
since learning only results from experience,
one can only structure
the environment.
be emphasized.

Process development, not content development
was to
Total democratic decision making was the rule.

During the summer workshop, Shelby adopted a laissez-fai
rg

leadership style which he believed was in harmony with
this doctrine.
He participated in the T-groups.

He told an observer that part of his

decision making style was to deliberately delay decisions, as he
did in
the ordering of the textbooks.

During the committee meetings in the

workshop, he generally played a laissez-faire role.
During the workshop, some of Shelby's behaviors indicated a
second leadership style of high task and low relationships.

He

announced his Institutional Plan to the staff, for the first time,
during the week of the T-groups, stating that it was a given, and that
a serious problem would arise if the teachers' personal goals were

radically different from his plan.
blast".

It came, said an observer, "like a

In the second week, he instructed the faculty to meet in their

teams as they deemed necessary, sign up for already named committees,
fill out daily logs, and report to him on an individual basis during
the remainder of the workshop.

As the workshop progressed, a teacher

noted that when the principal was not in a group, it made "tremendous
progress"
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These actions show the
principal organizing and
defining roles,
explaining what activities to
do, establishing patterns
of organizatiol
formalizing channels of communication,
and establishing ways of
getting
the job done. This high task
and low relationships
leadership style
was opposite to the doctrine of
total democratic decision
making and
the lai ssez-faire style.

This difference in leadership
styles became

manifest in Shelby's variation between
laissez-faire style and high
task, low relationships style in
the committee group meetings,
as
noticed by one teacher.
According to Life Cycle Theory, Shelby's
basic leadership style

during the summer workshop was low task
and low relationships

(

laissez-

faire) and his secondary leadership style
was high task and low

relationships.

(See figure 26).

In either case, according to Life

Cycle Theory, neither style would be appropriate
for the initial
"maturity" level of the teachers which, as previously
diagnosed, calls
for a high task and high relationships style initially.

The results of the summer workshop support this diagnosis.

goals of the summer workshop were not fully met.

The

Teachers reactions to

the T-groups were generally unfavorable:

Although a group development laboratory is never
a comfortable thing to participate in, it should
prove helpful....
We will not deny the frustration of the experience,
but undoubtedly it will prove to have been most
profitable. .
.

They felt it would have been more appropriate "to begin group action by
working on an actual problem instead of studying group process".

of the committee produced any authoritative position papers.

None

Because
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Leadership Style
Appropriate to
Follower "Maturity"

Shelby's
Basic
Style

—

Shelby's
Secondary
Style

Figure 26.

Shelby's Leadership Styles During
Summer Workshop
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of the emphasis on group
process and the de-emphasis
on nuts and boits
issues, the staff were not
organised for the opening day
of school.

During Change

The popular practice of letting
children have
unrestricted freedom has made tyrants
of
children and slaves of the parents.
.Welldefined restrictions give a sense
of security
and certainty of function within
the social
structure. Without this, the child
feels at
a total loss
His ever renewed efforts to
himself take a destructive course...
Without order, there can be no freedom.**
.

Rudolf Dreikurs
Children the Challenge

Staff Leadership of Students

Thus far, we have considered the principal's initial
leadership
style as it related to the teachers (followers).

This relationship,

however, is also affected by the interaction between the
teachers as

leaders and the students as followers.
The students at Kensington were assumed to be ready to learn in

an open school.

Yet before school opened, a district-wide ability test

revealed that the childrens' abilities were lower than their parents'

aspirations for them.

As well, the children were coming to Kensington

from traditional schools.

During the first days of school it became

apparent that only a few children could operate in the environment.
could not write.

Many

Behavior ranged from horseplay to passive listlessness.
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According to Life Cycle Theory,
the childrens’ "maturity"
level
in this situation was low.
(See figure 27).
Unused to learning in this
type of school, only a few "of the
older and brighter" students
showed
any achievement motivation. One
teacher estimated that only about
fifteen percent of his science class
were able to follow. The students'

experience and education in an open school
was nil; hence their ability

generally was very low.
in this setting

ws.s

Except for a few, overall willingness
to learn

low#

According to the school doctrine, the curriculum
was to develop
out of the individual student’s interests.

Ideally, teachers were to

follow the student’s direction, and facilitate his
or her learning in

whatever way possible.

The role of the "academic advisor" was to

support and encourage, but not initiate.

In Life Cycle Theory terms,

the teachers were to adopt a quadrant three style of high
relationship

and low task.

(See figure 13).

A few teachers, such as David, who

conducted the student T— groups, used a quadrant four low task and low

relationships style.
Largely inexperienced and unprepared for students' reactions,
some teachers began to move toward more traditional methods after the
second day of school.

Although some moved more quickly than others,

by the end of the first semester, most of the staff were teaching in

self contained units.

In terms of Life Cycle Theory, the teachers'

leadership style gradually became more structured; they moved backward
through the quadrants from low task and low relationships (quadrant
four), to quadrant three (T-groups, free movement in the building, no

structure initiated by teachers), to quadrant two (whistles, self-
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contained units, breakdown
of team teaching), to
quadrant one
(permission slips, students
marching from one place to
another in
groups at specific times.
According to Life Cycle Theory,
the ctenge cycle is effective
only when leader style changes
through each quadrant in turn
from one
to four, but not in reverse.

Movement forward will be seen as
positive

reinforcement by followers, while
movement backward through the cycle
will be perceived as punishment.
The negative consequences of a
reverse
style development were shown in the
increasing frustrations and

difficulties within the school as the
year progressed.
The Princ ipal:

During the Ypap

During the summer workshop, the principal’s
leadership style

varied between a basically low task and low
relationships style, and a

secondary high task and low relationships style.

As the first semester

progressed, the principal became more and more dissatisfied
with the

"sterile programs being offered in some classrooms", and
increasingly
used high task and low relationships style in an attempt to
remedy the

situation.

The following chronology shows his change to a quadrant one

style:
1.

October

principal anxious, dissatisfied

2.

November

move to the new building

3.

December

principal issues two lists of
45 rules

4.

January

principal changes ISD Division
to self contained units with
individual teaching
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fires outside consultant

changes organization of physical
education program to more
traditional approach
5*

announces budget cuts and
advocates more traditional
curriculum and closer cooperation with other schools

The principal's issuing of the December rules
provides a

critical example of his high task and low relationships
style.

Parental

dissatisfaction, teacher dissatisfaction, problems and
frustrations with
the new building and personal anxiety all drove the principal
to take

action in December.
rules.

In an attempt to create order, he issued some

While a logical step, the manner in which he did this caused

more problems.

In his eyes, he acted democratically, for he consulted

with the teachers before issuing the rules.

The teachers, however,

perceived this as a "fake democratic approach" for he did not incorporate any of their suggestions.

Essentially, the principal drew up

the rules as he saw them necessary, and issued them.

As Tannenbaum and

Schmidt (1958) caution:
If (a leader) actually intends to make a certain
decision himself, but the subordinate group gets
the impression that he has delegated this authority,
considerable confusion and resentment are likely
to follow.
In this instance, the rules created hostility against the principal,

disillusionment with the principal's doctrine of complete democracy and
apathy in the staff.
Thus, this high task and low relationships action by Shelby was

inappropriate; even initially a quadrant two style was called for.

As
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well as being inappropriate, the
action came too late; at this
point in
the year teacher morale was already
low, and needed building up.
A
high task and high relationships style
might have been more appropriate.
The fact that the rules created not
anger, but apathy, indicates the
low level of staff morale.
Shelby’s inability to practice relationships
behavior prevented
him from using a quadrant two or three leadership
style.

During the

summer workshop, there is no record of Shelby
providing socio-emotional
support, or psychological strokes for the staff.

In October, though

unhappy and frustrated, teachers were reluctant to tell
this to Shelby.

This in itself, indicated a certain amount to fear and distrust.

In

turn, though Shelby was beset by many anxieties, he told an
observer,

but not his staff.

This lack of personal communications prevented

relationships behaviors.

Though, as one observer commented, Shelby was

an expert teacher himself, he did not share this, or attempt to assist
floundering new teachers.

The reasons why were never advanced.

Unable

therefore, to adopt a quadrant two or three leadership style, and only

able to use a quadrant four or one style, Shelby was unable to develop
the "maturity" of his teachers by varying his style through all four

quadrants.

This difficulty was compounded by the fact that, like the

staff, Shelby progressed backwards through the cycle jumping from

quadrant four, to quadrant one.

This had an effect of increasing

hostility, fear and distrust, and decreasing morale in the staff, so
that when most support and cooperation was needed, there was the

least possibility for it.
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Summary

Why did Kensington Fail?

The principal blamed Kensington's
failure on adverse public
opinion, and lack of resources.

Some of the teachers blamed the
failure

on the non-supportive Milford district.

While these were some of the

factors working against Kensington, there
were others.
some of the reasons Kensington failed
include:
1*

diagnosis of student population; hence
leadership style of teachers inappropriate
to students' needs.

2.

Principal's leadership style inappropriate
to teachers' needs.
Principal lacked
flexibility in leadership style; hence
could not adapt to changing teacher needs.

3.

Both teachers and principal attempted a
reverse change cycle according to Life
Cycle Theory, creating confusion, fear,
hostility, and distrust. This contributed
to a breakdown in communications.

4.

Educational leaders ignored community
environment; thus cut off support and
increased hostility from environment.

5.

Qnphasis on process in the school doctrine
resulted in poor administration of nuts
and bolts items which in turn resulted in
all round frustration.

6.

The design of the building created
frustration.

7.

The Milford district's failure to obtain
outside funding for its curriculum project
caused Kensington to become a scapegoat.

To summarize,
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—Change

C ase Two;

In A Newspaper

Background

This case is taken from Behind The From(1974).

by Chrl3 Argyri3

Motivated by his interest in "the
processes needed to enhance

organizational health and create effective
on-going renewal activities

within organizations (p. ix)," Argyris,
during the sixties, chose as a
field for his research a major American
newspaper of considerable
renown.
He had three reasons for electing to study
this successful

organization.
1.

So far as he could see, the communications
media had shown little interest in learning
how healthy organizations can be designed
and managed effectively [p.x.].

2.

He had never studied an organization that
was skeptical about the value of behavioral
science.
If he could be admitted to do
research in an un-cooperative organization,
he ’might learn more about the process of
gaining credibility where we need it most
[p.x].
’

3*

He wanted to learn what impact the internal
system of the newspaper had upon the perceptions, thoughts and writing of those
who worked for it [p.x].

After initiating an interview with the President and senior

executives of the newspaper during which he declared his motives and
outlined his proposed study, Argyris was invited in.

For three years Argyris interviewed top management, observed
and analyzed their meetings and conducted training seminars.

At the

end of the third year, his attempt to bring about organizational self
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renewal quietly ground to a halt.

Because of increasing fear and

resistance, the newspaper executives decided to
discontinue the seminars

and the change program ended, "not with a bang, but a whimper."

Before Change

The Environment

The American press had been under attack for having grown remote
and unresponsive to its public.

A national blueribbon task force,

privately financed, cited as causes of this situation, a lack of nation-

wide standards, non-competitive salaries, too much emphasis on the
sensational and dramatic, decreased competition between newspapers, and
control of newspapers by individuals who are forced to be profit
conscious.

In response, the task force recommended that a national

press council be established to control these problems.

The Organization

The increasingly critical environment was beginning to cause
some creditility problems for the Daily Planet.

However, in spite of

this, the Planet had a fine reputation, was acknowledged to be a news-

paper of high professional standards, and was judged both by the

sponsors of the task force and others in the field to be an excellent
newspaper.

Organizational consultant Dr. Chris Argyris chose to study this

newspaper for three reasons:
1.

He wanted to learn how healthy organizations can be designed
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and managed effectively
so as to create within
themselves on-going renewal
activities. So far as he could
see, the communications
media ted shown
little interest in such
activities.
He wanted to learn what
impact the internal system
of the
organization ted upon the perceptions,
thoughts, and writing of the
2.

employees.
3.

He wanted to study an
organization that was skeptical
about

the value of behavioral science.

He felt that in a resistant
organiza-

tion he could learn more about the
process of gaining credibility for
the
behavioral sciences "where we need it
most [p.x]." According to Argyris,
the Daily Planet was "full of executives
who genuinely did not believe

[p.x]" in his approach.

As one informant told Argyris, "To
put it mildly,

they would consider your views to be
nonsense [p.x]."
In order to preserve anonymity, Argyris
did not supply many

details about the newspaper's organizational
structure.

We can glean

however, that the Daily Planet was a heirarchical
bureaucracy with the

following structure:
®° ar ^

Board of the corporation that
publishes the newspaper

.

President

member of the Board and
publisher of the newspaper

Executive Vice-President
Vice Presidents

Senior Editors
Editors
Copy Editors

Reporters

1

-

Executive Committee
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Argyris focussed his study
on "the top forty
executives [p. 2 ]»
at "the highest levels of
editorial, news and
administrative activity
tp- 2J."
After he asked for their
cooperation, declared his motives,
and described possible pay-offs
for them, they invited him
in to make
the study, although expressing
reservations. One old timer
warned
Argyris, "Hell, it's like tilting
with windmills to think you
can
change anything in this place
[p. 40]."
The Tod Forty Officials

For one year Argyris interviewed and
carefully observed the meetings of this group.

From this study, he formed a diagnosis
of their at-

titudes and behavior regarding work,
competitiveness, meetings, decision
making, leadership, conflict, self perceptions,
and feelings of pessimism
Work.

Over three quarters of this group believed that
being

task oriented, working hard, and producing led
to promotion and raises,

and that their effectiveness was measured by how
well they performed
their tasks.

Working hard also fulfilled a need to feel essential to

the success of the newspaper which was, in turn, essential
to the

nation.

Working for the prestigious Daily Planet also satisfied the

need for confirmation that professionally one was above average to tops.
An overwhelming majority said their need for security was satisfied by

the Planet's backing up its employees' articles.

84# expressed enjoy-

ment in overcoming intellectual challenges which were seen
challenges.

as personal

Almost all said they sought jobs which provided this kind

of challenge, and 80 % said that working for the Planet was intellectually
challenging.
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Competition

Almost all described colleagues as
very competitive.
They're competitive as the devil; they're
competitive for a sandwich [p. 10].
Furthermore, almost everyone, including the
president, felt that compet-

itiveness is a good quality in news people.

Stories were often secretly

assigned to several different reporters, who were
thus placed in severe
competition.

As support for this, two administrators cited
a letter by

the president which said in effect that a good
staff is a restless
staff, and that the company is not an old age home.
If we're honest, I'd have to say that we're
so competitive that our reaction is... who
cares about the old guys (those demoted)
just so long as it isn't me [p. 2].

Discussions of important issues were commonly competitive winlose interchanges, enjoyed and seen as "fun" by most of the group.

"That's the name of the game [p. 11]" said one administrator.

Said

another:

Somebody defined a good newspaperman as being
like a kid who murders his parents and then
pleads sympathy from the court because he is
an orphan [p. 10].

After observing fifty meetings, Argyris commented that the scores for

members not helping others were the highest he had recorded in all his
studies.

Those scores indicated that people were cutting each other

off in order to seize scarce air time.
According to Argyris, this focus on winning intellectual

challenges resulted in managers speaking in a persuasive or selling

manner in meetings.

Others immunized themselves by deflating him,
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cutting off his speech, tuning him
out, or listening to find
weaknesses.
Meetings.

The general feeling was that group
meetings were a

waste of time, and what was needed was
a good, strong leader.

82 % of

the top group spoke in a derogatory
manner about meetings.
If I had my way I’d cancel all group
meetings....
They re a big waste of time.... You get
people
who. .repeat, repeat, repeat to impress
the
boss, I guess and who are unbelievably
stupid
,

—

.

—

[p. 15].

Meetings were considered poor places to explore new
ideas.

Members characteristically resolved ambiguous issues
immediately, without discussion.

One executive said:

You can throw them anything and they’ll have
the answer [p. 13 ].
As a result, meetings were considered places where only
unimportant

issues were discussed.
Almost three-quarters of this group saw meetings as a place for
the chairman to set forth his ideas, and thought this was appropriate.

Because the superior's needs were made the center of attention, comments
and ideas of the superior often became orders to those below, often to
the superior's surprise:

There's a tendency for some people to walk out
of the room thinking they heard an order and
pass it down as a command, when in fact the
intention most of the time is to raise a
question [p. 27 ].

Decision-making

.

In meetings, subordinates presented their

views persuasively, argued down the other side, and waited for the
ruling from on high.

Threatening decisions were passed upward, often
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to the president.

This helped lower levels
play it safe and "get
off
the hook [p. 26].» Argyris
observed that when the buck
landed at the
top, the top accepted it,
and even seemed to enjoy
making the decision.
Important decision-making was
thus centralized at the top.
Hany were aware of the dependency
of executives upon the president,
and
their easily given acquiescence
to what he asked.

Disagreement with the

president was often difficult to discern
because it was put so mildly.
It was usually followed by the
individual assuring the president
that

having raised his doubts, he would now
go along with the president's
decision, even before the president had
reacted.
The executive committee, advisory to
the president, was seen by
the majority of its own members as being
ineffective.

Said one member

of that committee:
It's not a very effective group
First of all
by and large, the executive committee has not
dealt with important issues, and has tended to
deal with minor matters. Secondly, it is highly
indecisive. Thirdly, there is little evidence
of trust, and there have been few indications
of past successes on which we could build. There
is very little data brought to bear, and decisions,
when they are taken, all too frequently are taken
by default; we don’t take any action, but that
in effect, is making a decision.
In other cases
we are in a crisis situation and time has run out,
and something has to be done. And we just walk
out on it
[p. 36].
As well as being passed upwards, decisions were made in secrecy.

70$ of the top forty believed, "This is a management by secrets and

conspiracies

Our management wants to do something without saying so;

it's the hallmark of our style [p. 22]."
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0f these administrators
believed that groups

are effective when they have
a strong leader.

A leader is one who runs

disciplined meetings, and knows
what the decisions should
be before the
meeting begins. They identified
two types of leaders in
their organization; one type was directive
and controlling, the other
passive and with-

drawn.

Most said that the majority of
leaders in the newspaper were in

category one.
1.

Most of the top people are brilliant,
insecure, emotional, with a need to
dominate [p. 29].

2.

Most of the executives really want
participation until we disagree with
them [p. 29].

Though approved of, strong leadership was
nevertheless risky in
this organization.

As an example:

for supervising conflicted situations

in which performance was relatively effective,
management sought exec-

utives who were "diplomatic [p. 40]" and could
"help the situation defuse
[p. 40]."

If performance was highly ineffective, they
sought more

aggressive executives who were charged with "cleaning up
the mess
[p. 40]," while warned to "go easy lest there be union
difficulties or

someone hurt [p. 40]."

However, executives who upset the system while

"cleaning up the mess", even if successful, were apt to find themselves

ostracized and not supported.

One administrator described what happened

to another in such a situation:

What I admired S for most, when he took over, he
had to get rid of the old layers, and he did.
In doing that, in my opinion, S committed suicide
on this paper.
It is too bad in many ways.
That
was the mission that descended upon him, and I
admire him for having done it. At the same time
I admire him... I don't want to do it myself... [p. 40].
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Because of this, cautious administrators
spent much time and
effort "setting up [p. 41]" people for
change.

You have to start a long way in advance,
say three or six months and longer.
You
have to plant seeds in people's minds

[p. 41].

Being cautious reached a point where
some key executives felt forced to
use subterfuge to manage change.
Conflict..

One executive summed it up this way:

Conflict resolution is conflict supression.
Now you see it; now you don't [p. 19 ].
The prevailing opinion was that conflict should be
managed "diplomat-

ically [p. 19]," that is covertly.

"Diplomatic" handling meant, for

91%, that when interpersonal conflict arises, an effective leader "tells

a joke to cool things off [p. 19 ]."
[p. 19]" were other methods.

"Bury it [p. 19 ]" or "hide it

Said one administrator:

I have a horror of conflict
So I idle
around the thing, and only go to confronttation when it is the last desperate resort [p. 19 ].

Management dealt with a dispute between the reporters and the

copy editors by setting rules that reporters were not permitted to talk
to copy editors directly, only through "channels".

Demotion, another

conflict-ridden situation, was handled by "easing out a person and
putting him on the shelf [p. 21]."

One executive explained:

We don't demote a person around here. He doesn't
get a demotion on the chart. In fact, it may
show up as a promotion. This company is known
for cushioning the shock [p. 21 ].

Self-perception

.

Top management had a desire to run a "humane"

system, and rated themselves high on encouraging the expression of
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others’ views, and on openness
to new ideas.

Said one executive:

am trying to get people to be
open.
is unusual in our business
I

This

[p. 3.].

Said another:

Every morning I assign them their
work
I
try to be gentle with them.
I try to avoid
being authoritarian. Of course, it
is up
to me to show then the way to do
the job.
I’ve got to assume that the way I do
it is
correct [p. 31].
The executives were seen by their
subordinates as being unaware

of the gap between their self-perception of
openness, and their behavior which caused conformity and dependence.
breaking the norms of the system.

appear "like a damn fool [p. 39 ]."

Subordinates feared

To do so would make an individual

Said one reporter,

If you ever tried to deal with issues openly
and directly, everyone would ask, 'What the
hell does he think he's doing [p. 39]?'

Pessimism.

The group, according to Argyris, had a deep and

open pessimism about changing human nature.

Many expressed a sense of

helplessness about changing internal conditions.

"Not you, or anyone

else will ever change this place [p. xi]," was a prediction Argyris
heard often.

One editor said:

After a while, you wonder if this is all worth it.
What the hell is life all about? Is this what I
should be doing? Maybe I should go back to my
typewriter [p. 32].

The Reporters

According to Argyris, "resistance from the upper levels [p. 45 ]"
prevented him from studying the reporters.

Therefore they will be
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included in this study only as they
bear upon the upper administration.
Some important facts that emerged
from interviews of twenty young
reporters were that they:
1.

have a need for recognition
[p. 49].

2.

have a need for immediate feedback
[p. 49].

3.

doubt their capacity to take action:
"Host
of us like to rattle things around but
what
the hell would we do if it were our
job to
resolve them [p. 54]?"

—

4

.

expect authoritarian leadership: "The boss
has to show tight control, and it's our job
to complain about his control [p. 63]."

During Change

Feedback of the Diagnosis

Feedback Meeting

This was the first meeting in a two year series of interventions.

For one and a half days, the top fifteen news, editorial and administrative executives discussed the report containing Argyris' analysis

of the newspaper’s "living system

[p.

1 ]."

utives were concerned with nine issues.

were the findings?

At this meeting, the exec-

How desirable or undesirable

Said one, "How else would you run our business

[p. 73 ]?

M

tions.

They sought explanation of the technical details of his

They asked Argyris how they compared with other organiza-

analysis, and challenged the validity of his research methods.

They

asked Argyris to identify persons whose behavior was being discussed.
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They questioned the results of the study:
A:

Argyris:

I thought (those meetings) were
well
conducted and very productive. Are
you saying I'm wrong about that?

I'm saying that almost none of the people
interviewed would agree with you [p. 77].

I

They expressed disappointment and anger at being
misunderstood by subordinates:
Hell, people may think that, but that's not
our intention (said with anger) [p. 76].

Some openly questioned the advisability of continuing with the
program.

Argyris' suggestion of periodic half day meetings to discuss

organizational issues and to diagnose the behavior of group members,

was met with many questions.

Why was training necessary?

Should feel-

ings be discussed?
I just

question the desirability of having a
sort of group theraputic self-examination [p. 85].

Should the president's leadership be discussed?
If we are going to talk about leadership, we're
going to have to discuss the president's leadership.
Do we really want to do this [p. 85 ]?

Argyris suggested they hold a meeting without him (Argyris) present to

decide whether to undertake a change program.

The Meeting with the President

The president told Argyris three weeks later that all but
had voted to go ahead.

one

He went on to state that he was planning

certain changes, and asked Argyris to guarantee that promotions,
demotions, and the jobs of each top executive would not be discussed
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in the learning experience.

He felt such discussion would
threaten the

men who had questions about their jobs.

Argyris said no, and suggested

the president think carefully about
continuing to employ Argyris in the

study
After several weeks, the president independently
made a round

of changes in the top management.

He promised Argyris that this was

the final change, and that he would not now require
any constraints in
a learning seminar.

Argyris agreed to return in two months for a

planning meeting, if the president would tell the group the
reason why
the program had been postponed.

The president agreed.

Planning for the Learning Seminar

The Planning Meeting

The president opened the meeting stating its objective:

discuss various designs for a conference away from the office.

to

Argyris

then made a presentation in which he stated that the conference would
focus on "increasing our effectiveness in dealing with human relation-

ships [p. 90]," ways of using power effectively, and leadership styles.
Real life organizational problems would be gathered in pre-conference

interviews, and become the springboard for discussing these issues.

After giving his rationale for exploring behavior, he closed by
recommending a week long conference.
The executives responded with many questions.

session be worthwhile?

Said one:

Would the
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can't see the value of it to us, in
a way
that it would actually affect our
future
actions as executives of the organization...
Maybe it will relieve people of feelings.
I can't see it myself, but that
doesn’t mean
that I won't give it a try [p. 92].
I

Were they going to make real decisions about
actual business problems?
In that case, said one executive, "We'd better
reserve this place for

a month [p. 93 ]."

Would examining personal behavior accentuate

difficulties?

How do you (Argyris) know a conference like
this might not make interpersonal conflict
even worse [p. 92]?
Can systems really be managed by focussing on personal needs; would it
not make more sense to discuss new kinds of structures rather than

interpersonal relationships?
Argyris responded to all these concerns, stating that the group

might experiment to see if the session was worthwhile, and that it
could be stopped whenever there was agreement it was not; that he
would work hard to see that no one got hurt; that no one would be
coerced to do or say anything; that the conference should be at least
five days; that the entire top group be invited but not required to

attend, and that effectiveness depends on making explicit the present

covert personality-centered management style of the group, so that the
system could be oriented towards growth and innovation instead of

defenses and anxieties.

The meeting ended with a commitment for hold-

ing the conference, for two and a half days.
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The Learning Seminar

Session One:

Dav One, evenin g

The group was composed of approximately fifteen
members of top

management, men in their forties and fifties.

On arrival, each member

was given an agenda containing the five issues
gathered in the preseminar interviews.

These were:

1.

The president:
his role, his style of
leadership; his hopes and aspirations
for the organization [p. 96].

2.

The executive committee: why is it
unable to take action [p. 97]?

3-

The long-range development of the
newspaper [p. 97].

4.

The relationship between departments [p. 98].

5.

The total organization, including
subsidiaries:
its future growth [p. 98].

Argyris began this session by reiterating the objectives for
the seminar.

During the evening, the members attempted to decide which

of the agenda items to discuss, with no success.

One member finally

said:

One and two are the guts
Look, let's face it.
of the issue. A lot of us are leery. We're
dancing around it... We 're simply postponing
the moment of truth [p. 114].

The session ended with an agreement to discuss items one and two during
the next session, and a request for drinks.
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Session Four:

Dav Tw o, afternoon

During this session, several
agenda items were put forth and
ignored.
When time ran out, members quickly
agreed that in the next

session they would focus on "the new
feature [p. 120]," an issue that
had a four year history in the paper.

Session Fiv e:

Dav Two, evening

In this session, one member proposed a
compromise plan for

producing the new feature.

No agreement was reached to accept this

plan.

Session Six:

Dav Three, morning

Argyris opened this session by asking if people would like to
discuss how they felt about the previous night’s session.

The director

of the editorial department revealed hurt feelings over the previous
session.

He felt his department had been destructively attacked.

There

ensued four hours of discussion, after which the director said that he
now thought the whole process of the seminar was worth a serious try.

Argyris noted that this was the first overt change of commitment to
the learning seminar.

Session Seven:

Dav Three, afternoon

Most of the time in this session was spent in conceptualizing
the progress of the group to date.
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Session Eigh t:

Dav Three, evening

Argyris opened this session by reminding the
group that it had

made a commitment to discuss leadership styles,
particularly the
president’s.

Despite both the president’s and Argyris’ efforts,
the

group avoided this issue, and instead attacked
Argyris:

When we finish with this exercise, you (Argyris)
go back to your school. These men have to
live with each other. Your idea is to force
us to tell the truth directly to the president.
This will be clarifying, and you think purifying.
I think it could be destructive.
That explains
the silence in the room [p. 131].

Session Nine:

Dav Four, morning

During this session, several members gave feedback to other
members; one for fifteen uninterrupted minutes.

Session Ten:

Dav Four, afternoon

The member who had received lengthy feedback during the previous
session, received more, and raised the issue of how to use it back on
the job.

Session Eleven:

Dav Four, evening

Argyris gave a short lecture on the giving and receiving of feedback; discussion of feedback followed.
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C onclusion of t h e Learning Seminar

After the feedback lecture and
discussion, all members said that
more progress had been made than they
had expected.
Several said it was
one of the most meaningful experiences
they had with that group.

Some

raised the possibility of continuing the
seminar which had already gone
a day and a half over the set time.

The decision was made to stop.

Some wanted to set a date for a follow-up session.

Evaluat ion of the Learning Seminar

Two weeks after the seminar, Argyris interviewed all
the participants.

Some of the responses they gave in the evaluation
1.

Little behavioral change had occurred.
Experimenting took place only with
fellow seminar participants [p. 142].

2.

One executive wanted to start a similar
program in his department [p. 142].

3.

The president reported no behavioral change;
however, he felt others showed signs of
taking initiative, though all too few [p. 142].

4.

One person who reported positive feelings to
Argyris, secretly reported a contrary message
to the president, and asked to be excluded
from any experiences [p. 143].

included:

One month later, a meeting was held to assess people's views, and
if desired, to plan the next step.

Although members began at this meet-

ing, according to Argyris, for the first time to explore openly the connec-

tion between success on the job, and feelings of personal self- esteem,

opinion in the group was divided on whether or not to go ahead.

The meet-

ing ended with members agreeing to another meeting to discuss next steps.
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Consequences of the Learning Seminar
The New Feature

The issue of the new feature, which had been raised
at the
learning seminar, was continued in this subsequent meeting.

Who would

have leadership of the new feature, the news department, or the
editorial
department?

The director of the editorial department felt that because

he had a long history of involvement with the new feature, it should be
part of his department.

The director of the news department was

concerned that if his department had to give up ten percent of its
space to the editorial department for the new feature, he would be

"stoned [p. 155]" by his subordinates.
At this critical point in the meeting, when each side had

clarified its stand, the president stated he had to leave to catch a
plane, and asked that the meeting be stopped.

He then asked if the

next step should be a series of one-to-one meetings.
this.

No one supported

He asked if the group wanted him to make the decision.

said no.

They

The meeting ended with a promise to meet again.
No such meeting took place.

Several months later the president

announced his decision to place the new feature under the control of
the editorial department.

"There wasn't enough time [p. 158]," he told

Argyris.
Besides, this decision has been over four
years in the making and I knew they weren't
going to make it. So I made it [p. 158].

The news director's reaction, according to Argyris, was mild

anger and disappointment.

He said:
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The president does whatever he
wants to do.
lhat s the trouble with this
stuff
(behavioral science).
If the man at the
top doesn’t really believe in
it. then I
wonder [p. 158].
The editorial director, however, was
concerned about the hostility

emanating from the news department.

Several days later he reported to

Argyris he had been ridiculed and humiliated
at lunch by the director
of news, who was

’’out to

knife [p. 160]" him.

meet to discuss these issues.

Argyris suggested they

Several weeks later, Argyris was asked

to attend such a meeting.

Editoria l and News Explore their Prohlpm^

When the director of news gave his version of what had
happened

at lunch, it became clear to the editorial director that there
was no

intention to hurt him.

The two executives then proceeded to discuss

other issues concerning them.

They discovered areas of agreement; they

both agreed there was too much subjective interpretation in the paper.

The news director said his deepest concern was finding a way for both

of them to come together.

At the end of the meeting both said it had

been very helpful; it had shown that their problems were solveable.
The director of news set a date for Argyris to meet with his department.

The Meeting with the News Department

This meeting was attended by the director of news and seven of
his immediate subordinates.

Argyris outlined the problems as set forth

in his initial report, described the type of learning experience he

proposed, and its objectives.

The members expressed many fears and
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objections, summarized in the
following list:
1

-

Homogenization

sneak y deling, not
that you are trying to
pull
anything over on us, but
that
leadership styles will get
homogenized.
I’m not convinced that any single leadership
style works the same way for
everybody [p. 186].

2.

Feedback is
harmful and
negative

What bothers me is every time
I discuss something with
you
(Argyris), your approach is
negative [p. 189].

3.

Waste of time

The reason I think it’ll be
a waste of time is because
we've been talking for maybe
an hour, and nothing relates
to me [p. 188].

4.

Artificial

We don't have councils of war
like this. When you were here
before and we had those meetings,
they were bullshit, if I can
be blunt [p. 189].

5.

Unnecessary

They maintained that things had
changed since the last report.
However, the director was resistant to Argyris making a new study
of his department [p. 191].

After four hours, the news director asked for a decision.

The

group s answer was that he should make the decision, saying:
If a director feels that this (project) would
be beneficial
then we ought to do it, no
matter what [p. 198].

Argyris urged the director to let the group take responsibility for
this decision.

The group then voted against the project:

five voted

no, the director voted yes, and two remained undecided.

In interviews after the meeting, members expressed further

reasons for their resistance.

Some of these include:
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belief that the president had
pressured the
unwilling director into the meeting
(two
members) [p. 203].

2.

Argyris had pressured the unwilling
director
into the meeting [p. 204].

3.

Opening old wounds would destroy good
working relationships [p. 205].

4.

Changing behavior would be ineffective.
"Let’s say you (Argyris) make me work at
a slower pace.
I don't think this job is
manageable without a fast pace [p. 208]."

The President Meets the Editorial Demrtmpnt-.

During three meetings after the learning seminar, the president

and the director of the editorial department stated their concerns
to
each other.

The basic concerns are summarized in the following chart:

President

Editorial Director

As president and publisher, we
have to keep this corporation
going and... have to perform
some very dangerous balancing
acts between the board and the
editorial group [p. 172].

Although the president has
final authority and veto
power over the editorial
page, he should not publish
an editorial promoting any
corporate interest, including the paper's own.

The tone of the editorial page
is too strong, too much on the
attack. The president described
his feelings when several board
members read the editorial to
find their company's actions
condemned [p. 176].

For years the editorials
were flabby.
I was determined that if I made it
to the editorial group,
I'd begin writing editorials
that said something [p. 173]-

Figure 28.

A

Comparison the President and Editorial Director's Concerns
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In the third meeting, in response
to the president’s statement

that he had never been able to have
a ’’rational discussion that
would
lead somewhere [p. 179]’’ with his
executive group, the editorial

director suggested the top people meet
regularly to talk about important
issues.

Such meetings had not previously taken
place.

Both the

president and the editorial director agreed that
this had been a very

important meeting; it had broken down old barriers
to action, old myths,
and created an atmosphere of willingness to experiment.
The president said the next step was to hold a meeting
with a
few more top people.

After several months, with no meeting called, the

president explained to Argyris that the problem was ’’getting these
guys

together [p. 181]."

Argyris asked to have a meeting with those who had

attended the seminar, to test their commitment.

The president agreed.

The Final Meeting of the Tod Group

Three months after the president had agreed to call this meeting,
he called Argyris and apologized for the delay, saying several executives

had been travelling.

The final meeting was attended by the president and

three top people in the news and editorial departments.

Its objective

was to explore their commitment to further organizational development.
They began by describing important problems, some of which included:
1.

The president was concerned that there be
a better dynamics of choice than previously
to fill several key positions during the next
”I’d rather not make the decision
few years.
in a little dark room by myself, and then have
arguments with you for the next three or four
years [p. 221]."
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3-

The group's willingness to
discuss organizational problems and their behavior
as a
group [p. 225].

After these and other issues had
been discussed, the president
asked if
the next step was not to set up
another
meeting.

All agreed.

The news

director then said to Argyris:
really admire you... The desire to stay
with
us through all these years that's
great If
I were him (Argyris)
I would have walked out
two years ago
[p. 226].
I

—

,

After this meeting, Argyris received letters and
telephone calls,

assuring him of "everyone's great interest" in continuing
the program,
but no further meeting was ever called.

After Change

According to the president, there were two reasons why no
further meetings were called:
plans.

one was extended travel and vacation

The second, and more important, was that a new top management

team was being appointed.

The president said he wanted Argyris to

continue working with the new top team.
new team expressed interest.

Argyris said he would if the

Up to the time this case was published,

it had not.

Argyris interviewed eight of the top ten executives to gather
their reactions to the whole program.
1.

Some concluded:

We became aware of our lack of
communication [p. 232].
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I remember it as something
fine that almost
came about [p. 232].

.

3-

Our problem was that we never
learned the
concepts or the skills [p. 232].

4.

We were unable to learn the
language of
genuine openness [p. 232].

5.

There is probably not very much
behavioral
change. .. .People didn't change their
'spots [p. 232].

The majority expressed feelings that,
although the learning
session raised the level of openness and
candor,
the behavioral patterns have not improved.
In
fact, the results may be contrary.
We have

more difficulties, such as competitiveness and
secrecy.
I see growing signs of empire-building,
efforts at personal publicity, secrecy, unwillingness to tell other people what is going
on and I think it's going to get worse [p. 234].

—

One change that did occur has remained.

"The strident tone of

the editorial page has diminished significantly [p. 236]."

Analysis of Case Two

Before Change

This newspaper will break your goddamn heart
The paper does not owe you a goddamn thing.
I tell my people that they should work hard
like hell because that is what they really
want.
An executive on the Daily Planet

The Situation

The organization

.

Although we are given few details about the

organizational structure of the Daily Planet, we do learn that it is,
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over all, a traditional bureaucracy.

managers with a short span of control.
"top administrators [p. 2].»

It has many departments,
and many

For example, there are forty

It emphasizes formal rules,
"channels of

communication [p. 38 ]" and adheres to
unspoken norms.

Although there

is constant evaluation of effectiveness
in performing tasks, negative

evaluation is withheld.

As Baldrige (1971) states, an
"emasculating

promotion" process is practiced, which
promotes administrators who are

negatively evaluated, up and out of power.
The task of the newspaper requires it to
be alert to almost

hourly changes in the environment, and to ingest
constant feedback, in
an atmosphere of high stress and uncertainty.

All departments, news,

editorial, and reporting, work under great time pressure,
at complex

interdependent tasks, for immediate, short term goals.

must meet daily deadlines.

A newspaper

The executive branch must also be concerned

with long term goals, such as the future of the newspaper, and operate
with the time frame of years.
In general, this is a highly differentiated organization,

operating under conditions which require directive leadership and swift
decisions in daily operations.
problem.

Integration is a constant and accepted

Communications are commonly vertical, one a one-to-one basis.

Decision-making is centralized at the top executive level.
usually carried out in secret.

This has helped erode trust.

It is

High

competitiveness and a win-lose orientation have further lowered trust
until it is non-existent.

The interpersonal orientation of the depart-

ments is towards task; social relationships are usually attempted in
nearby bars where people "blow off steam

[p.

55 J" and try to get close.
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However, as one reported said,
"You feel elose (in bar S )y et you are
not close [p. 55]."

All this has resulted in internal
diffieulties in the newspaper.
Decisions are often passed to the
president, accompanied by subsequent
complaints. Turnover in administrators
is fairly frequent, once at the

beginning of Argyris intervention, and
again at the end.

As Argyris

predicted, angry resignations and
psychological withdrawals over

secretive job shifts were increasing; the
younger more aggressive

reporters were increasingly demanding more
influence in managerial
activities.

There were increasing problems between the
president and

the board over the growing subjective and
anti-big business tone of the

newspaper.
T he environment

.

Without, the paper was just beginning to lose

some of its credibility with its constituencies.

One prominent editor

had begun to publically criticize the newspaper.

Nationally, a dis-

gruntled public had created a task force which had studied the American
press and recommended a national press council to raise standards.

How-

ever, in spite of all this, the Daily Planet still maintained its ’'fine

reputation [p. 42]" as an excellent newspaper.

Its problems had not yet

reached a crisis stage.

Resistance to change

.

This case presents a paradox.

The

president and administrators allowed Argyris to carry out a study

involving a change program oriented towards participative management.
Yet, in the final analysis, they wanted to carry on in the traditional

bureaucratic way.

Ironically, the administration met many problems by

repeating more strongly the behaviors and practices which had initially
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caused the problems.
program?

Why was there such
resistance to the ctenge

And why did it fail?

One answer may lie in
the leadership

styles of the key group.
The Followers

The top forty administrators
of the newspaper had two
roles:
they were leaders in their own
departments, and followers in
their

relationship to the president.

This analysis will concentrate
on the

top forty as an administrative group
subordinate to the president.
A bility to take responsibility

.

The task relevant experience

of this group in the workings of a
newspaper was very high.

The Daily

Planet had a tradition of promotion from
within; administrators rose

through the ranks.

The director of the editorial department,
for

example, had worked his way up from reporter.

They were thus generally

able to take responsibility.
A chievement motivation

.

According to McClelland’s definition,

this group was highly achievement oriented.

calculated manner, with great caution.

was spent "setting up [p.

4 .]"

Risks were taken in a

For example, up to six months

for an attempt at change.

Almost every-

one said they sought intellectually challenging jobs, and that working
for the Planet provided this kind of challenge.

Intellectual challenges,

seen as personal challenges, were opportunities for win-lose inter-

changes which were enjoyed and seen as "part of the game [p. 11]."
a group, they were highly competitive in everything.

As

When Argyris

presented his diagnosis, they immediately wanted to know how they

compared to other organizations Argyris had studied.

Competitiveness

1H4

was considered a good quality
in news people, and was
an approved,
accepted group norm.
Constant feedback was important
as a check on effectiveness.
In itself, working for the
prestigious Planet provided confirmation
that one was competent. Promotions
and raises were a measure of how
well one was doing; success on the
job was of prime importance.

W illingness to take responsibility

,

take responsibility, this group was
divided.

in terms of willingness to

As leaders to the middle

echelons, they were very willing to take
responsibility in their departments.

This was shown in the training of reporters
and copy editors.

As one manager said,

Every morning I assign them their work... It is up
to me to show them the way to do the job
[p. 31].
In this role, their leadership style was high task
and low relationships,
a style expected and considered appropriate by the
reporters.

All the

reporters interviewed agreed that "the boss has to show tight control
[p.

63 ]."

Their effectiveness as leaders in their own departments was

reflected in the Planet’s reputation for high professional standards
and excellence in writing.
As a policy making executive group reporting to the president,

this group was unwilling to take responsibility, as illustrated in
their decision-making process.

decisions was well established.
discuss the problem.

The procedure for handling policy
First, the lower echelons met to

Each side stated its position, argued the other

side down, and waited for the superior to make the decision.

If two

departments were involved, the middle management met, argued the other

145

side down, and waited for top
management to make the decision.
This
process was often repeated until
the buck stopped with the
president.
In this manner, meetings
became competitions for air
time, and decision-

making was avoided.
Maturity of the followers .

Although, according to Argyris'

description of maturity, this administrative
group would be generally
immature (see figure 14), according to
Life Cycle Theory, these

administrators would be "mature" in relation
to their departments, and
"immature" only as they related to the
president.

In their own depart-

ments, their "maturity" would be very high,
as discussed above.

figure 29).

(See

Thus, the appropriate leadership style for
their superiors

to adopt for them as leaders within their
department would be quadrant
four;

low task and low relationshps

.

This in fact was generally the

practice.
On the other hand, the "maturity" level of these administrators

as executive decision makers relating to the president, would be low.
(See figure 30).

They were unwilling to accept responsibility; they

were not motivated to try, and they had no experience in acting as an

administrative unit because they had never been trained to do it.

Thus

the appropriate leadership style at this time for these executives, if
the president wanted group decision making, would be quadrant one; high

task and low relationships.

This in fact was the primary leadership

style adopted by the president.
decisions.

Yet the executives avoided making

In order to account for this apparent contradiction, let us

examine the president’s leadership style in more depth.
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Continuum

.Task Relevant Experience

Figure 29-

Maturity Level of Administrators as Leaders in
their own Departments

Appropriate
initial
leadership
style with
Administrative
Group

—

above
average

average

bel*ow

average

Maturity Continuum

4
Ach
.Willingness
.Ability
.Task Relevant Experience

.n

Figure 30.

Maturity Level of Administrative Group as They
Relate to the President

During Change

Authoritarian organizations tend
to develop
dependent people and few leaders.
Rensis Likert

The President:

Primary Leadership si-yio

T ask behavior

.

Over the two year intervention
period, the

president's leadership style

ma

one to on*

was primarily

quadrant one; high task and low relationships.

He usually explained

when, where and how to accomplish tasks;
for example, he customarily

opened meetings by stating their objective.

length of the learning seminar with Argyris.

He attempted to set the
He endeavoured to formal-

ize channels of communication when he established
the executive committee, and when he volunteered to become a mediator
between the director

of news and the director of the editorial department.

He established

patterns of organization when he placed the new feature under the

control of the editorial department.

He attempted to establish better

ways of getting the job done when he supported Argyris' change program,

and set up various meetings for Argyris.

During the learning seminar,

he attempted to focus the discussion on his leadership style.

Relationships behavior

.

We have almost no evidence of the

president developing personal relationships with members of the executive group, giving them socio-emotional support or psychological
strokes, or of engaging in interpersonal communication.
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—Secondary Leadership stylp

T he President:

The president's secondary
leadership style, in respect
to his
executives aa^roup, was quadrant
four; low task and low
relationships
As we have shown, the
appropriate leadership style,
according to Life
Cycle Theory, for the floudering
executive co^ittee, would be
q^drant
one; high task and low relationships.
(See figure 31).

Yet the

president largely ignored the executive
committee, the group which he
said he wanted to take an active
role in policy making.
Lacking
direction, the executive group became
more and more ineffective.

Their

ineffeciveness attests to the inappropriateness
of the president's

quadrant four style with them.

Appropriate
leadership
style for
executive
committee
at this time

above
average

average

!

;

*
Figure 31

1

•

below
average; <

—

»—

I

Diagnosis of Executive Committee

Executive
Committee s
Maturity Level
'
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It is interesting to note
in passing, that according
to Life

Cycle Theory, Argyris' leadership
style as a consultant was
also
inappropriate to this executive group.
(See figure 32).
In attempting
to use a T-group approach, with
an emphasis on interpersonal
relations,

Argyris was using a quadrant three
high relationships and low task
style.

Life Cycle Theory would predict that
this approach would fail

with this group, as indeed it did.

Leadership
style
practiced
by Argyris

o’

Q

Leadership
style
by president

ht

(
l

I

R

-w>

)

/

Leadership
style
initially
appropriate
to executive
committee

T
I
I

Maturity Level of
Executive Committee

Figure 32.

Leadership styles of Argyris and President in Relation to
the Executive Committee

The President:

Lack of flexibility

Although according to Life Cycle Theory the president's basic

leadership style was appropriate to the present "maturity" level of his
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administrators, he 1) did not adopt
the appropriate style on a
group
level, and 2) he lacked leadership
flexibility. Life Cycle Theory
postulates that when a group is low in
task relevant "maturity", an
effective leader begins by adopting a
quadrant one high task and low

relationships style.

As the group learns the task and
gains in

"maturity", the leader should reward the
new behavior, while gradually

increasing his or her relationships behavior
and decreasing task
behavior.

In this way, followers "mature" in the
task as the leader

progresses through quadrant two and quadrant three
leadership styles,
and finally adopts a quadrant four style when the
followers are highly
"mature" and no longer need the leader.

The president, like many of

the executives in the organization, was able to adopt
quadrant one and

quadrant four styles, but not quadrant two and three styles
involving relationships behaviors.

—

those

(See figure 33).

^President’s
style

Figure 33.

The President's Leadership Styles
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R esults of the Presiden t ’s
Leadership st-.yig

According to Life Cycle Theory, a high
task and low relationships style is initially appropriate
for followers with below average

task relevant -maturity".

However, if a leader lacks the flexibility

to adopt different styles, and maintains
a quadrant one style, he or

she will prevent followers from developing
"maturity" in the task, and

keep them dependent.

Eventually the continued use of a quadrant one

style will become inappropriate.

Follower growth will be stalemated.

This postulation is borne out in the present case.

The Daily

Planet administrators waited for the president to tell them what
to do.
The frustrated president tried various tactics to get his administrators

off their behinds.

For example, he emphasized competition, reflected

in his remark "The company is not an old age home [p. 30]."

did not respond, the president's frustration increased.

When they

In order to

get decisions made, he practiced secret decision-making, such as when
he discussed issues with one member of the executive committee, and

asked him not to tell any of the other members.

He went around exec-

utives, and talked directly to their subordinates.

Although ambivalent

about Argyris' theories, he allowed him in, verbally supported his

change program, and asked for feedback in the learning seminar.
The discrepancy between the president's verbal espousal of a

theory Y participative management approach, and his on the job theory X

behavior was clear to his subordinates.

As the director of news

observed
If the man at the top doesn't really believe in
it (participative management), then I wonder [p. 158].

153

Thus, despite the president’s verbal
efforts in the learning seminar,
the
executives would not give him feedback
on his leadership style, make

decisions, or initiate action.

As Likert (1961) observed,
"Authoritarian

organizations tend to develop dependent
people and few leaders [p. 236]."
As the president’s frustration grew,
he made more unilateral

decisions.

This increased fear and uncertainty in
the executives, who

became more cautious and secretive in their
activities.

They increased

their avoidance of decision-making, and disagreeing
with the president.
The president, at the end of the change program,
felt as though he was
"in a little dark room by himself [p. 221]" with
respect to policy
•

Top administration was caught in a downward spiral.

After Change

Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
French proverb

Orientation of the Change Program
In this change program, Argyris was attempting to raise the

awareness of administration so as to move toward a participative system

of management.

In the following chart (see figure 34), some of the

values expressed by Argyris during this case are compared to Likert's
(1961) system four of participative management [p. 223-233-]

Orientation of the Daily Planet

The orientation of the Daily Planet was more in keeping with

Likert's (1961) system one of exploitive authoritative management.
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Argyris

2.

P nt
P feelings and lustrations
^ 7iJ u
should
be dealt with when
and

where they are occurring,
confronted in their natural
setting [p. 34].

People

liking subterfuge could
be
a sign of sickness in the
system
Lp. 80].

L ikert’s Sys tem Four

Members are skilled in
group process. Machinery
for handling conflict
exists.
Atmosphere is
free of conflict.
The atmosphere is free
of
hostility, fear and distrust. Good communications.

3.

Planet executives accept this
low
quality of life because they
accept a Calvanistic-Masochistic
view of life which allows them,
and others to continue working
even though it is not much fun

There is extensive,
friendly superior-subordinate interaction.

[p. 43].
4.

Healthy organizations are selfexamining and contain on-going
renewal activities [p. ix]

Figure 3 *.
1

The work group has high
confidence, trust,
loyalty and cooperative
motivation.

Argyris' Values Compared to Likert's
System Four of
Participative Management

Decisions and goal setting were made at the top.
under fear, punishment and occasional rewards.

Subordinates worked
In addition, as Kelly

(1970) states, the attitude was taken that conflict is
to be avoided

at all costs, and scapegoats are inevitable.

Rejecti on of the Change Program

The clash between these two opposing value systems was one of
the causes of the rejection of Argyris' change program.

Rather than a

gradual developmental approach, the change program with its previously
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described orientation, was
introduced at once.

In ten* of Life
Cycle
Theory, in order to get from
quadrant one to a quadrant
four leadership
Style, a leader must gractally
progress> in order, through
aU
quadrants. So too, to develop
from system one to system
four, it
would seem appropriate to start
where the people are at,
in system one,
and progress grdually towards
system four.
Indeed, in planning for the
learning seminar, the administrators
said they felt it would make
more
ense to start by discussing new kinds
of budgeting, information, and
long-range planning structures, rather
than interpersonal difficulties.

^

Result s of the Change Program

The results of the change program were
negligible.

Although some

people reported temporary changes in attitudes,
behavior remained the
same.

The president seemed to follow his previous
behavior pattern.

In

the final meeting, he made a plea for a new,
more participative personnel

selection process, so he wouldn't have to take decisions
about filling
new key positions "in a little dark room by myself
[p. 221 j."

The

president and all members present agreed another meeting was necessary
to discuss this and other issues.

Some time after, the president told

Argyris he had not called a further meeting because a new top management
team was being appointed

— we

can infer, by the president's usual

methods.
Some administrators reported that behavior had, in fact, become

even more bureaucratic after the change program.

There was more

competitiveness, secrecy, and empire-building than before, and they
felt it would grow.
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Summary

Why Did the Cha nge Program Fail
Some of the reasons include:
The quadrant one high task
and low relationships
style practiced by the president
and administrators
was expected by subordinates;
considered
by subordinates, to a newspaper,
and was an Sorted’
norm of leadership throughout
the organization.

approve

The quadrant one leadership
style was, to that
ime, effective.
The newspaper was nationally
recognized with an excellent reputation.

Although the president supported the
participative
management approach of Argyris change
program, his
subordinates perceived his behavior as
supporting
a system one autocratic approach,
and behaved
accordingly.
4.

The values underlying Argyris' change
program
suddenly introduced, clashed with the values
of the organization.

5.

Argyris perceived problems in the organization;
the
majority of members in the organization did not.

Thus according to situational leadership theory, the
Daily Planet,

although ineffective in its human relations, was efficient in
production.
It was a theory X, system one organization that produced
a high quality,

nationally recognized newspaper.

It did not change because in the eyes

of the employees, its leadership was, and remained, appropriate to
organizational needs.
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Caa? Three:

Change

i

n th e s tate

Den*^,,,-

Background

This case is taken from
Making Waves In F oggy Bottom
by Alfred
J. Marrow (1974).
In 1964, Alfred Marrow
was invited to a luncheon
meeting by Deputy Undersecretary
of State William Crockett,
to talk
With Secretary of State Dean
Rusk and other businessmen
and betevioral
scientists about the management
problems besetting the State
Department.
From this beginning, Marrow
became an advisor to Crockett's
change
program which had as its aim the
reorganization of the State Department
into a more participative system
of management. He advised and
observed
the progress of the reorganization
through to Crockett's resignation
in
1967.

Crockett's successor, Idar Rimestad
liquidated the reorganiza-

tion program, restored the State
Department's management system to its
former status quo, and dismissed Marrow,
along with the other advisors

and consultants to the program.
When William Macomber replaced Rimestad in
1969, Marrow
received another invitation to lunch.

On this occasion, along with

Professor Harry Levinson of Harvard, he met with Deputy
Undersecretary
Macomber, Secretary William Rogers, Undersecretary Elliot
Richardson
and other senior staff members to discuss Crockett’s reorganization
program, and future reform of the management system of the State Depart-

ment.

Once again, Marrow became an advisor to a change program which

culminated successfully one year later in July 1971.
What follows is a summary of Marrow's personal account of the

progress of change over seven years in a massive bureaucracy.

In it he
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describes two change cycles:

one unsuccessful under
Crockett, and one

successful under Macomber.

Before Change

Introduction

Effecting change in the United States
Department of State, often
called the "Fudge Factory [p. 3]" would
appear to be nearly impossible.

Established in 1789, grown in the days
of Yankee Clippers, the State

Department is the oldest federal department.
II,

At the time of World War

its 2000 employees, including diplomats
trained in the classic

tradition of messages sealed in red wax, were
housed in one building.
In 1973,

the State Department employed 11,950 people.

The Secretary of State, first ranking officer in
the President's

cabinet, heads the State Department.

The deputy undersecretary of

administration is chief administrator.

Employees in 1973 included 8750

support staff, administrators, department managers, lawyers, and
secretaries, and 3200 foreign service officers.

Prior to World War II, foreign service officers were most often
sons of prominent eastern families.

After World War II, a selection

test, patterned after the traditional image, resulted in a corps of

FSOs primarily liberal arts scholars from Ivy League schools.

The

difficult foreign service examinations administered by the Foreign
Service Institute, admit a group of competent and committed people,
largely men with 5$ women.

They regard themselves as the State Depart-

ment's elite corps, are proud and jealous of their rank, perquisites,
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and the intellectual and
social status implied by
their FSO title
They
see themselves as "hunanistic,
subjective, cultural,
qualitative, and
generalizers detached from personal
conflict".
P roblems in the Sta te Department

For fifty years the Department
of State and its foreign service
have been criticized for inefficiency.
Critics have made charges of
overstaffing, and under-employment of
human resources. Possessed of
an
enormously long chain of command, the
Department has earned the reputation of being administratively rigid,
choked by red tape, sluggish

and overcautious.

These are attributed to its hierarchical
structure,

emphasis on authority as the indispensible
means of managerial control
detailed prescriptions for carrying out each
job, outmoded personnel
practices, and sanctified routines.

Over the years the State's manage-

ment problems have been examined, chided, reported
on, and experimented
with.

Sweeping changes affecting organizational structure,
staffing

and training the foreign service corps were always recommended
and
resisted.

The Bypassed Organization

Agreeing with President John Kennedy's 1962 characterization of
the State Department as a "bowl of jello [p. 7]," the bright, slightly

disrespectful young men of the Executive Branch of government devised

methods to bypass the Department's bureaucracy whenever speed in
decision making was required.

They were annoyed by the "timid" nine-

teenth century pace of foreign service diplomats in a twentieth century
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wond.

in developing internatio,*!
policies, all Presidents
chose to
rely on a few trusted men,
bypassing the 6000 people
in the Department
at home, and 6000 people
abroad.
Thus, with the power
shifted to the
White House, and the general
belittling of the State
Department by the
Washington power structure,
morale in the Department
plunged and

resentment was high.

Change Cycle One

Enter the Dragon

William

J.

Crockett was appointed deputy
undersecretary of

state for administration in 1 6
9 3

.

His reputation for unorthodox

approach to management had been gained
at the United States Embassy in
Rome.

"Results are more important than
regulations [p. 13] ,» Crockett

said.

"Regulations are not chisled in stone.

paper... they can be changed [p. 13]."

They are printed on

Crockett took on duties

following the inability of two capable
administrators to reform the
foreign service system.

His aim was major reorganization

—

one that

would encourage wider participation in problem
solving and decision

making
Through conferences and reading, Crockett had become highly
interested in Douglas McGregor's theories of management.

Recognizing

that McGregor's Theory X assumptions underlay the authoritarian system

operating in the State Department, Crockett hoped to replace this with
a Theory Y based system of flexibility and participation.
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A ction One:

Con s ul tat inn

Crockett consulted with
Alfred J. Marrow, a
psychological
consultant to organizations.
During their discussion
of the Department's
problems, Marrow suggested
that the T-group training
method might help
bring about a participative
management system.
A ction Two:

A d visory

Groups

In 1964 Crockett set up
five groups of advisors.

composed of three prominent

union Carbide; Dr. F.

A.

L.

business:

E.

E.

Fogle, vice-president

Holloway, president Esso;

chairman of the board, Harwood
Manufacturing.

Group one was

Dr. A. J. Marrow,

Their task was to advise

Crockett on introducing a more
participative management system
into the
department. G roup two
a team of National Training
Laboratories
behavioral scientists, led a series
of T-group training seminars for
,

State Department personnel that
were to increase the participant's

awareness of their behavior.

Group three was composed of internal and

external specialists in art and architecture,
building construction,
food supply, education, and others.

Their purpose was not specified

in the original case study.

Gr oup four

,

a scientific task force from the University
of

Michigan, was to evaluate the effectiveness of
the reform program.
G roup five

,

a consortium of behavioral scientists and some State
Depart-

ment officers, were to develop and implement a program
to administrate
the total reform effort, and serve as a link to N.T.L.

This was called
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D Action for
Organizational Development.

All of these groups
worked

separately and directed
their efforts to help
Crockett.

—Change

Ac tion Three:

in Structure

In June 1965 Crockett
announced a major reform
designed to reduce
bureaucratic stratification.
With Secretary of State
Rusk-s agreement,
he abolished six supervisory
layers between himself and
the operating
managers, cutting the time
required for a problem to
reach him from six
months to two days. This
eliminated 125 positions, and
caused 160

employees to be transferred to
other parts of the Department.

This

announcement was couched in Theory
Y concepts of openness,
participation, self management,
decentralization, responsibility,
and management
by objectives.
In a speech Crockett
stated:

I believe that our present
concept of decentralized
management by objectives and programs
will accomplish
these objectives by: decentralizing
our management
into self-contained, semi-independent,
and semiautonomous programs, each with a manager;
eliminating every intermediate supervisory
level; delegating almost complete authority for daily
operations
to the program managers ....[ p
20].
.

The staff perceived the reorganization
as an order, and were

dismayed at its inconsistency and premptoriness.

Grumbling, complaints

and fears were evident among those who had no
opportunity to participate
in the decision, and their resistance helped limit
Crockett's original

objectives.

The old climate of suspicion, fear, and anger was only

slightly improved.

State Department officials were generally pleased

for they could now reach the deputy undersecretary in one step.

For

timid young officers, suddenly deprived of the security of the six

layered superstructure, there was anxiety.
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Action Four:

T -Groups

Several months after the reforms had
begun, upon the advice of
his advisory group, Crockett instructed
the team of NTL behavioral

scientists to conduct training seminars for
the staff.
FSOs and senior officials attended.

More than 200

Some were coerced into attending.

Each seminar lasted one week and was held away
from the work site.

The

seminars were taped.
We will focus briefly on one seminar as an example,
conducted
in the summer of 1965 by Chris Argyris of Yale University,
and Warren

Bennis, then of MIT.

Six months prior to the seminar, Argyris held

thirty-one interviews with young FSOs to determine critical problems.
The FSOs stated that the foreign service community was characterized
by:
1.
2.
3-

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

suppression of interpersonal issues
minimal openness and trust
withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and
conflict
little risk taking and acceptance of
responsibility
overdependence on the superior
crisis orientation
cautious memo writing
an attitude of "Don’t make waves [p. 55]."

During the seminar, these issues surfaced.

The attitudes of the

foreign service officers and the administration towards each other were
revealed as illustrated in figure 35.
The seminars were rated very valuable by most participants.

Typical of the positive feelings is the following:
I’m prepared to testify personally that the
value of my week of T-group training was
higher than that of any week of foreign
service institute training to which I have
been exposed [p. 56].

The FSOs thought the
administrators would
see them as [p. 30]:

.
.

.

.

The administrators
actually saw them as

arrogant snobs
cliquish
effete
resistant to change

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The administrators thought
the FSOs would see them as
[p.

.

.

.

.

.
.

.

.

bureaucratic
practical
preoccupied with minutiae
limited perspective
educated clerks
defensive
inflexible
a necessary evil

.

31];

resourceful and serious
inclined to stability
dedicated to job
externally oriented
cautious and rational
masked, isolated
surrounded by mystique
manipulative and defensive

The FSOs actually saw
them as [p. 31]:

31 ]:

Figure 35

[p.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

doers and implementors
decisive and forceful
noncultural
limited goals
interested in form
jealous of us
drones but necessary evils

Attitudes of Foreign Service Officers and Administration

Those less enthusiastic were those irritated at being "sent".

Clarify-

ing of perceptions produced some lessening of antagonism and made the

climate a bit less hostile to change.

The report

.

Argyris was asked if a summary of what happened at

the seminars could be produced.

The report presented an objective and

unvarnished summary of the actual taped statements made by FSOs during
the seminars.

The FSOs described the following norms as influencing

their organization:
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1

.

ncie
^.^
^ y to
difficulties

with draw from interpersonal
and conflict

2.

not being open about interpersonal
problems
or substantitive issues that
could be
threatening to others, especially
superiors
and peers

3.

distrust of aggressive or openly
competitive
behavior in others
a tendency to withdraw from aggression
and
judge the other man negatively, but not
tell
him [p. 53-54].

In his report, Argyris stated that the
FSOs feared being engulfed

by "the system [p. 54]" and felt helpless
about changing it.

Under the

system as it was the FSOs learned to check with
everyone, develop

policies that upset no one, take positions in such a way
that their

superiors had to bear the responsibility for them, and to
make

protection of one’s "bureaucratic skin [p. 55]" the prime concern.
Initially the report was sent only to participants.
it created a furor.

However,

One senior FSO told Argyris it was harder to get

than one stamped top secret.

In order to counter accusations of

censorship by critics of the State Department, several top level FSOs
decided to publish the report to symbolize the Department’s interest
in improvement.

Crockett volunteered to write the introduction in

which he gave a detailed explanation for reasons for publishing the
report.

Nevertheless, arguments over making the report freely acces-

sible were heated and acrimonious.

Action Five:

The Executive Group

In response to pressure from his superior, Secretary Dean Rusk,

Undersecretary Ball, and his own staff, Crockett created an executive
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group in 1966 to assist him in
managing the administrative
area.
Rusk
and Ball had grown concerned
that Crockett was moving
too far too fast

and that his span of control was
excessive.
substitute for a hierarchy?

Rusk asked "What to you

How do you ensure that it isn't
running off

in all directions without much
guidance [p. 42]?"

Crockett felt that:

The executive group was introduced
to establish
the window dressing' for the span
of control
problem because this was a persistent
problem
on the part of my bosses. ... [p. 41].
As well as pressure from above, Crockett
was being pushed by his staff.
He stated that:

They wanted greater clarification of the
functions
and responsibilities of the special assistants
whom I had appointed as coordinators [p. 42].

Crockett saw the executive group as a 'council of elders'
staff

members with no line responsibilities.
My concept was that almost anything that came to
my desk was something that the executive group
might take on. I was willing to relinquish much
most all of the authority so that I wouldn't be a
single authoritarian voice in it. I was willing
to play the game absolutely open in dealing with
the executive group [p. 42],

—

The executive group accomplished little.

Despte Crockett's

view of them, they found it difficult to separate themselves from their
role as line managers.

Ambiguity, arising because their duties and

functions were not clearly established, created misunderstandings and
rocky group functioning.

When news of Crockett's impending resignation

moved through the grapevine, they moved even more cautiously, hesitating
to make any change that could jeopardize their position under a new

undersecretary.
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—The Evaluation of

A ction Six:

the Program

Fourteen months after the first reforms
were ordered, and at

Marrow’s advice, Crockett directed the
evaluation team under the

direction of Rensis Likert, Director for
Social Research at the
University of Michigan, to begin its study.

They reported that:

1*

^he stripping away of six layers of
hierarchy
had increased managerial autonomy.
Response was
generally positive. However, several managers
'
who spoke negatively said they felt isolated
and frustrated because no one was near enough
to notice if a good job was done.
Crockett
saw that dependent managers were threatened
by the new program [p. 37-38].

2.

There were inadequate and erratic resources,
especially in funds, to develop the new program.
Crockett agreed and explained that the budget
appropriation was late in being submitted.
"Too bad", he said, "but we are grown-up and
people ought to understand [p. 38]."

3-

The manager's role in the decision making
process was slightly to moderately increased.
In matters affecting operations of the program,
subordinates felt an increase of influence on
superior’s decisions [p. 38].

4.

There were slight gains in communication in all
areas. Some managers complained of longer delays
in communication.
This was because in the
preceding six months, Crockett had been away for
about five months [p. 39].

5.

Generally, the new program did heighten incentive
for better performance in the operating unit [p. 39].

6.

Net effect of changes on motivation and attitudes
of managers was positive [p. 40].

7.

There was a reduction in coordination. The reforms
resulted in excessive fragmentation. There was
uncertainty about responsibilities and little
direction from above [p. 40].
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Action Seven:

Resignation

The strife caused by his reforms played a
large part in

Crockett’s resignation.

He had expected to meet resistance, but
not

as strong as it turned out to be.
[p.

Attacks on "Crockett's Rockettes

44]" were growing more frequent and intense.

not supportive.

His superiors were

Budget problems and job stresses grew.

Some FSOs who

overtly supported his reforms, covertly were sabotaging them.

was sluggish.

He feared distorted reports of shattered morale being

leaked to the press.

accepted.

Progress

When a job offer was made from IBM, Crockett

From there, he took an executive position in Saga foods

which he still holds.

Eighteen months after he had started the

reorganization program, Crockett announced his resignation in January

of 1967.

Simultaneously with his announcement, he left.

After Change

Idar Rimestad, whose experience was limited to his having

worked in a traditional hierarchical structure, replaced Crockett in

January 1967-

As an old line administrator, Rimestad had little

interest "in making waves [p. 47].”

Rumor spread that the Crockett

program would be eliminated or drastically altered.

Before long,

Rimestad made it clear he considered the new system a mess.
Angered at the reports of the Michigan evaluation team,

Rimestad declared to Marrow that it was ridiculous to spend money on
a project that found so much negative to report.

Negative information,

in his view, encouraged employees to express dissatisfaction.

When he
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learned the Michigan evaluation team planned
to feed back the data to
the staff, and involve the staff in planning,
he suggested that the

University of Michigan cancel its contract.

Because the data was

already in the computer, Rimestad instead cut
$25,000 from the

Michigan contract, leaving enough to complete the analysis
of the data.
Likert had to receive a private grant to publish the results.
Rimestad saw no value in continuing to use specialists from

industry and behavioral scientists, even though they had been volunteering their time.

He removed them, and cancelled the contract with NTL.

In December 1967, he abolished ACORD, and restored line supervisors to

their old jobs.
About four months after he had taken this post, the Argyris’

report was published and Rimestad appeared at
tions hearing.

congressional appropria-

Chairman John Rooney, irritated because he had not been

informed about this report, questioned Rimestad and expressed his

displeasure at the report.

Rimestad responded:

I have no exception to a study (such as the
I do not agree with this
Argyris’ report).
study in its rather clinical approach; its
very small sampling of people. I think we
could have arrived at this type of information
I also do not agree
without spending $3000.
with having it printed for public distribution.
I think it should have been for the use of
officials of the Department and the foreign
service.
[p. 49]
.

.

.

This episode seemed to stiffen Rimestad 's resolve to return to the old
style authoritarian bureaucratic system based on Theory X assumptions

about people.
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Eager to shift to a less
turbulent atmosphere,
Rimestad bid for
the opened post of special
Ambassador in Geneva,
Switzerland, and
was
He left in October,
1969, after a little over two
and a

appointed.

half years as deputy undersecretary.

Change Cycle Two

Pressure For Change

William B. Macomber replaced
Rimestad in October 1969. The new
leadership of the State Department
was under pressure to reorganize.
The new President, Richard M. Nixon,
dissatisfied with the operations
of the State Department, declared he
wanted to "clean house in the
State Department [p. 59]."

He wanted the Department's managerial

capacity strengthened through modern techniques.

The foreign service

officers pressured in a similar manner through
their professional
association.

Their drive culminated in the American Foreign
Service

Association becoming an independent professional union
in 1973.

Calls

for change also came from the junior Foreign Officers
Club.
In response to these urgings, undersecretary Elliot
Richardson

invited Professor Harry Levinson of Harvard University, Alfred Marrow,
Macomber, and several top members of the State Department staff to meet

with him.

They discussed the failure of the previous reform efforts.

Levinson and Marrow advised Richardson and his staff not to bring in
outside experts, but have the Department undertake to change itself
from within.

Secretary of State Rogers, Richardson, and Macomber,

after further discussions among themselves, agreed on a self study
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conducted by an in-house set of task
forces.

They would also encourage

the widest possible participation
by all FSOs.

Macomber' s First Stpp

On January 14, 1970, Macomber spoke
to a large meeting of exec-

utives of the State Department.

His chief theme was that a reform

program was imperative, and that there were
many outside the Department
who would happily impose reform ideas; earlier
rimours had it that

Senator Fullbright was planning a full-scale
hearing on Department
effectiveness.

Macomber described the situation clearly:

Management had not been out bag.
.We have
tended to be intuitive in nature, weak in
planning, and unenthusiastic about management.
In retrospect, it is clear that these resistant
instincts have caused a great share of our
difficulties
The key fact is
either we
produce the improvements necessary to meet
this challenge, or, as I have suggested, this
this will be done for us
[p. 63 ].
.

.

An absolutely essential requirement for our
future ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,
assistant secretaries, deputy assistant
secretaries and counterparts in our sister
agencies is the capacity to manage [p. 63 ].

Macomber pointed out that the Secretary of State, the Undersecretary and himself believed that outside efforts would not be as

effective or informed as those of the staff members themselves.

outsiders claimed the job could not be done from within.

Some

But, said

Macomber, he did not agree with them.

Macomber acknowledged the helpful studies previously made, and
how useful this work would be.

He affirmed his confidence in the staff,
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and stated that in his view, the competence
level of the foreign service

officers was unequalled.

The "Diplomacy of the 70' s" Program

Enthusiastically

,

the staff responded by creating thirteen in-

house task forces, working under the title "Diplomacy of the
70’
[p.

64]."

Their aim was to study basic questions troubling the State

Department.

The thirteen task forces comprised more than 250 career

professionals of State, and forty officers from other foreign affairs
units.

Each task force was composed of about twenty members.

were chosen from the most outstanding men in the Department.

Chairmen

Members

were selected through a nomination system, and through volunteers.

Macomber and his staff carefully avoided suggesting chairmen or
members.

Each group set its own meeting schedule; on the average they

met weekly.

They were given complete freedom to examine any problems,

and come up with whatever recommendations they chose.

Macomber set

loose guidelines, so that questions could be discussed in a very frank
spirit.

Results of the Program

Slightly less than one year later, a summary report written by a

member of Macomber' s staff was presented to the Secretary of State.
addition, each task force submitted its own report.

contained slightly over 500 recommendations.

In

The thirteen reports

This process was probably

without precedent in the history of any government agency.
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Secretary of State Rogers quickly approved about 400
recommendations in principle.

were rejected.

A few recommendations needed further study,
and some

Macomber was directed to begin implementation at once,

and in July 1971, about six months later, he reported about
75 % had been
put into effect.
In February 1972 Macomber again addressed Department personnel.

Reviewing what had been accomplished, he described the self-study as:
the most comprehensive and searching critique
ever written about the Department
no other
document can match it
[p. 66].
He continued, praising the staff as he outlined their achievement:

The past two years have been a time of turmoil....
No effort of this kind starts without antecedents.
Much of the credit must go to those career officers
among you who, in increasing numbers in the years
immediately preceding January 1970, pressed for
reform; and to the many who joined you in the past
two years, we owe a considerable debt [p. 66].

For the first time, under the reform program,
members of the foreign service will have an
important and formal voice in the development
Furthermore,
of all personnel policies
modernization and reform, if they are to be
really effective, require the development of
an increasingly effective, fair, and enlightened
[p. 67].
system of human relations
Here too, we have had a remarkable two years
What has
with much progress being made
emerged is a system under which the men and
women of the foreign services can have a real
voice in the policies and regulations affecting
their careers [p. 67]-

The self-study program was supported by Secretary of State Rogers.

When he received the report he said:
The efforts we are making in-house speak very
well for the vitality and dynamism of the

D e pa r tm en t and the foreign service.
I continue
to believe that if we could leave
behind us
an improved and modernized system
for dealing
with this country’s foreign policy
problems,
this could well be a more lasting and
significant contribution to the public
interest
than success in handling many of the
more
transitory matters which necessarily occupy
our attention [p. 67].

Analysis of Case Three

Before Change

We trained hard, but it seemed every time we
were beginning to form up into teams we would
be reorganized.
I was to learn later in life
that we tend to meet any new situation by
reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can
be for creating the illusion of progress
while producing confusion, inefficiency, and
demoralization.
Petronius Arbiter, ca. 60 AD

The Situation

The organization

.

This organization is a massive bureaucracy

nearing two centuries of age, employing nearly 12000 people.

According

to Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) Integration-Differentiation Model, it
is a highly structured organization, highly differentiated, with little

or no integration between departments [p. 169-171].
1.

Hierarchically ordered the great number
of administrators in the long chain of
command have short spans of control in
overstaffed departments.

2.

Formal rules and review are exceedingly
important; in fact they are the modus
operendi of the entire organization.

,
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Traditionally, time ori entation has bepn
ong term it took six months for
an
issue to travel through six supervisory
layers up to the chief administrator
of the organization.

3-

.l

;

Primarily concerned with tasks the interpersonal orientation of this organization
is formal and cautious.
Qnphasis is on
authority as the means of managerial control.

4.

,

When making decisions, formal rules and
immediate superiors are considered first.
Saving one's bureaucratic skin and making
decisions in such a way that responsibility
does not fall on you, are the prime criteria.

5.

T he, environment

is meteoric.

,

fete of change in the world of foreign affairs

Certainty about conditions is low; conditions, for example,

in the current oil crisis, change hourly,

ronment is high, to top administrators.

fete of feedback on the envi-

The time available in which to

make decisions is very short; the non-stop Henry Kissinger attests to
this.

There is then a disparity between the organization and its environment.

Lacking methods of integration and adaptability, the organiza-

tion cannot respond to the demands of the environment.
in two things:

1)

This has resulted

the environment has become increasingly hostile;

witness the derisive names assigned to the organization, and the many

attempts at wholesale reform.

2)

The organization has been bypassed.

Presidents have assigned foreign policy responsibilities to a few trusted
politicians, taking matters out of the hands of the organization.

These

have had an effect rather like poking a porcupine with a stick; instead

of moving any faster, the porcupine merely rolls up into a fiercely
bristling, untouchable ball, and refuses to move at all.
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Ihe_task.

The main task of the State
Department is dealing

with the foreign policy problems
of the United States.

As may be

appreciated, this is an enormously
complex task; one requiring the
highest amount of interdependence,
and performed under conditions
of
stress.
When one is a lower-echelon employee,
one of 11,950, the

satisfactions of working on any part of
that task must be small.

By the

time the task has filtered down through
the maze of layers, it has been
diluted, divided, and specialized, so that
a secretary sees only a

fragment of the whole.

Satisfactions, such as they are, are experiened

more by those at the top of the organization.
The Followers

There are two general categories of employees in this
organization; support staff, and foreign service officers.

The 8750 support

staff, domestic and foreign, who do not travel, are composed
of

administrators, department managers, lawyers, and secretaries.

For the

purpose of this analysis, the FSOs will be focussed upon.

Achievement motivation

.

According to McClelland (1961), the

foreign service officers have many of the characteristics of high

achievers.

In McClelland’s theory, a person with high achievement

motivation is a moderate, calculated risk- taker, prefers non-routine
tasks, tends to be overconfident, tends to think ahead, works harder

when there is a chance his or her personal efforts will make a

difference in the outcome, prefers concrete feedback, and is not

motivated by money alone [p. 211 -237].
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All of these apply to the FSOs.

In order to become a foreign

service officer, one must compete for the
position in the difficult
foreign service examinations.

This results in the selection of a
group

of FSOs who are intelligent, competitive,
and committed.

They are seen

by the administration as resourceful,
serious, dedicated, cautious,

rational, manipulative and externally oriented.

Their self image is

confident; they see themselves as subjective, cultural,
qualitative

and generalizers detached from personal conflict.

Thus they may be

described as persons with high n Ach.

Ability t o take responsibility

.

Well educated, the best of the

brightest, the FSOs are part of an elite tradition of Ivy League
scholars.

They are described by Marrow as proud and jealous of their

rank, perquisites, intellectual and social status.

Trained by the

Foreign Service Institute, their ability to take responsibility is
high.

Willingness to take responsibility

.

However, their morale,

productivity, and willingness to take responsibility is low.
this?

Why is

Though they enter the State Department highly motivated, the

organization soon teaches them to check with everyone, develop policies
that upset no one, take positions in such a way as to place responsibility on their superiors, and cover their ass.

The organization has

caused the FSOs to:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

supress interpersonal issues
give minimal openness and trust
withdraw from interpersonal difficulties
and conflicts
take few risks and accept little
responsibility
be overdependent on the superior
be crisis oriented
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write cautious memos
adopt an attitude of
"Don't make waves
[p. 55-56]."
In Herzberg's terns,
they tave been "overhired".
The effect is akin to
putting racehorses in a
starting gate that never
opens.
Peeling helpless
about changing the system,
and fearing being engulfed
by it, the FSOs
watched power and opportunities
shift to the White House.
They became
frustrated and resistant.
78.

Maturity of the followers

.

According to Life Cycle Theory,

although the "maturity" level of
the FSOs was potentially
high, it was
reduced by the organization. At
the beginning of this case,
it would
fall in the middle of the maturity
continuum.

(See figure 36).

Achieve
ment motivation is generally above
average, though little expression
is
allowed by the organization. Ability
to take responsibility is above
average, though the situation allows
few
opportunities.

Willingness to

take responsibility is below average
because of the situation.

Taking a

midpoint between these three would place the
FSOs at an average level

of maturity. Thus the appropriate leadership
style called for in this
situation would be a combination of quadrant two,
high task and high
relationships, and quadrant three, high relationships
and low task.

Change Cycle One

One of the most fascinating spectator sports
of the last ten years has been watching the
responses of large bureaucratic organizations
to efforts of change
Most of them have had
the impact of thrusting a fist into a feather
pillow, holding it there for a while and
withdrawing it. While many of the feathers
have been ruffled, the shape of the pillow
remains unchanged.
How does this happen?
Richard S. Underhill
First Tango in Boston
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Leadership style
appropriate
for FSOs

Maturity Continuum

l

Maturity Level
of FSOs

Figure 36.

Foreign Service Officers' Maturity Level
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Crockett's Leadership Style

Basic Style:

Quadrant One

Reliance on experts.

Crockett’s first act was to seek the

advice of Alfred Marrow, an outside professional
consultant.

Of the

five groups Crockett set up, the first was formed
of three external

businessmen, including Marrow;

the second, of a team of NTL behavioral

scientists; the third, of individual specialists containing
some State

Department personnel; the fourth, of University of Michigan
researchers;
the fifth, of behavioral scientists, and some State Department
officers.
In seeking advice, training, and evaluation, Crocket did not
assess the

skills within the organization but relied on outside experts.

Being

bypassed was a familiar condition to Department employees, one that had

already caused much resentment.

It might be expected that the presence

of so many external consultants would fuel the fires of resistance even
higher.
In setting up these five groups, Crockett was establishing a

structure for the reform program, and channels of communication.

The

groups worked separately, and each directed their efforts to help
Crockett.
system.

Thus Crockett was the central point of the communications
(See figure 37).

Coercive change stragegy

.

Crockett's first step in the reform

program was the elimination of six supervisory positions, 125 jobs, and
the shifting of 160 employees to other departments.

We are not told if

he was advised to take this step, so must assume it was largely his own
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Figure 37.

decision.

Relation of Five Consulting Teams to Crockett

In this action, Crockett was using his position power in a

coercive change strategy, illustrated in figure 38 - (Hersey & Blanchard,
1972, p. 160).

It resulted in greater efficiency of communication and

it also intensified resentment, fear, suspicion, and lowered morale.

Chris Argyris (1971) has noted that people who do not own up to
feelings, who are not open, who reject experimenting, and who do not

help others, can attitudinally support Theory Y assumptions that people
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have the capacity for creative
problem solving, motivation,
and selfdirection.
And, similarly, people
who do own up to feelings,
are open,
do experiment, and do help
others can attitudinally
support Theory X
assumptions that people are
unambitious, have no desire for
responsibility, no capacity for creative
problem solving, and need to
be closely

controlled, if not coerced into
action.

Though attitudinally Crockett

sympathized with Theory Y assumptions,
his behavior followed Theory
X
assumptions.
Given the situation, speedier
communications were desired, but
this short term result was achieved
at the expense of lowering already
low morale, and increasing resistance,
thus jeopardizing long term

success in the reform.

—groups

.

Of all types of training, T-groups are most
directly

concerned with interpersonal relationships, and good
interpersonal
relationships with open communications are one of the
foundations of

management based on Theory Y assumptions.

How can we reconcile a high

task and low relationships quadrant one style with a series
of T-group
seminars?

Crockett established the seminars upon the advice of his

external consultants, believing they would help bring about a system
based on Theory Y assumptions.

However, once again, in the decision

and recruiting of participants, Crockett adopted a coercive change
strategy, and used a high task low relationships leader style.

Those

who would be involved in the T-groups were not consulted or included in

making this decision.

Furthermore, some of the participants were
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coerced into attending.

His intentions
notwithstanding, Crockett

attempted paradoxically to
command openness and trust.
Another factor mitigating
against the effectiveness
of the Tg roup seminars was the nature of the
State Department itself.
In a 1955
study of hunan relations training
in industry) Fleistaan
Harris and
Burtt found that day to day
climate is more important in
determining
an employee's behavior than the
human relations training he
or she has
,

received.

Training in isolation (which is
how the training for the

State Department was carried out)
was found not to last in real
life
situations which are counter to the
climate in training. Such was the
case of the closed, fearful attitudes
in the State Department.

Fleishman

et al concluded that:
to a considerable extent, the specific
training in human relations is wasted
unless the environment in the plant
(organization) is also strong in human
relations [p. 387].

Crockett's basic style.
task category of leader behavior.

The behaviors above all fall under the
If we look at relationships behavior,

we see very little recorded evidence of Crockett developing
personal

relationships with his staff, giving them socio-emotional support,
psychological strokes, or engaging in interpersonal communications.

His

basic leadership style falls into quadrant one of the Life Cycle Model:

high task and low relationships.

Secondary Style:

Quadrant Four

MBO program

.

Crockett established the Management by Objectives

program because he believed that by decentralizing management into self-

185

contained, semi-independent and
semi-autonomous programs, eliminating
every intermediate supervisory level,
and delegating almost complete
authority for daily operations to the
program managers, a system of
management based on Theory Y assumptions
would develop. Following his

previous pattern, Crockett used a coercive
change strategy and instituted
the MBO program from the top, not by
or with the managers who would be
involved.
In setting up this program, Crockett
exhibited a high task

and low relationships leadership style.
After Crockett reviewed and signed a manager's
list of objectives
for the year, Crockett became absent, even to
the point of being out of
the country five out of six months.

In so doing, he was unavailable for

periodic review and support of managers unfamiliar with the
system, one
periodic review and support of managers unfamiliar with the
system, one

of the steps essential to the MBO process.

Thus after setting up the

MBO program, Crockett adopted a Quadrant four low task and low
relationships style.
In terms of Life Cycle Theory, a quadrant four style is appro-

priate to followers of high "maturity".

In adopting this leadership

style, Crockett appears to have assumed a high "maturity" level among

all his subordinates; however, this assumption proved to be incorrect.

Inexperienced and dependent managers felt threatened, as shown when they
pressured for more clarification of their roles, and complained they
felt isolated by the new program.

Noting this problem, Hersey and

Blanchard (197*0 suggest that MBO could be more effective if superior
and subordinate negotiated the leadership style the superior would use
in helping the subordinate accomplish each of his or her objectives.
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m

handling the MBO

prog™,

Crockett could not be
said to te ve

demonstrated relationships
beteviors with his onagers
such as allowing
them to participate in the
decision nuking for change,
developing
personal relationships with
them, giving them
socio-emotional support,
or engaging in interpersonal
communication.
E xecutive group

.

Crockett used the same low
task and low

relationships leadership style
with his executive group.
Zoning
their "maturity" level to be
high, as indicated by his
calling them a
"council of elders", he did not
define their duties, function,
or roles
As previous program managers,
they in fact, had little
experience in
being members of an executive group.
Crockett's quadrant four leader-

ship style would thus be inappropriate
for this group, and was, as
evidenced by their lack of accomplishment.

I nappropriateness

of C rockett’s Leadership Sty Ip

According to Life Cycle Theory, Crockett's
leadership style
tends to fall into two quadrants.

His basic style is high task and

low relationships; his secondary style is low
task and low relationships.

He does not show a sequence of style, but
alternates between

quadrant one and quadrant four.

Previously, we diagnosed that the

appropriate leadership style needed by the followers, the FSOs,
in
light of the situation, was quadrant two and quadrant three.

Thus

Life Cycle Theory suggests that Crockett's style would be inappropriate
in this situation, and that in the long run, he would be ineffective.

(See figure 39).
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Style Appropriate to Followers

Figure 39-

Comparison of Crockett's Leadership Style
and Style Appropriate to Followers
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Crocket t's Effectiveness

If Crockett launched the reform program,
how could he be said
to be ineffective?

Bernard M. Bass (I960) distinguished between

successful and effective leadership.

When person A attempts to

influence another to do something, and person B does
it, then behaviorally speaking, person A has been successful.

However, if B is

antagonized, and responds only because A has control over
the rewards

and punishments, then A has been successful, but not effective.

If B

responds becaue he or she wants to, because the activity is rewarding
to B, then A has been successful and effective.
If a leader is interested in success, he or she will emphasize

position power, which is delegated downward.

If a leader is effective,

he or she will also depend on personal power which tends to be

generated upward through follower acceptance.
(1972, p. 93-94) illustrate this concept.

Figure 40.

Hersey and Blanchard

See figure 40.

Successful and Effective Leadership
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As deputy undersecretary
of state for administration,
Crockettposition power helped his short
term success in launching
a reform
program.
However, his leadership styles
hindered the long term develop
ment of his followers' human
resources, and reduced his
personal power.

Crockett's first action of reducing
stratification created resistance
and resentment which steadily grew.
By the time of his resignation,
Crockett's personal power was at a low
ebb, as some FSOs secretly
sabotaged the program, while both staff
and superiors verbally attacked
it.

Thus, while Crockett’s leadership style
was successful in the

short run, it was not effective in the long
run.

After Change

A state official noted that he had not achieved
his position by jumping on quixotic bandwagons.
His position, when faced with proposals for
change, was to assume the position of a passive
observer, to provide minimum response under
pressure, to conform where essential, and to
wait for the tide to ebb.

Richard S. Undershill
First Tango in Boston

Rimestad 's Leadership Style

Rimestad 's leadership style paralleled Crockett's.

Although

attitudinally Rimestad was Theory X and Crockett Theory Y, behaviorally
their styles had similarities.

After reading the evaluation report,

and talking with the various external consultants, Rimestad cut the

University of Michigan team's budget, removed the outside experts,

abolished ACORD, restored the supervisory positions that had been
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eliminated and restored the fired
supervisors to their former
jobs.
All of these actions were aimed
at restoring organizational
structure,

organizing and defining roles of staff,
formalizing channels of

communication and establishing ways of
getting the job done.

Rimestad

concentrated on task; we have little
evidence of relationships behavior.
His initial comment that he considered
the system a mess, and
the rumors that he would eliminate it,
would have tended to increase the

tension and fear in the situation.

His discussions with the external

consultants focussed on task, as did his meeting with
the Congressional

Appropriations Committee.

As did Crockett, Rimestad directed his

communications outward to consultants and upward to superiors.

His

leadership style falls then primarily into quadrant one; high
task and
low relationships.

Figure 41.

Rimestad 's Leadership Style

Rimestad 's Effectiveness

Again, according to Life Cycle Theory, Rimestad' s leadership

style would be inappropriate to the followers and the situation, and
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as such would be likely to
be ineffective.
change on coercive change.

Rimestad laid coercive

Some of the FSOs and
administrators had been

involved in T-groups, and had
found them beneficial,
and some managers
had flourished under the MBO
system. These people, who
ted found
Crockett's low task and low
relationships style appropriate,
would find
Rimestad s quadrant one style
especially inappropriate.
'

Reactions to Rimestad's leadership
bear this out.

Dissatisfac-

tion with the State Department and
pressure to reorganize it grew, not
only from superiors, but also from
subordinates. President Nixon

demanded a "house cleaning [p. 59]."

The foreign service officers

joined forces; both their professional
association, which unionized, and
the junior Foreign Officers Club, called
for change.
During the period

of Rimestad's leadership, pressure for change
came to a peak, both within and without the organization.

Change Cycle Two

Fundamentally, most efforts at bringing about
change in government organizations have failed
because they have not been directed at the needs
of the participants who are responsible for the
success of the change.
Richard S. Undershill
First Tango in Boston

Macomber’s Leadership Style

Macomber’s First Step

William B. Macomber's leader behavior was different from that

of his predecessors.

It was Macomber’s superior, Elliot Richardson,
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who called the first meeting to
discuss reorganization.

Macomber,
several top members of the State
Department, and twg outside
consultants
were present. After seeking advice,
Richardson and Macomber decided
upon a method of change
a study by in-house task forces.
Thus
Macomber, his superior, and officers of
the Department were collabor-

—

atively involved in planning for change.
Macpmber's Initial Leadersh i p Style:

Quadrant. Two

Having settled on a method, Macomber 's next
step was to present
the situation and the proposed method for change
to Department personnel

at a large meeting.

He outlined the "now or never” aspect of the

situation to the assembled group, clearly setting forth the
pressure on
the Department to change.

At the same time he stated the reasons why

change was necessary in the long run:

the capacity to manage was

essential to Department officers in the future.
In this speech which demonstrated Macomber' s Theory Y assump-

tions, he also acknowledged the helpful studies of predecessors,

declared confidence in the staff, and praised the FSOs competence level
as being unequalled.

Macomber in this action combined an emphasis on task, and an
emphasis on relationships in his talk; in Life Cycle Theory terms, he
practiced a quadrant two leadership style of high task and high relationships.

According to the previous diagnosis of follower "maturity”, this

would be an initially appropriate style.

The response from the staff

in creating thirteen in-house task forces, attests to the appropriateness

of Macomber' s style.
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Ssqugnge of Macomber

'

s

Leadership

i-

As the task forces were
being fenced, Macomber
and his
diate staff supported the
effort, but deliberate^
avoided suggesting
Chairpersons, members, or
selection methods, thereby
giving people a
say in these decisions.
Department staff themselves
decided how many
persons on each task force,
and selection methods
of chairpersons and
members,
fech task force decided its
own meeting schedule.
Macomber
set very loose guidelines
so that the task forces
could examine any
problems and make any recommendations
they chose.
During this stage,

me-

Macomber moved into a quadrant
three leadership style:

high relation-

ships and low task.
During the year the task forces
were at work, Macomber practiced
a quadrant four style:
low task and low relationships.
Each task
force presented its own report to
Macomber's superior Elliot Richardson.
Macomber s own report was written by a
member of his staff.
f

According to Life Cycle Theory, given the
"maturity" level of
the staff, this sequence of leadership
styles would be appropriate and

effective in this situation.

(See figure 42).

Macomber's leadership

resulted in the formation of thirteen in-house task
forces, thirteen
reports, 500 recommendations, 400 recommendations
approved by

Secretary of State Rogers, and 75% implemented by Macomber in
six
months.

As well, morale had improved; the FSOs for the first time

had involvement and power in developing Department policies.

Morale

was built up further by the praise of Secretary of State Rogers for
the "Diplomacy of the 70s" program.
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Style Diagnosed as Initially
Appropriate to Followers
I

I

Macomber's
initial style
during speech

above
average

average
1

Figure 42.

below
average
1

Maturity
Continuum

Sequence of Macomber's Leadership Style During
Change Cycle Two
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Summary

jjhy

Was the Reorga nizatio n Under Crnokett Un S nnnp^rm 9
Based on the data presented by Marrow,
as analyzed according to

the theoretical framework, some of the
reasons why the reorganization

under Crockett failed may include:
1*

Consultation of outside experts by Crockett,
rather than those within the organization
who would be directly affected by the reorganization created resentment and resistance.

2.

The first structural reform was accomplished
through a "top down" coercive change strategy.
This created resentment and lowered morale
among staff.

3.

The T-group training seminars were "laid on"
by top management, creating resistance and
resentment among those who felt coerced into
attending.

4.

Because the State Department was still closer
to Likert’s (1961) system one and two type of
organization, it presented an environment unsupportive to human relations training. The
T-groups were an inappropriate intervention
at that time.

5.

Crockett’s initial high task and low relationships leadership style was inappropriate to
the initial "average maturity" level of the
FSOs, creating resistance and resentment in
them to the reform program.

6.

The MBO program was inappropriately implemented,
creating insecurity among some administrators.

7-

Crockett’s low task and low relationships
leadership style was inappropriate to the
"low maturity" level of the Executive Group,
resulting in their inability to take effective
action.
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Crocket's leadership style and
reform program
were not fully supported by
his superiors.
Crockett's high task-low relationships,
and
low t sk ~^ ow relationships
leadership
f
style
^
profile
did not allow him the flexibility
to
develop the task "maturity" of some
staff
members, or meet the needs of those
with
"average maturity".

Why The Reorganization Under Macomber Succeeded
1.

Macomber and his associates had the benefit
of
learning from Crockett's previous reorganization program.

2.

Some of the State Department staff had responded
responded positively to Crockett's progressive
program, and had grown in it. They were ready
to support another such program.

3-

Forces from within (unionization of the FSOs)
and without (the White House) the State
Department were both pressing for reform
simultaneously

4.

Macomber 's initial high task and high relationships leadership style was appropriate to the
"maturity" level of his staff who responded
positively. His flexibility allowed him to
change his style as the program got underway,
and the staff increased in "maturity".
Ultimately he was able to leave responsibility
entirely in the hands of his staff.

5.

Macomber 's collaborative approach was appropriate
to the needs and competence level of his staff.
Those who would be affected by the change responded
positively to being involved in and responsible
for it.
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VI

SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES

£kanKe

.In

an Automob i le Assomhly

P]

nn+

Background

This case is taken from Chris
Weisfelder's (1974) condensation

0f

^

gaill Zatl0na l

The Effect of Suonessfi a Leadar.shi
p by

Robert Guest (1962).

In the early 1950»s, Robert Guest
and his

colleagues at the Technology Project of
the Yale Institute for Human
Relations conducted a series of studies in
two large automobile

assembly plants.

They wanted to discover "how modern
technological

methods influenced intrinsic work satisfactions
[p.4],» and how mass
production affected interpersonal relations among hourly
workers.
In 1953 Guest focused his attention on "Plant
Y",

name) the plant under consideration in this case.

(a

fictitious

Poorest of the six

plants in its division, it was under the threat of being closed
by the
corporation.

In order to find out the causes of this critical condition,

the Yale researchers interviewed everyone from foremen to executive vice-

president, observed production, held informal discussions with workers,

and examined personnel and performance records.
During the two and a half years this study was in progress, a

new plant manager was hired, and word began to circulate that Plant

Y
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was undergoing "some profound
changes [p. 5]."

Spurred by a desire to
discover what led to the positive
changes in Plant Y, Guest
began a
new full-scale research program
in February 1956.
Again, he

conducted
interviews, and examined records
of personnel, perfontance and
technical
changes. By learning about "the
way in which hunan beings
actually
behave in our complex industrial
society [p. 7]," Guest hoped
to produce
findings which would shed light on
the "broader theoretical
questions
about leadership and change in complex
organizations [p. 6]."

The following is a precis of his
account of three years in the
life of Plant

Y—a

period which saw it rise from last to
first place in

its division.

Before Change

The Organization

Structure

.

Plant Y is an automobile assembly plant, part of a

corporation employing more than half a million people.

The corporate

structure, and brief job description for each level is shown in figure
43

.

Approximately one third of the plant population is made up of

non-production personnel including:
Resident Comptroller

-

in charge of the budget

Personnel Director

-

all personnel matters

Plant Engineer

-

in charge of maintenance

Director of Material
and Production Control

handling and supplying
materials

199

Supervisor of work
standards

Chief Inspector

derat i ons

.

in charge of work procedures and performance
evaluation
-

in charge of all product
inspection and responding
to reports from dealers

Plant Y is a highly complex
operation which requires

an enormous amount of planning and
cooperation by specialized technical
groups.

The assembly line, focal point of
thousands of parts and units,

produced completed automobiles at a rate of
over 350 each eight hour
day, or over 700 on a two shift basis.

Parts are delivered mechanically

to and from operators working in a maze of
conveyors and machinery.

Any mechanical breakdown, or human error in this
sensitive assembly
line can upset the work flow of the entire plant, and
create waves in

management from foreman to manager, and higher.

The Situation

In the mid-fifties, the automobile industry found itself "going

all out [p. 6]" to meet booming market demands.

something was going wrong.
being met.

However, at Plant Y,

Costs were too high, schedules were not

In short, Plant Y was failing to meet the new demands.

The

increasing demand from the public was accompanied by an increasing

number of urgent telephone calls, telegrams, letters, memos, and visits
from the division to Plant Y, demanding better performance.

were complaining about defects and poor delivery.

Dealers
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Ike Plant Manager

The Plant Manager was “on the
spot [p. 6].»

He explained his

bind to observer and case author
Guest this way:

They just don't know in the
central office what
we have to face
They think everything can be
done by schedule, no matter how
fantastic.
Thev
keep saying to me, 'Why can't you
do it'?....
When I get this kind of pressure on
me, I get
butterflies in my stomach. It makes it
hard
for me.
I can't tell those below me
I can't
do anything about this impossible
schedule,
so of course I get blamed for a lot
of it.
I can't treat my superintendents
the way I
get treated.
They would just pack up and go
hone
1 can't say these things to my
people.
I can't say them to my superiors.
Results
are all that matter to them
[p. 7 ].
On two occasions, the Plant Manager made recordings
of his

meetings

,

and played them back to the division manager.

One

official said later:
He was trying to show the division manager that
he was carrying out orders.
I think he was also
trying to put the blame on his own staff. They
knew this [p. 7].

The plant manager held sporadic meetings with his staff, which
he called as a result of a divisional complaint or an emergency in the
plant.

With the focus in these meetings on short run solutions to

immediate problems, he generally requested information or explanations
from individuals, and frequently interrupted members with his own

opinions or orders.

In these meetings, there were few lateral

discussions among staff.

As one department head observed:

We spend most of our time making explanations
about why something went wrong and who made it
go wrong [p. 8].
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The plant onager's usual
response to an emergency
was a trip
to the production
department, where he gave
orders to individials
or
groups. The trips were
frequent; the pattern the
same.
One general
foreman put it this way:
S

’?e^

e

sS

r

nd laSt WOrd

[p! 8].?

'

1

Just

**

Ihe Subordinates

Superintendents, general foremen, and
others said that the
plant manager "puts the heat on us
and we can't talk back
[p. 7].»

All agreed that the manager's
behavior was characterized by
obedience
to orders, enforcement of rules,
and the exercise of power through
threat of punishment.

One superintendent observed:

This plant is a one-man show, so people
are
taught not to be self reliant. Fear,
that's
the trouble.
Nobody questions an order
In the meetings we have, they just give
us
hell [p. 9J.

Said a general foreman:
The only time I have anything to do with the
manager is when he comes down and chews me out,
usually in front of others [p. 9].
A section foreman commented:

The manager would come down and stand next to
me and point out some man and say 'What the
hell is that guy doing'? I get all nervous
and confused. .. .You can't work under a manager
like that [p. 9].

The foreman was caught in the middle.

Subject to punishment from above

if he failed to carry out orders, he risked alienating his men if he
obeyed orders as given.

His dilemma was the same as the manager's.
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In addition,
superiors

co^only ignored the
chain of co^nd

one superintendent
objected to the fre
q uent by-passing of the
general
foreman.
The section foremen,
most affected by
discplinary measures
taken against the hourly
workers, found officials
above taking over
this responsibility.
Said one
foreman:

I get

aggravated by all the
interference
6
to run the men in my'
y
section
1 resent this
[p
11 ]

iT

.

.

.

New foremen, promoted from
the ranks, found themselves
quickly

Changing to conform, to plant

norm,s,

even though they began
their Jobs

with a desire to treat their
men otherwise.

As one new foreman said:

Cat!' t
that (act differently toward
v°
orkers).
You can't change overnight
what's
been going on for fifteen
yea?s.
Now I tnTt
my men the way they have
been treated more or
less in the past [p. 12].

the

Problems in Qnp rations

Assembly line operations require
close cooperation between the
operating (line) groups and the
non-production departments. Because
this cooperation did not exist, there
were many problems in operations.
Because the system of material flow and the
layout of equip-

ment was inadequate in some areas, "bottlenecks
[p. 12]" and shortages
were chronic.

As technical difficulties worsened,
interpersonal

conflicts increased.

A general foreman described the problem
this way:

A line like this depends upon good material
flow.
A shortage holds up the operator
I call the
material department. First time they ever heard
about it. Say they'll check. Nothing happens.
I go look for myself.
My foreman in the mean-
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time is getting into other
troubles, and I’m not
around to help [p. 12].
The

-lack

of fiommun i catrion links between lower
level

departments, along with the formal
separation of function, created
frequent complaints.
Inspectors were ultimately responsible
to the

chief inspector, not to the section
foremen or other production
supervisors, who expressed the need to be
in close touch with the

inspectors in order to gain a fuller understanding
of quality
requirements.

In addition, standards varied because
the inspectors

in different areas rarely communicated
with each other as a group.
In like manner, the work standards department
"dictated [p. l4]» how

a foreman should distribute his work load, without
getting the

foreman's opinion.

Production scheduling changed schedules without

due consideration of the current manpower situation.

Plant Y's performance record was abysmal.

With the poorest

efficiency of all the division's assembly plants, it exceeded the
division's maximum standard of defects and rejections, and had the
poorest quality record of all the plants.

Plant Y's safety record

placed it between last and second-last place in the division.

Grievances were substantially higher than those of other assembly
plants, and its turnover rate was double that of the average of the

other plants.

This poor performance could hardly be accounted for by

chance; nor was there evidence that the plant's geographical location

or market conditions were significantly different from other plants.
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During Change

When an unofficial and costly
walkout hit the deteriorating
Plant
Y, divisional executives
decided to take action. They
retired the plant
nager with an early pension
arrangement, and hired Matthew
Cooley as
new plant manager. In his
previous position as manager of
another plant,
Cooley had demonstrated his
ability to increase efficiency.

introduction of the N ew Manager

The division manager escorted Cooley
to an introductory dinner

meeting attended by all the members of
the organization down through
the foremen.

Both the reactions of the guests, and
Cooley's behavior

at that dinner are captured in these comments
by a general foreman:
When I went to this dinner meeting, the first
thing that struck me was the way they had the
seating arrangement. I think it was done very
well.
Whoever arranged it made sure that the
old cliques they had in supervision were broken
up.
We also noticed that the new plant manager
sat down among the foremen and general foremen.
We can remember when an earlier manager came
here, and he got rid of a whole lot of people
in supervision
We wondered what the new man
was going to do.

After the meeting... he (Cooley) just kept
circulating on the floor and meeting as many
of the guys as he could.
I was quite surprised and so were the others [p. 16 ]

Early Davs Under Coolev

Attitude from the top

.

From the first day of Cooley's arrival,

there was an abrupt reduction of "interference from above [p. 26]."
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Specific directives, telling the
onager what to do in response
to each
crisis, came to a halt. What
appears to have happened, based
on the

comment of a high corporation
official, was that the division
manager
was urged by superiors, to let
the new manager at Plant Y
"run his own

show [p. 27]."

Top management added a "blank
cheque [p. 27]" clause

to their instructions to the new
manager:

"We don’t care what you do,

as long as you get the plant out of
the mess it is in [p. 27]."

Cooley

was told he could have whatever personnel
he needed, and was advised to
"clear out the dead wood [p. 16]."

Cool ey’s f i rst meeting

*

In his first meeting with all supervi-

sion, Cooley put forward "a few basic goals
[p. 16]" for the organiza-

tion in terms of expected efficiency and quality.

Stating candidly that

Plant Y had a bad reputation, and that he had heard that many
employees

were not capable of doing their jobs, he said he was "willing to
prove
that this was not so, and until shown otherwise, I personally have full

confidence in the group [p. 16]."

He declared, "I don't believe in

firing a lot of people and using threats and fear [p. 17]," and went on
to say that his job was "not to catch and punish people for doing a

poor job, but rather to help them in any way he could to do a good
job [p. 16]."

Letters to the foremen

.

One of Cooley's first steps was to

send a letter to each foreman, asking that the foreman invite Cooley
to his section.

That surprised the foremen.

As one said:

guess this new fellow is a pretty good
He wants to be invited to come
manager.
down to inspect my section. I'll be
very happy if he does come around [p. 17].
I
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Within the first three
days
Cooley .et with the
union shop ec^ittee,
and urged the. to
any
cornments thev
tr> on
nn his
y wanted to
general
ax uujectives.
obiectivp^
The union president
reported the meeting this
way:

^

’

He (Cooley) said that
before he camp in
u .
b e ed °"
Plant and
he’ted heard
f

i^s 1

^ ^ VSt^^
>

that m
-Xtl

xe Dlt
£ngle\n
? ^
1

were otay™
y
way
*

SS

the couple of davs he had
ttet people at Plant Y
He 331(1 he was g°ing to
operate this

He said he was inviting
us personally to see him
Ut ays t0 raake the plant
better
Me
He said he
hTwe?°
a any
welcomed
suggestions.

Sd
3

-

33

new approach to the committee
^i Y a completely
d ° f the b0ys Were ske tioai
8
P
most
r/uf en
13 "lan meant uhat he

^T

a chang! [p

%!

Lack Cf Planning

’

.

.

»»t

Cooley recognized that there was
little long

range planning at the local level,
and that the "cooperate or else"

philosophy under which the plant had
operated was not working.

He said

saw that the organization needed a
long-range
program, spelled out in writing and reviewed
with
department heads, the staf, and superintendents.
They needed to be in agreement on something
that
was realizable and tangible and practical.
It
had to come from the whole organization and
be
explained to the whole organization [p. 18].
I

Reduct i on cf overt i me

.

Another of Cooley's first steps was to

get permission from the division to begin reduction
of the long overtime hours.

As one union officer described this:

We have had managers come in and give us a lot of
soft talk, but they never backed it up. This fellow
showed up, and one of the first things he did was to
cut down on the long hours which had been going on
for months.
It had been ragged on the men [p. 18 ],
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In these first weeks,
no measurable changes
in performance
were
o served. Nevertheless,
Cooley's heavier
evoked favorable
counts.

&uor

Changes in

Communio^^

M2aat>iE
„

r-ly

^^

mm

in the change process,
some members of material
control, and the

production departments were
assigned "to study the
bottlenecks,
especially in the trim
department [p. 3 1].» They
discussed thlir
recommendations at weekly
department meetings. These
meetings were
among a series of regularly
scheduled meetings initiated
by Cooley
involving members of supervision
at all levels. These
meetings
continued for the balance of
Cooley’s term of office.
Thoroughly
discussed alternative proposals
were presented to the plant
manager
and his staff by this committee.
In this new method of
decision making,
management was able to choose a
recommendation and implement it.
As a
result of this committee’s work,
foremen were able to concentrate
on
planning that would avoid emergencies,
rather than on handling crises.

Inspect i on

•

At weekly meetings initiated by
Cooley, the

chief inspector and operating supervisors
down through the general
foremen discussed critical problems.

Ultimately this group outlined a

training program for inspectors and foremen.

As a result, operating

supervisors and inspectors were able to agree on
what was, and was not,

acceptable quality; communications between these two
groups was no
longer dominated by the inspectors, and finally,
inspectors were

accepted by the foremen ”as part of my group [p. 33]."
"tipped off [p. 32]" inspectors on jobs causing trouble.

Now foremen
This greater
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acceptance of inspectors
took place even though
quality standards ted
measurably stiffened
during this time.
Also, once a week,
initiated by Cooley, the
comptroller, the
production manager, the
heads of personnel and
work standards, all
supervisors in production
down through general
foremen, and the chief
inspector, met to review
matters relating to
inspection and quality.

** *

5tan(lfl r<1ff

-

After seve ral months of
discussion between work

Standards and operating
supervisors at all levels, a
change in policy
was made, whereby the
section foremen were made
chiefly responsible for
determining the work assignment
of the individual hourly
employee.
Before, it ted been done by
work standards. As a result,
foremen
and

work standards now communicated
frequently, and collaborated.
The union also appeared to
change its policy with respect
to
work standards disputes. One
union officer said:

Now what we do when we hear a
complaint is to take
a Quick look at it.
If a man doesn't have a gripe
we tell him.
If he does, we talk to the fore^n
it settled.
So, management doesn't have
to
send the time standards men out all
the time
’

[p.

Maintenance

•

34],

Within f°ur months, it was observed that
operating

and service departments at lower levels
were beginning to meet together,

though not specifically ordered to do so by
Cooley.

With the integra-

tion of activities by other departments, the head
of plant maintenance

now focussed on solving technical problems in cooperation
with the
people involved.

"Doing the right thing for the plant [p. 34 ]»

replaced "doing the right thing for the department

department [p. 3*0."

—

the maintenance
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C.omDtrol
[p.

1

pp.

Two or three times a week,
Cooley "grabbed

35]''

the comptroller and took him
for a "walk through the
plant
[p. 35]."
During this time, the comptroller
talked with department
heads, superintendents, general
foremen, and section foremen
about how
the figures coming out of the
comptroller's office could be made

meaningful to them.

It was discovered that there
were many factors

that could cause a foreman to be
"over standard [p. 35]," and although
some were beyond his control, he was
punished for them. As a result

of these walks and talks, the comptroller
worked hard, and produced a
formula which all the foremen and supervisors
could use to analyze

efficiency figures quickly.

The idea was presented to all of supervi-

sion, saying that this had come out of the comptroller's
talks with
them.

Another result was that the comptroller's department, now
"cut
in on the deal [p. 37]," was able to make a more convincing
case to the

division for money for major physical changes.

Now almost no requests

were denied.
Also once a week, at Cooley's initiation, a cost meeting was
held by the comptroller and production manager, attended by Cooley,

heads of personnel and work standards, and all production supervisors

down through general foremen.

The comptroller and production manager

presented current figures on costs and plant efficiency, while

participants asked questions and made suggestions.
General meetings

.

Cooley initiated once a month general

meetings of all members of plant supervision, to "tell everyone in the
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organization what was ahead
for the next thirty
days, review the past
thirty days, and answer
questions that come up
[p. 19 ].»
Cooley
encouraged supervisors to
sutait written questions
about any subject,
and promised frank answers.

Staff meetipp=.

Once a week, Cooley chaired
a meeting of his

immediate staff at which they
discussed new developments,
information,
and directives from the division
and corporation. This group
in time
became a decision making body
for the plant as a whole.
Rea ct i ons hv flir^Yi -n r ~.

Although several members of
supervl

sion initially thought the group
meetings were too "time consuming
[p.

20]," they changed their opinion.

Said one general foreman:

It began to dawn on us that if
we were ever to
stop running around and putting out
fires, we
had to do this.
Also, just getting together as
a group was worth something in itself
[p. 20].

Ma.ior Changes in Per.s Pnn p]

Although Plant Y made many shifts in supervisory
personnel, only
three of the three hundred salaried personnel were
discharged or asked
to resign.

Plant Y adopted a policy of internal promotions and
lateral

job transfers.
Shifts in job assignments were made possible in two ways:

one,

when members of supervision on temporary assignment to Plant Y returned
to their home plants, and second, when other plants requested

supervisors from Plant Y.

Eventually, Plant Y came to be looked upon

as a "training ground [p. 21]" for other plants in the division.
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One example of an internal
promotion oooured when a
young time
study man who held a
non-supervisory position in the
work standards
department was moved up rapidly,
and at age twenty-nine
became production manager for the entire
plant.

Most personnel shifts were
not promotions, but planned
lateral
job transfers, mostly of
production foremen. Men were
"tried out
[p.

22]” for a period of time.

were returned to their old job.
edge of operations was expanded.

If they did not "work out
[p. 22]" they
In the long run, the foremen's
knowl-

One foreman observed:

The thing we have noticed is that
they do move
the foremen around a lot more than
they ever did
before.
I think it is helpful because
it gives
the foreman a much broader knowledge of
the job
Lp. 22].

A deliberate long-range program was
instituted to develop under-

studies.

Each member of management above the foreman
level gave his

job over to one or more of his subordinates for a
temporary period of

sixty days.

Ma.ior Technical

Change

Few physical changes had been requested or made for several

years in Plant Y, although it was the oldest among all the assembly
plants.

The first requests Cooley made to the division for capital

expenditures were for improvements in working conditions.
The obsolete caXe.tsria was refurbished, re-lighted and air-

conditioned.
expanded.

New clothes lockers were installed.

Exhaust fans were installed.

Parking areas were

Large heaters were installed
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at the rail freight doors.
in summer.

entire

l

Electric Xaua were provided
for areas hot

To eliminate cold drafts,
and facilitate unloading,
the
i v i ng a rea was re-located. Hand
loading was eliminated

by elevator

The plant hosp i ta l was
air-conditioned.

Plumbing was installed in the
repainted and retiled washroom

New
A

union officer commented that these
changes showed that "Cooley meant
business [p. 23]."
Further physical changes were made
to improve the operations
themselves.

Old ovens were ripped out of the

located on the roof.

ments were made in the

mint

department and re-

New spray booths were installed.
me.tfll

department,.

Major improve-

Heavy, obsolete tools were

replaced with lighter tools as quickly as
possible.

Because of

increased electric power requirements, a new
power statiop and later, a

new power house were built.
The method by which changes in the trim department
were brought

about provides a model of the change program generally.

First Cooley

and the production manager asked the foremen and general foremen
for
suggestions on how operations in the trim department could be improved.
Cater, his superintendent began to meet with the foremen and general

foremen to discuss and agree on a minimum number of changes.

Next, the

production manager took over a further series of meetings including
service and production groups.
implemented.
[p.

Then the agreed-upon changes were

A general foreman observed that there was "a good spirit

24]" in the thrashing out process, and "we finally arrived at some-

thing to satisfy all of us [p. 24]."
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Change

when the technical
"bottlenecks [p. 24]" were
eliminated, the
conflicts were sharply reduced,
and the extreme sense
of emergency
eliminated. Many comments
agreed with these of a
general forenmn:
With all those little changes
and big changes '*
a Uttle bit more about
planning"
W° rryinS
g ° ing t0

^

next"inute

^

^

It was when the men saw
some of these changes
being made that they began to
believe that we
were trying to do something
for them.
You can
talk a lot about human relations,
but unless
you can show something that you
have done, why
it is only a lot of talk.
We used to get that
talk in the old training sessions,
but it didn't
mean anything [p. 25].

As a result of the changes,
supervisors had more time to plan and

reduce the potential for interpersonal
conflict.

As one foreman said

All of us are more willing to get along
because
there are fewer reasons for squawking at
each
other [p. 25].

After Change

Climate

After three years, the old climate of fear had disappeared.
One superintendent observed that now "nobody today who knows he's
doing
a reasonably good job has any fear of losing his job [p. 26]."

With

fear gone, supervisors felt free to express their ideas for improving
the organization.
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Attitude

Toyjflrrl

Manager

Several supervisors stressed
Cooley’s belief in "the
worth of
the individual [p. 27],"
and stated tha this
individual approach was
felt "right down through
the organization [p. 27]."
The manager’s
informal visits were now seen
as opportunities to exchange
technical
ideas, or "socializing [p.
27]," not as being for the
purpose of punishment. These visits were helped
by Cooley's avoiding in
his words, or
dress, any display of superior
status.
Here are some comments of the
foremen:
1.

The manager goes all over the plant
and
speaks to everybody. Not the way it
used
to be.
He comes up and says ’Good morning'
to me and the men, and he means it
[p. 28].

2.

The foreman knows (that)... top management
wants to help the foreman get ahead [p. 28].

Attitudes Among Subordinates

Although attitudes among subordinates were slower to
change,
three changes were observed.

First, opinions of superiors and sub-

ordinates about each other were now more positive.

Second, more

information was flowing between superiors and subordinates.

Third, a

greater proportion of communications concerned future planning.
There was a change from fixing the blame on the foreman, to

concentrating on the problem.

Said one foreman:

They don't take it out on the men or the foremen
as the scapegoat, but they take it out on the
problem first [p. 29].
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This resulted in more information
and help being supplied to
the foreman who was now in a better
position to make his own decisions.
This
in turn caused superiors to trust
their subordinates to manage;
thus
interference from above lessened.

One general foreman commented:

Now I don't have to worry all the
time about my
foremen getting me into hot water
[p.

30].

Promotion, often mentioned before the
change, was rarely

mentioned after.

Almost no one expressed the hope or desire
of

advancing out of the plant.
However, despite all the positive changes in
attitudes, two of

the twenty-five foremen still feared that if it were
not for the pattern
set by the plant manager, some members of middle management
would return
to their former tactics of using threats of punishment.

Plant Performance

With labor CQStS down fourteen percent, Plant Y's position was
first in the division.

When two major schedule changes during the

year caused major cutbacks, Plant Y's cost rose less than any of the

other plants, and it "recovered" more quickly than any.

After the fall

introduction of new models, Plant Y's manufacturing costs were fifty
percent lower than the poorest of the seven plants, and it came up to
line speed more quickly than any of the other plants.

The non-production

departments tied for first place in the division for lowest cost per unit.
Plant Y consistently held either first or second place in the

division for quality performance
record

r

.

It stood fourth for its safety

remarkable since its potential for accidents was higher than
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for roany other types of
production operations.

With respect to

Plant Y Stood first ln the
division with three
grievances
per hundred workers per month.
Its aimrtee
dropped to 4.9 percent
’
as did its average monthly
turnover rate.
In gener.1, when compared
to
the other similar assembly
plants, Plant Y went from
bottom to top
position in most categories.
At the end of three years,
Cooley ws promoted to a higher

position in the division.

When he left, Plant Y not only
maintained

itself as the leader in the division,
but continued to improve.

Analy sis of Case Four

Before Change

We become our environment.
Leland Kaiser

The Situation

or gani sat i on

.

Plant Y itself, and the corporation of which

it was a part, were traditional bureaucratic structures.

(See figure 43).

The production department of Plant Y, focal point of this analysis, had
four organizational levels below plant manager, approximately 125

supervisors of different types, each with a short span of control, and
three levels to a shared department superintendent.

Time and goal

orientation of the production department was short term and specific:

approximately 350 automobiles per eight hour shift.

Formal regulations,
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such as quality standards

were of utmost
importance.

The primary
focus of this department,
and the plant in
general, was on task
efficiency.

fech hourly worker on
the assembly line
performed a clear and
routine task, under time
pressure. Taken together,
these thousands of
tasks were highly
interdependent, requiring
precise orchestration to
keep the sensitive assembly
line moving.
It „as an enormously
complex
and stress filled operation.

Ite environment.
.

demand for cars.

.

A

booming economy was creating
an insatiable

Demands for different models
changed seasonally,

necessitating changes in production
that involved all departments
in
Plant Y. Feedback from the
public and dealerships was
constant and
insistent. Pressure on Plant Y
was
intense.

^er i ora

.

As demand from the environment
increased, so did

demands from divisional headquarters.

With each new crisis in the

plant, the division responded by
directing the plant manager as to

exactly what to do in response to the
situation.

This high task and

low relationships leadership style increased
pressure on the already

harried plant manager.

He responded defensively and dependency
by,

for example, tape recording two of his meetings
and playing them back
to the divisional manager to prove he was obeying
orders.

Given its organizational structure, type of operation,
stress

of demand from the environment, and pressure from top
management, Plant
Y needed a high degree of integration between its
departments in order
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to function efficiently.

Plant

this integration was lacking.

Va

rock bottom performance showed
that

Let us examine the factors that
prevented

Plant Y from meeting production
demands.

Eactors h i n d er i ng prod uction
adequate in many areas.

-

Plant Y was technically in-

Poor layout of equipment, shortages
of

materials, outdated heavy hand tools, all
combined to produce bottle-

necks on the assembly line.

This created short tempers and frustration.

As bottlenecks increased, pressure from above
increased, and inter-

personal relations worsened.

Low supervisory morale was not bettered by poor
hygiene factors.

Eating in a dismal cafeteria in need of repainting,
on old rickety
furniture, using rundown washrooms that needed new plumbing,
unloading

and loading supplies in freezing drafts, breathing in paint
fumes from

inadequately ventilated paint booths

—

all of these things and more

increased the workers' dissatisfaction, and further worsened human
relations.

There were no meetings held between supervisory staff of

different departments, or indeed within departments.

For example,

inspectors in one area frequently held different quality standards
than inspectors in another area, thus creating greater frustration and

difficulties for the foremen.

A general lack of communication existed

because there were no established means by which people could discuss
problems.

Therefore, the socio-technical structure worked against

efficient production.
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£lant Manager's Leadership

^Y

,

l

Q

Feeling pressured and panicky,
"butterflies in

ray

stomach

[p. 7],- the plant manager
attempted to control the
situation by using

a punitive quadrant one
leadership style.

In response to divisional

orders, he customarily made a
trip to the plant, "chewed
a nan out
[p. 9]," and issued orders.
As one general foreman put
it, "He has
the first and last word.

I just say 'Yes, Sir'

[p. 8]."

Another

response the plant manager made to
a crisis, was to call a meeting
to
solve the immediate problem. He
requested information, explanations,

and gave opinions and orders.

Again, his interruption did not
allow

subordinates to respond or discuss the
issue.

Communications were

vertical, not lateral.

Subordinates Maturity Level

The subordinates' response to the plant manager's
quadrant one

leadership style indicates that their "maturity" level,
as defined by
Life Cycle Theory, was higher than the plant manager realized.

were the signs?
through fear.

What

Subordinates recognized that the plant manager led
One superintendent commented:

Whatever we had of success was paid for at a great
cost.
What a cost!... Out and out fear. This
plant [runs] on fear, and fear alone [p. 25].
As well, subordinates perceived the plant manager's leadership style as
ineffective.

His giving of orders was seen as "chewing out [p. 9]."

His emphasis on task was seen this way by a superintendent:
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This plant is a one-man show,
so people are
taught not to be self-reliant
[p.

9].

His attempts to solve problems
was perceived as useless
according to
one section foreman:
I get all nervous and confused
work under a manager like that

You can't
[p.

9].

According to a department head, the plant
manager's problem-solving

attempts were attempts to place blame, and
as such, ineffective:
We spent most of our time making
explanations
about why something went wrong and who made
it go wrong [p. 8.]

According to Hersey and Blanchard (1972), a leader's
style may
be seen as appropriate or inappropriate by the
followers.

If it is

perceived as inappropriate, then the leader's behavior will
be ineffective.

They explain that when a quadrant one high task and low

relationships style is being used inappropriately, the leader is
often
seen by followers as having no confidence in others, unpleasant, and

interested only in short-run output.
situation.

Such was the case in this

The plant's ever decreasing performance and worsening human

relations, culminating in a walk-out, attested to the inappropriateness

and ineffectiveness of the manager's quadrant one style.
On the basis of the above evidence, we argue that the "maturity"

level of the supervisory group was at this time average, not below
average.

In terms of ability, they were not as incompetent as the

gripes, absenteeism, turnover, and accidents among the workers made

them appear.
the ranks.

Many section and general foremen had been promoted from

Their experience on the job, and knowledge of its problems

222

was high.

TTieir unwillingness to
participate in problem-solving,
and

their low achievement motivation
was the result of the
plant managerleadership style which raised
their level of fear to the
point where
they were afraid to give the
suggestions they had.

Equally as
important, technical problems kept
them too busy running around
"putting
out fires [p. 20]" to think about
long term performance improvement.

With this diagnosis, according to
Life Cycle Theory, a more
appropriate initial leadership style for
this group in their present
situation, would be quadrant two, high
task and high relationships.
(See figure 44).

Emphasis on task would be needed to
rectify the

present problems in operations, while emphasis
on relationships would
be needed to raise morale and mend shattered
interpersonal relations.

Supervisors' Leadership Shyl p

The plant manager's leadership style had a two-stage
effect on
subordinates:

it caused them to become "nervous, confused
[p. 9]" and

fearful, which in turn caused them to exercise the same punishing
leader-

ship style on those beneath them.

General foremen were afraid that the

section foremen would 'get them into hot water' if they were not

constantly watching them.

They often disciplined the section foreman's

men, much to the resentment of the usurped section foremen.

In this

way anger and distrust built up.
At this time, Plant Y was an example of Likert's (1961) system

one of exploitive authoritarian management.

Figure 45 shows a comparison

between Likert's system one and Plant Y before change.
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Leadership style
appropriate to
supervisory group

Present plant
manager's
leadership style ineffective

I
I

above
average
‘

——
average

*
I

»

below
average

i

Maturity
Continuum

I

Present maturity level
of supervisory group

Figure 44.

Appropriate Leadership Style for
Supervisory Group Before Change
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Likert’s Sv^tpp) n n o

Plan t Y Before Chan g P

•management is seen as having
no confidence or trust in
subordinates

•at rare meetings, manager
gives orders, asks questions;
subordinates do not talk to
each other, discuss or make
suggestions

•control lies in top management; subordinates seldom
involved in decision-making;
bulk of decisins and goal
setting made at top and
issued down chain of
command

•division tells plant
manager what to do in each
crisis; plant manager tells
supervisors what to do

•subordinates forced to work
with fear, threats, punishment
and occasional rewards

•plant manager ’chews out'
foremen; general foremen
punish section foremen

•superiors see subordinates
operating at physiological
and safety levels

•'if you can't do it, get

•the little superior-subordinate interaction that
does take place, is with
fear and mistrust

•plant manager plays back
tapes of his meetings to
division manager to prove
his obedience to orders;
'I just say yes, sir.'

•an informal organization
within the formal organization opposes the goals of
the formal organization

•union disputes constant;
quality lowest in division.

Figure 45.

out'

A Comparison of Likert's System
One and Plant Y Before Change

225

During Change
£fl.Qlev

f

S Leadership

During Cooley -s term as plant
manager, his leadership
style
evolved through three stages according
to the Life Cycle Theory.
Initially he adopted a quadrant two,
high task and high relationships
style. Toward the middle of his
tern, he moved to a quadrant
three
style of high relationships and low task.

At the end of his term, he

adopted a quadrant four style of low task
and low relationships.

Let

us follow his development through each
of these stages.

Beginning at the introductory dinner meeting,
Cooley attempted
to develop personal relationships between
himself and members of plant

supervisory personnel.

He sat down to dinner with the foremen.

After

dinner, instead of hobnobbing with top management,
he circulated the
floor, meeting as many men as he could.

Right at the beginning of

his term of office, he emphasized and modelled relationships
behavior.

Early Stage.

During his first days on the job, Cooley

immediately attacked two problems:

1) poor interpersonal relations

and morale, and 2) lack of integration between and within departments.

During this time, according to Life Cycle Theory, he used a quadrant
two style.

Cooley entered a situation full of hostility and frustration;

workers had just staged a walkout.

All of his subordinates, down

through foremen, expected him to "get rid of a whole lot of people

226
[p. 16]."

Division management had
advised him to "clear out
the
dead wood [p. 16]." Contrary
to expectations, Cooley
began by admitting
the situation
he had been told it was a
"lousy plant with lousy
people in it [p. 17 ]," and stating
that he didn t believe lt
He
persisted in developing personal
relationships (sent a letter
to each
foreman asking to be iiudlfid to visit
his section) ; giving socio-

-

,

_

emotional support and psychological
strokes (told all of supervision
at a meeting that he believed everyone
was capable of doing his job,
and he, Cooley, had full confidence in
the group); engaging in
facilitating behaviors (personally invited
the union shop committee
to make suggestions as to how to make the
plant better)

With many years of conditioning in fear, his
subordinates were

initially skeptical.
before.

They had heard "a lot of soft talk [p. 18 ]"

Cooley demonstrated his sincerity in his first step
of getting

overtime hours reduced for the hourly workers.

The improvements in

working conditions made by Cooley further demonstrated to
the workers
that he meant business.
rooms, fans, heaters

—

A re-modelled cafeteria, refurbished wash-

all these raised worker morale.

Recognizing the lack of long range planning, Cooley initiated

meetings at all levels; between material control and production;
between the chief inspector and supervisors; between the comptroller,

production manager, and work standards; general meetings of all

members of plant supervision; staff meetings of his immediate subordinates.

Cooley wanted a concrete, practical, long range program

that "came from the whole organization [p. 18 ]."
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In setting up these meetings,
Cooley demonstrated task
behavior:

through these meetings he was
attempting to establish new
channels of
communication and ways of getting the
job done. He was also demonstrating relationships behavior; he
was present at all meetings
initially;
he encouraged the flow of ideas;
he used and acknowledged these
ideas,
such as the comptroller's formula for
analysis of costs. These meetings
opened lateral communications, and created
integration within and between
departments. Interpersonal relations began to
improve. Although

initially doubtful, one general foreman's comment
shows the positive

subordinate reaction:
It began to dawn on us that if we were ever
to
stop running around and putting out fires, we
had to do this. Also, just getting together as
a group was worth something in itself [p. 20].

This response by the supervisory group attests to the
appropriateness

of Cooley s initial high task and high relationships leadership
style.
Middle Stage-

Through these meetings, Cooley had established

a means of participative decision making which eventually enabled him

to move a quadrant three high relationships and low task leadership
style.

When it came to making major physical changes in the plant,

the changes were discussed by those involved in the area who would be

most affected by the changes.

It must be noted that the process by

which the committees became independent from Cooley was gradual.

The

change program in the trim department provides an example.
Initially, Cooley and the production manager met with the

general and section foremen and asked for suggestions on how to improve

operations in the trim department.

Later, the superintendent met with
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the foremen to agree on
the minimum number of
changes.

production manager took over
further meetings.

Next, the

Finally, the agreed-

upon changes were implemented.
A number of things are
noteworthy about this process.

it enabled everyone to have
a say.

First,

Second, although it allowed
initial

control to remain in the hands of
Cooley and the production
manager, it
also allowed Cooley to exit from
the process so that the
production

manager could take over.

As this committee grew more
experienced,

Cooley was not necessary, not even to
initiate the process.
Through this mechanism, physical changes
in the paint department,

metal department, and in the machinery were
made.
bottlenecks on the assembly line.

These eliminated the

These improvements, made through the

committee decision making process, in turn reinforced
the participative

decision making process.

The committee process enabled supervisory

personnel to gradually gain in experience, to become
more independent,

and in terms of Life Cycle Theory, to "mature" as decision
makers.
Cooley’s approach to personnel shifts also provided opportunities
for supervisors to "mature".

Rather than discharge men, Cooley estab-

lished a procedure of lateral job transfers, so that supervisors could
"tryout" another position.

about the job.
[p.

In this way, they gained broader knowledge

Another of Cooley’s innovations, the "understudy

217]" program, enabled each member of management above foreman

level, to train a subordinate in his position.

Thus when another plant

requested a supervisor from Plant Y, there was a replacement available.
Signs of the group's increase in task relevant "maturity" began
to appear.

Inspectors and foremen cooperated on quality standards; the
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uruon shop committee began
to settle disputes
without always involving
management; the operating
and service departments
began to meet on
their own initiative; Cooley's
immediate subordinates,
the staff
committee, became a decision
nuking body for the plant
as a whole.
As subordinates gained
in "maturity", Cooley
gradually moved
to a quadrant three high
relationships and low task
leadership style.
His visits around the plant
became informal opportunities
to exchange
technical ideas and socialize.
Rising plant performance, and
improving
human relations were witness to
the appropriateness of Cooley's
quadrant
three style.

After Change

Each system tends to mould people in
its own
linage. ... Participative organizations
tend to
develop emotionally and socially mature
persons capable of effective interaction,
initiative, and leadership.
Rensis Likert

The Organization

As a result of Cooley’s leadership, Plant Y, without changing

its organizational structure, and dismissing only three out of
three

hundred salaried personnel, changed from Likert’s (1961) authoritarian

system one, to one approaching a system four of participative management.

The following chart compares the elements of Likert’s system four

with Plant

Y

after change.

Likert's Svstpp) p^ 1r
management has complete
confidence and trust in
subordinates

Plant Y After Change

changes was in the hands
of the committees

decision-making widely
dispersed throughout
the organization and
well integrated

foremen involved in long
range planning; foremen
responsible for work
assignment to hourly
employees; all supervisory
personnel involved in cost
control

communication flows up
and down the hierarchy
and among peers

Cooley a member at some
committee meetings, and
later, they are held without
him; Cooley invites
suggestions

workers motivated by
participation and
involvement in: developing economic rewards,
setting goals, improving
methods, and appraising
progress toward goals

subordinates feel top
management wants them to get
ahead; they participate
actively in committees;
a free flow of suggestions

extensive friendly
superior-subordinate interaction with a high degree
of confidence and trust

Cooley visits plant to
exchange ideas and socialize;
well liked by all subordinates
no fear, high trust; positive
superior-subordinate opinion;
no scapegoating; promotion
out of the plant not sought

widespread responsibility
for control process, with
lower units fully involved.

inspectors and foremen take
responsibility for quality
control

informal and formal
organization one and the
same

union committee settles its
few grievances largely without
involving management

,
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Along with this change in
orientation and management
style,
Plant Y rose to a top position
in almost every category
among all of
the assembly plants in the
division. Other plants began
requesting
Plant Y personnel; it came to
be looked on as a training
ground.
gflQlev's Leadershi p Style

Figure 46 shows a comparison between
Cooley's sequence of

leadership styles, and Likert's four
systems of management.
According to Life Cycle Theory, Plant Y
after change was operated
by a highly "mature" group.

As such, the appropriate leadership
style

for this group would now be quadrant four,
low task and low relation-

ships.

(See figure 46).

This in effect happened, for when Cooley
was

promoted out of the plant to a divisional position,
Plant Y maintained

itself as the leader in the division, and continued
to improve.

Summary

Mhy

Pifl

Cooley

Sucfl.e.e.d,?

1.

Cooley's leadership style was both appropriate
and flexible. His initial high task and high
relationships style was perceived as appropriate
by his subordinates who responded in a positive
manner.
His flexibility allowed him to change
his leadership style as the managers and workers
of Plant Y gained in "maturity".

2.

Cooley's implementation of plant-wide meetings
at all levels improved communications, and
allowed managers and workers practice in decisionmaking and problem-solving. Through these meetings,
they were able to develop their managerial ability
their "maturity".
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8 00nd ^i°n3 raised morale,
’hygiene factors’ were
satisfied through improvements
in working conditions, while 'motivators'
were satisfied through
g
meetings.
In this way, the productive
abin?y
Sf
tuant Y personnel increased.

S^rzbe^s^MW 1

xn nerzDerg s (1959) ?
terms,

Technical improvements supported and
enhanced
improvements in the social and managerial
systems
within the plant.
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Background

In the mid 1930 's
Alfred and Seymour Marrow
took over their
father's pajama factory.
Alfred, a psychologist,
became chains of the
board, while his brother
Seymour, an engineer, assumed
the presidency.

Because of their interest in
applying group dynamics to
management problems, in 1939 they
invited Kurt Lewin to conduct
a program of
leadership training and betavioral
science research in the
Harwood
company. This approach succeeded,
and the company thrived.

Twenty-two years later Harwood
purchased its leading competitor,
the Weldon company. The initial
plan was to continue Weldon
as an
autonomous division; however, within
a few months Harwood's owners
decided that they would have to step
in and make major changes in
their
fast sinking acquisition.

The following case is a condensed
account of that change, as
seen through the eyes of Alfred Marrow and
other behavioral scientists.
It follows the events of two years,
during which the Harwood company

changed the management system of the Weldon Company.

Before Change

Backgro und of

t he

Harwood Company

In 1899, with a carefully put together capital of $1000, a

personable man of limited technical knowledge opened a pajama factory.
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With a philosophy of benevolent
nanagement, he survived on
a TOrglnal
basis in the highly competitive
garment business, and after
more than
thirty-five years, turned the company
over to his two sons. Seymour
Marrow, an engineer, became
president, and
Alfred, a psyhologist,

became chairman of the board.

They expanded the company in
1939 by

opening a new plant in a small Virginia
community.
Seymour and Alfred began immediately
to apply group dynamics to
management problems by, in 1939, inviting
Kurt Lewin to work with plant

management in a program of leadership training
and behavioral research.
Their aim was to bring about more satisfying
employee relationships, and
more willing, active cooperation in work.

As Harwood's president put it

People can enjoy working together far more than
they do. For a majority
dissatisfaction,
ill will and conflict have produced anxiety,
resentment, and hostility, with disruptive and
harmful consequences for the individual and
the organization [p. xiiij.

Some tenets of Harwood philosophy were that:
1.

a participative approach to management leads
to more loyalty, flexibility, cooperation and
efficiency, and will succeed only when there
is mutual confidence [p. 27].

2.

a job is done best when employees feel their
needs are considered in a way that they can
maintain self-respect and a sense of responsibility [p. 26.]

3-

employees have more informed opinions on matters
relating to their own jobs than top managers,
and can make practical suggestions of merit
[p. 26].

4.

when the findings are the group's own, they
will be inspired to change their behavior [p. 26].
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5.

employees are unlikely to rebel
against
decisions they helped make
[p. 33 J.

6

employees want the same things
that their
employers do [p. 32].

.

After twenty years, gratifying
job satisfaction among
employees
and owners, high profits and
productivity demonstrated the
effectiveness of Harwood's participative
approach to management. On January
1,
1962, With underutilized capital, and
an opportunity for growth, and

higher profits, Harwood purchased its
largest competitor, the Weldon

Manufacturing Company.

As of 1967 Harwood-Weldon was the
largest

company in its field, producing about
twenty percent of the world's
supply of its product.

This case describes the process by which
the

Harwood company, within two years, changed the
management system of the
failing Weldon company.

Sactaround O f the Weldon Company

In 1932 the Weldon Manufacturing Company, under the
leadership

of two owner-managers, moved into a plant in the coal region of
Pennsylvania, and became one of the fastest growing producers of

quality pajamas in the industry.

During the 30s and 40s attempts to

unionize Weldon failed, as they were to do for the next three decades.

Whenever a union organizer appeared in town, Weldon’s management would
shut off the machines, start rumours that the plant would move if the

union came in, and make intimidating speeches.

The Amalgamated Cloth-

ing Workers of American (ACWA) officials said that the company's methods

for playing on workers' fears were they worst they had encountered in
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the Pennsylvania area.

In spite of this,
Weldon became by the
end of

World War II, one of the
recognized and highly
respected leaders in the
garment industry. By the
mid-fifties, at the height
of its success,
Weldon had expanded to five
plants which employed 3500
people.

Weldon's Leaders

The company was almost solely
run by two partner-owners.

(See

figure 47).

According to Harwood-s president,
one outgoing partner in
charge of merchandising, would
frequently solicit ideas from his
staff
on policy, but would always make the
final decision
to suit himself.

The other more taciturn and uncommunicative
partner in charge of manufacturing rarely shared problems, plans,
or objectives.

He announced

schedules, budgets and production quotas,
expected his staff to meet them,

and gave a hard time to anyone who failed
to.

area independently of the other.

Each partner directed his

With energy and competence, they made

all the necessary plans and decisions.
In this situation, over a number of years, the
partners drove

themselves and their staff almost to the point of collapse.

Every small

and necessary expenditure had to be personally approved by one
of the
partners, regardless of the time loss or work delays.

They spent evenings

and week ends on the job and required most of their executives to do
likewise.

Weldon's Pecline

In the postwar transition from a sellers' to a buyers' market,

Weldon's management problems began to grow.

The owner-managers made
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decisions independently of
each other and their
executives.
resulted in two costly
iy errons
T
errors fY>r> mo
for the company.

This

Ia 1953, though lacking

in necessary technology,
the owners entered the
lower-priced, mass
production shirt and pajama
business, and the womenspajama business.
Both ventures failed.
At the end of the fifties,
Weldon's problems intensified.

There was bad will toward Weldon
when, in I960, the union
picketed the
prestigious stores selling Weldon products.
Yet when the union held a
vote at Weldon, because of management
threats of firings, it lost again

Between 1959 and I960 Weldon closed five
plants, and consolidated its

work and remaining 1000 employees in the
main Pennsylvania plant.

To

meet mounting loses, the partners cut down on
staff, withheld wage
increases, called on people to make sacrifices, and
applied strong

pressure from production.

Within months following the failed union

election, Harwood purchased Weldon.

During Change

lha Situation at Weldon

At the time of purchase, Harwood's plan was to continue Weldon

as an autonomous division, with no change in its product, management,
or employees.

managers.

Weldon's two owner-managers were to continue as salaried

In the months after purchase, it became painfully obvious to

Harwood that this plan was not possible and that major organizational

changes would have to be made
chairman of the board:

—

and fast.

According to the Harwood
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Heavy losses, haphazard
inventory building
excessive costs and sagging sales
called for
organizational changes... to protect
our
investment at Weldon [p. 64].

Harwood's discoveries about Weldon's
advantages an disadvantages are
summarized in figure 48.

Goals of the Program

Because they felt that the Weldon people
had little experience
in learning new ways of working together,
the Harwood executives indepen-

dently planned the goals and approach of the
change program, and in the

words of the board chairman, "imposed

65]" it on Weldon.

[p.

The four

goals of the change program were:
1.
2.
3-

4.

to
to
to
to

retain existing personnel if possible
modernize the physical plant and work methods
introduce a new pattern of organizational life
accomplish these changes as soon as possible [p. 66].

MfilhQd Qf the Change Program

Harwood hired five consulting organizations to work on different

problems

Teams 1 and 2

Norris & Elliott Inc.
Consulting Engineers

to improve engineering and production

Team

Leadership Development
Associates and Dept, of
Behavioral Science,
Boston University

to improve inter-

Ladhams Associates,
training engineers

to train operators

Survey Resarch Center,
University of Michigan

to observe events,
measure what was
done, and evaluate
program

Team

3

4

Team 5

personal relations

Disadvantage
Advantages.

former owner-managers, now
salaried managers, do not
communicate; make unilateral
decisions; do not delegate
authority
little communication, no
coordination, antagonism
between manufact uring and
merchandising.

large roster of hesirabla
customers.

ardaca on hand to be filled.
basic facilities sound; plant
very large; floor space for
production ample.
large number of technically
competent supervisory staff

.

Plant production in turmoil;
mixed batch system, no production coordination, high
costs poor layout

large number of enereeti
people., willing and motivated
to undertake a change program.

outdated equipment
repair supplies.

highly skilled core of hour!
employees

,

,

no

supervisory staff overworked (1 supervisor to 155
employees) uninformed about
policy decisions; lack job
security; do not delegate
authority; discouraged from
making suggestions; some
falsified records to keep
information from ownermanagers.

one-third of hourly employees
(8056 women) young (under 25)
and inexperienced; highly
transient (half were planning
to leave); had high absenteeism, double that in the
industry-12/6 per day.

.

two-thirds of hourly employees
were older (over 25) and
experienced (over two years).
personal relationships between
hourly employees good; 8556
liked their fellow employees.
personal relationships between
super visors and hourly employees
fairly good; 64% satisfied with
supervisor.

inadequate operator, .training;
chaotic production system
prevented skill development.

Figure 48.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Weldon at Purchase
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Steps

in

the Change

Progp^

The two and a half year
change program had three
phases:
phase
one, assessment, during which
a diagnosis of Weldon was
made; phase two
of technical change, and phase
three, changes in the
management system.
Figure *)9 presents a detailed
chronology of the change program,
fech
of the numbered items in the chronology
will be briefly discussed.
Phase One:

Init ial Period of

Assessment

Oairq

The acquisition of Weldon brought relief
to those who had
feared the plant would be shut down, and also
raised anxieties about

"cleaning house [p. 130]" through wholesale staff
dismissals.

The new

owners made statements of their philosophy of management,
assuring

employees that the operation would continue, and that no
changes in
personnel were planned.

According to the Weldon plant manager,

changes introduced by the new owners were imperceptible at first.
Plans were made to bring in a new personnel manager, and attitude

surveys were conducted.

One executive commented:

It seemed to me there was no change for a long
time.
After all the talk about the new people
and new ideas, nothing happened. More than once
I said to myself ’You wouldn’t even know we had
new owners [p. 131].'

This period of quiet ended when the personnel manager was hired.
the view of a top plant staff member, this action

was an early indication, I think, that things were
I would say it was
going to be stirred up a bit
the first indication that there was going to be a

In
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Assessment

Jan. 1962
June 1962

Harwood buys Weldon
attitude surveys and feedback
begin

Oct. 1962
Dec. 1962

Technical
Changes

Feb. 1963

Personnel Manager hired
1 * Ifoit production svstPrri
b»

2-

nn

shipping department reorganized
incentive pay plan introduced
Supervisors and M a nagers
meetings .hfigin
Select i on J^ests fo r new empioyppp
.

.

-begin

absence and termina tion nolioy
changes
Mar. 1963

Apr. 1963

May

1963

July 1963

Management
System
Changes

Sept. 1963
Oct. 1963
Nov. 1963
Dec. 1963

Consolidation

Jan. 1964
to
Dec. 1964

Figure 49.

Management

t ra i nin g program hggjna first group
5- Operator training prog ra
m begins
Management training program - second
group
Supervisors and Managers staff
meetings end
three units in production
6* earni ngs development progr m begins
a
evaluation of Management training
program
7* problem-so lving me etings of
Supervisors and Operator s begin
unionization; minimum wage increase
Operator training program completed
period of rapid change ends

during this year:
unit production systems completed
attitude surveys and feedback
completed
problem solving meetings continued
change program ends, consultants
leave

Chronology of Change Program at Weldon
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completely different approach
personnel
[p. 68].

Phase Two:

at least to

Technical Changes

Unit System of Prodnot-.inp

The desire to satisfy their
customers had resulted in the
practice of putting small lots into
production in any part of the
plant without much consideration of
the effects on work flow.

In

some cases, operators faced seven to
nine job changes in an eight

hour shift.

In order to raise operator earnings,
lower costs, and

better utilize operators, materials and
machines, a decision was

made to change to a unit system of production.
This conversion was accomplished through several
technical
changes.

Four self-contained production units were set
up.

Cutting

work was modified and work standards introduced so that
cutters were
provided with incentive earnings opportunities.

Warehousing and

shipping operations were reorganized, cutting down on the overload

of employees in that area.
outmoded ones.

Newer machines were brought in to replace

Maintenance service was improved and stocks were

brought up to requirements.

The technically competent employees, who

expected and respected expertness in their superior, understood and

appreciated these improvements.

Supervisors and Managers Staff Meetings

To improve production efficiency of the new unit system,
supervisors, managers and consulting engineers met every Saturday
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morning to review plant progress,
discuss priorities, and
decide next
Steps.
Initialy, the effort to get
a freer flow of reactions
and
ideas did not go well. At early
meetings, the plant manager
did most
of the talking while the supervisors
and managers remained generally
quiet.

This pattern did not change until
the supervisory training

program (to be described later) was
completed.

After this, the

supervisors began to address each other
directly in their staff
meetings, join in the discussion, and
challenge the opinions of the

managers and the consultants.

Per sonnel Policy

chan^

Weldon’s high turnover (90% in the four months
after purchase)

and absenteeism (double the usual rate in the industry)
was accepted
by supervisory staff as an unavoidable fact of life.

The supervisors

felt that there was a shortage of good people in their
community, and
that ’’You can't get people to work on a more consistent basis
[p. 117]."

Unable to gain support for investigating the causes of
absenteeism, the personnel manager, outside consultants, and some staff
found that the same people were continually absent due primarily to

factors that existed within the plant.

This data, along with tables

demonstrating the high costs of one absentee for a department, was
shown to the supervisors, who in time were convinced that reduction in

absenteeism was possible and necessary.
Once convinced, the supervisors kept records on absenteeism,

discussed with absentees their reasons for staying away, and tried to
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assist absentees with outside
problems.

Gradually a new plant policy

was formulated in which:
1.
2.
3.

selection tests were introduced
chronic absentees would not be recalled
after
layoff
after a cutoff date, a certain number
of
unexcused absences would result in dismissal
Lp.

118 J.

Absentee rates were cut in half.

Qnployees regarded the new policy as

a fair one.

Phase Three:

Management System Changes

Management Training Program

Although things were improving, the new owners felt that
the
hostilities, fears and suspicions of managers and supervisors were

blocking potential progress.

Only one approach to solving this problem

was seriously considered by Harwood executives and decided upon:

a

direct examination by staff members themselves, of their own ideas,

attitudes and practices in management.
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

This examination would:

be conducted away from the normal working

environment
last for two to four days
focus on practical problems arising at work
use methods derived from "laboratory" or
"sensitivity" training
use a "family group" format
be mandatory - staff members were expected
to attend
all be conducted by the same trainer
not include the new owners or their
representatives unless asked by the group
have a follow-up of a similar kind
[p. 98-991.
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Merchant i

,si.ng

Snh-,^t- Pm

Initially three major training
sessions were held. Session
ne was attended by the five
merchandising department heads
from the
New York office. Despite the
mandate to attend, their
superior, the
fonner owner-manager, did not.
He became the focus of
discussion.
One result of this session was
a subsequent problem solving
meeting
with the superior, soon after
which he left the company. The
five
department heads and the two new
owners distributed organizational

responsibility and authority among
themselves, changing the pattern
of the organization. Friendship among
them spread from business to
social relationships off the job.

Manufacturing Sub-Sy^em

Session two was attended by the six top
administrators from
the Weldon plant, but not the former owner-manager
who by this time had

become inactive in the daily affairs of the plant.

The administrators

focused on the plant manager, who as a result of this
session, changed
his behavior in the plant in a way satisfactory to
himself and his
staff.

Another result of this session was the beginning of positive

relationships with the New York office.

Merchand ising and Manufacturing Together

Session three was attended jointly by administrators from

manufacturing and merchandising.

According to the consultant, the
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session resulted in better
communication, some openness
and trust, and
a detailed plan for improving
cooperation.
Later sessions, not family groups,
were held for groups of
supervisors, assistant supervisors,
and senior staff members, until

all staff were covered.

According to the consultant, evaluations
of

all sessions in the series were
favorable.

The consultant for the training sessions
described some

instances of transfer of training to on-the-job
situations in the
plant.

In response to interdepartmental quarrels,
the plant manager

initiated a series of staff meetings modeled on the
training sessions.

Differences were talked out, and some solutions tried.

Meetings were

initiated between operator trainers and their trainees; frustrations

were reduced.

Overproduction of merchandise was confonted in a

meeting with top management in which plant staff acknowledged their
limitations and requested assistance from top management.

This

degree of openness was previously unknown.

Qjrerator Training P rogram

A vestibule training area was set up where new operators

would be trained under the same conditions as the production line
except for pace and interruptions for demonstrations.

Trainers were

drawn from the staff, and instructed in teaching methods.

After four

weeks in the vestibule area, operators moved to the production line
with the machine on which they were trained.

As well, selection tests

were introduced, efforts were made to pre-determine the number of
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trainees needed in each department,
and provisions were made
for retraining low performing operators.
With considerable skepticism among
some supervisors, the

program was initiated, and positive
effects became quickly apparent.
Within four months:
!•
2.

labor turnover decreased from 9056 to
5056
speed of learning increased from 89% of
standard
to 10556

3.

training costs were reduced from $1,650 per
trainee to $703 [p. 92-93].

Earni ngs Development

P r ogram

The operator earnings program was initiated to raise
low

operator income.

First the consulting engineer made a three or four

hour production study of the operator to estimate her performance
potential.

He and her supervisor then sat with the operator for three

or four hours while the engineer taught the operator more effective

work methods and encouraged her.

Often meetings of these three were

held to discuss how the operator could increase her output and earnings.
In this way, supervisors were trained in assisting operators to improve

their performance.

Familiar with the tasks and equipment of garment making, and
lacking in knowledge of the principles and methods of controlling work
flow, the supervisors reacted to the engineers stoically at first.

They carried out his advice, even if they disagreed with it.

As success

was demonstrated, the supervisors began to seek out the engineers for

assistance.

Gradually the need for help diminished.
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The operators’ response to this
program was, according to the
consultants, generally good from the
start.
By the end of 1963, the

majority of employees felt that management
wanted them to improve their
production, and would help them get their
earnings up.

PXQb l em So l v i ng M eetings

Shortly after the sensitivity training sessions
for plant

supervisors were completed, problem solving meetings between
supervisors
and operators began.

In this program, work groups met in two one hour

sessions, approximately two weeks apart.

In the first meeting, the

production manager, the personnel manager, and the two production

assistants met with the consultant, floor supervisor and a group of
operators.

They outlined their ideas about participation and discussion

of work problems, supported the program, and left.

The consultant and

floor supervisor then asked the operators to give their ideas for

improving operations.
walls.

These ideas were recorded and posted on the

When the next group entered the room, they started by reviewing

the suggestions of the previous group.

In the second meeting,

the

group sorted out the more practical suggestions, and discussed

conflict-laden issues.

Out of this meeting came a list of problems

which became the basis for follow-up investigations.
As a result of these meetings, employee morale improved.

one operator said:

What a welcome change. This is something Weldon
never did before. You have a chance to tell them
what you think, and you feel you're a part of the
company [p. 121].

As
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Supervisors began to spend more
time following up on
problems, and
delegated more responsibility
to their assistants. One
supervisor
commented:
to t ink about the problems
my unit faced
and I began ^
to come up with answers.
I amazed
th ere was never any time
before
to do anything but go from one
crisis in the sewing
ns
room to another [p. 122].

According to the consultant, one example
of the way this

approach was transferred to daily operations
occured when an inventory
imbalance made a cutback in production
necessary.

The final decision,

to reduce the work load for all employees,
was mutually agreed on as
the most equitable solution by the plant
manager and the operators.
In the eyes of the plant manager, the
problem solving meetings

were a painful process to people unused to frequent
contact with the
high levels of the organization.

As well, the program put very

heavy demands on the staff physically and emotionally.
days with week-end and take-home work were common.

Fifteen hour

In the face of

this, many were surprised at the interest in the "experiment
[p. 137]"

of trying to change Weldon, and the ease of getting positive results.
Period of Slower Change

The acceptance of the union in November 1963 marked the

beginning of a slower period of consolidation for Weldon.

During the

following year, the change-over to the unit system of production was
completed; the attitude surveys and feedback sessions were completed,

and the problem solving meetings continued.

In December 1964 when

the outside consultants left, the change program officially ended.
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After Change
At the end of 1964, the team
of consultants from the Survey

Research Center at the University of
Michigan reported their findings
on the effects of the change program
at Weldon.
In mid 1969, two
consultants returned to Weldon to make
further assessment of the long
term results of the change program.

For discussion purposes, the

findings will be generally grouped into three
broad categories:
1)

performance and production changes,

2)

leadership changes, and

3)

interpersonal relations changes.

Performance and Production

flaal QVee

are.,

experience and stability

.

During the span of

the formal change program, the employees age and level of experience

increased.

By 1964, very few employees were under 25, or had less

than two years of experience.

As well as this change, there was a

change in attitude toward staying with the company (p. 198).

See

figure 50.

Plan to stay indefinitely

Figure 50.

1962

1264

1263.

12%

Ql%

66%

Attitude Toward Staying with Weldon

The desire to remain with the plant was accompanied by a lowering of

absenteeism and turnover

(p.

147).

See figure 51.
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Absentee Rate (per day)

Turnover Rate (per month)

Figure 51.

1262

19M

6%

3%

10 %

4$

Absentee and Turnover Rate at Weldon

Operator perfonmnoe

.

During the change program, there was
a

substantial rise in operators’ performance and
operators' earnings
(p.

147).

See figure 52.

1262

1261

Operator Performance

89 %

1145S

Operator Earnings
above minimum - incentive
employees

none

Figure 52.

165S

126a
7

sustained at
a relatively

high level

Operator Performance and Earnings at Weldon

After extensive analysis, the consultants concluded that the following
four elements in the change program, in this order, were the prime

cases for the above changes:
1.
2.

3-

4.

earnings development program
weeding out of low earners in 1963, and
training of supervisors and staff in
interpersonal relations
group consultation and problem solving
meetings
miscellaneous sources, or the combination
of several sources [p. l8l-l82].

Efficiency of production

.

Over the period of the change

program, production and profits rose, and continued to rise through
1969

(.

147).

See figure 53.
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1262

12M

Production Efficiency

- 11 *

+ 14 *

Return of Capital Invested

- 15 %

+17*

Figure 53.

Production and Profit at Weldon

According to the consultants after their 1969 visit to
Weldon, "during
the period since 1964, there have been substantial gains
in efficiency

and volume for the factory as a whole".

Leadership

Supervisors
1)

.

The consultants divided leadership generally into

"supportive" and 2) "goal setting" or "work facilitating".

The

conclusions about the change in leadership styles practiced by
supervisors as experienced by employees, during the change program, are
summarized in figure 54 (p. 209).

1262
Supervisors’ Supportiveness

Supervisors' Goal Emphasis
and work facilitation

Figure 54.

1264

remained constant
relatively high
38*

27*

196a
rose

47*

Leadership Styles of Supervisors at Weldon

The consultants state that while the amount of task oriented leadership
provided by the supervisors to the operators dropped substantially
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during the change program, the task
oriented leadership provided by
the
supervisors to their assistant supervisors
was relatively high during
the same period.
According to the operators, when the
supervisors changed to
less close supervision and gave less exclusive
emphasis to productivity,

they became 'less good at dealing with people
[p. 208].'

This was

accompanied by a drop in satisfaction with supervisors
which remained
constant to 1969.

After the change program, the employees' task

•ientation increased greatly (p. 208).

See figure 55 below.

12&2

.

1964

I2S2

Peers approve of high
producers

58*

58*

66*

Desired closeness of
supervision

57 %

52*

64*

Satisfaction with
supervisors

64*

54*

54*

Figure 55.

Organization

Task Orientation and Attitude toward
Supervisors of Weldon Operators

.

One of the goals of the new owners was to

transform Weldom into a system four organization with a completely
participative management system.

According to the employees, the

control structure at Weldon did not change much during the change
program.

The influence of the higher people diminished slightly, but

the changes were not statistically significant.

However, trends toward
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system four began to appear.

There was a general
agreement that before

change Weldon fell at the
border line between Likert's
(1961) system one,
exploitive-authoritarian, and system two,
benevolent-authoritarian
management systems. Ratings in
1964 showed that Weldon had
shifted to
system three, a consultative
management system. In
1969, there was a
small change "of modest degree"
which brought Weldon still
closer to
system four.
According to the plant manager at
Weldon, some who felt at home
in the old system found it very
difficult to change. As of this
writing,
one senior member of management had
left.

To a majority, the strenuous,

if not painful change, "has meant a good
adjustment to their work for
the first time, and they derive a good
deal of satisfaction from it".

Interpersonal Relations

19.6.2,

1964

1969

Like fellow employees

85$

86$

85$

Group Cohesiveness

25$

25$

30$

Figure 56.

Personal Relationships at Weldon

In general, attitudes toward the company moved from neutral to slightly

more positive [p. 189]; attitudes toward the job remained quite
positive [p. 189], and attitudes toward fellow employees remained quite

positive [p. 197].
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Anal ysis of Case Fiv^

Before Change
ve passed a law that everyone
should be happy.
Eugene O’Neill,
Marco Millions

Hie Leaders

,

;

.

Original Owner-M anagers

Weldon’s original owner-managers practiced an
almost exclusively

high task leadership style.

They organized the roles of all their

administrators; they directed when, where and how all
activities were
to be carried out; they set up the pattern of organization
in two

separate hierarchies, and they formalized the channels of
communication
one way, downward, with almost no horizontal communication
between
them, or their two divisions.

Not only did they not engage in inter-

personal communications, their policy was to deliberately maintain
secrecy about all of their decisions.

For example, the sale of Weldon

to Harwood came as a complete surprise to all but a very few top

executives.

Along with their policy of secrecy went a spy system, in

which certain of their subordinates "reported confidentially
to them any deviations from their orders.

[p.

9]"

The effects of this created

animosity, fear, hostility and frustration among management.

Insofar as relationships behavior is concerned, these two

leaders appeared to adopt a style devoid of personal relationships.

They established no personal relationships with their executives, save,
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one might suppose, that
between themselves and
their relatives whom
they had placed in
positions of authority. They
appeared to give no
socioemotional support, or
psychological strokes. Subordi^tes

heard

from them only when they had
done a ted job.

This behavior, practiced

on overworked executives and
administrators who were TO ny tunes
required
to spend evenings and week-ends
on the job, was demoralizing.
Finally,
the owners intimidated and
threatened the largely female work
force,
for over thirty years, to prevent
unionization. As the ACWA said,

their methods of playing on worker fears
were the worst the union had

encountered in the Pennsylvania area.

The hourly workers, therefore,

lived in a perpetual state of job insecurity.

According to Life Cycle Theory, each of the
four basic leader-

ship styles can range from extremely effective
(+4) to extremely

ineffective (-1).

In this case, the owners' leadership style
would

fall close to the ineffective extreme of the continuum,
in a quadrant

one high task and low relationship style.

Hersey and Blanchard (1972)

state that an ineffective quadrant one leader is seen by subordinates

as having no confidence in others, unpleasant, and interested only in
short run output.

Ihs.

Followers;

Managerial Staff

For discussion, the followers referred to will be the
personnel in manufacturing, and will be divided into two groups:

1)

executives, administrators, department heads, supervisors, and assistant
supervisors, and 2) hourly workers or operators.
focus on group one.

This section, will

%
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T a sk re Want fiXperlfnffi .

As a group, the Weldon
managers were

highly knowledgeable in the
details of naking gannets,
the styles, the
manufacturing process, the plant's
problems, and its equipment.
Thus
their level of technical
competence was high.

As policy makers, the

managers' task relevant experience
was low, for they were
actively discouraged from making suggestions
or giving ideas for improvements,
and
deliberately kept uninformed about
costs, policy decisions, and
what was
happening in merchandising.

Wllli nKrififfS and abi li ty to take respond

hi

i

^y

Considering

the conditions under which management
worked, their willingness to take

responsibility was surprisingly high.

Although there was only one

supervisor to 155 workers, orders were always
produced.

The production

manager literally ran through the sewing rooms all
day giving orders
and checking on them, to make sure production
quotas were met.

According to the Harwood vice-president, considering
they (the managers)

were terribly overworked, bogged down in detail, and
not given the
information needed to understand supervisory responsibilities,
their

performance was better than might have been expected.
That their ability to take responsibility was greater than
they were allowed, was evidenced by their frustration.

Each level of

management checked the work of the one below it, often unnecessarily
reversing decisions that had been made.

As managers and supervisors

were frustrated by their inability to deal directly with matters within
their personal competence, their anger, worry and confusion increased.
Aoilie.Y.ement.

motivation.

According to McClelland’s (1961, 1965,

1972, 197^) theory, Weldon’s management were moderately high in achieve-
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ment motivation.

These managers took moderate,
calculated risks; in
order to get merchandise produced
on time, they would use
any methods
they could.
In their situation, they
felt production depended on
their
skills and abilities, and were
frustrated they could not exercise
them
more.
They constantly had to meet the
challenge of ever changing orders
for different items. Their creativity
was stretched in finding ways
to
meet demands in a chaotic factory. It
is difficult to assess their

attitude toward the probability of their
being successful in their job.
It seems likely that by the time of
purchase, confidence was at a low
ebb.

Long range goals were not made by the
managers; goals were set

by the owners, who, if they had them, kept
them to themselves.

Managers' goals were, by and large, to meet the
demands of the season,

while supervisors concentrated on meeting quota demands
each day.
Feedback to the managers was constant; quotas were met or
they were
not met; customers were pleased, or they were not.

The managers always

knew how well they were doing, though usually they heard about their

mistakes rather than their successes.
To summarize, those factors characteristic of high achievement

motivation were:

risks were calculated, personal efforts were

important in outcomes, challenges were constant, and feedback was
immediate and constant.

ment motivation were:

Those factors characteristic of low achievetheir attitude of confidence was low and they

did not plan ahead.

Maturity Level

.

From the above, in terms of Life Cycle Theory,

management's "maturity" level, as managers, at the time of purchase,
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would be low average.

(See figure 57).

With this "maturity" level,

e initial leadership style
appropriate for management at
the time of
purchase would be quadrant two,
high task and high relationships.
As previously discussed, the
owners practiced an ineffective

quadrant one high task and low
relationships leadership style.
According to Life Cycle Theory, this style
would be inappropriate to management’s "maturity" level. The frustration,
hostility and breakdown at
Weldon attest to the inappropriateness and
ultimate ineffectiveness of
the owner’s leadership style.

Mhy was the Owners* Leader s hi p style Unsuccessful ?
.

The question may be asked, why, if the owners'
leadership style

was inappropriate, did Weldon succeed for over thirty
years?
this, let us first consider the Weldon organization.

To answer

The garment

industry operates by seasons, at the mercy of fashion dictates.

As a

manufacturer of quality garments, Weldon operated under the stress of
seasonal style changes and special orders from prestigious stores.

The

primary orientation of each department in manufacturing was towards
task.

Time pressures were intense; every eight hour shift, certain

orders had to be produced.

Customers were always waiting.

While each

operator had a clear independent task, high coordination of production
was required to produce the finished item under time pressure.

In

order to produce large amounts of merchandise within short time spans,
high cooperation and coordination between the departments within
manufacturing, and between manufacturing and merchandising was needed.
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Leadership style
appropriate to
management at
purchase

Leadership style
adopted by original
owner-managers ineffective
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Maturity Level of
Weldon’s management
as managers at time
of purchase

Figure 57

Weldon Management's Maturity Level at Purchase
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During Weldon's beginnings, when
all manufacturing operations
were located under one roof, and
all merchandising operations
were in
one New York office, the partner-owners
could personally control all
the
activities in their building. In this
situation, it would be possible
for them to personally sign every
order. Through close supervision
they

could keep production going even though
coordination and cooperation was
poor.

However, when Weldon expanded to five
plants in the mid-fifties,

the owners could no longer personally
direct all operations.

Like the

frog who tried to swallow the pond, they drove
themselves and their staff
to exhaustion and ulcers trying.

Another question logically occurs:

if the owners were successful

at the beginning when Weldon was one factory, why were
they not successful when Weldon shrank its operations back to one plant
and 1000 employ-

ees?

By 1959 Weldon's leadership had created hostility among
the staff,

fear among its workers, and bad will in the public.

In addition, in the

early fifties, the owners had made two costly business errors.

The

reasons for the owners' decision to enter the two unsuccessful ventures

were never explained; however, had they consulted their executives, they

might have been prevented from making these mistakes.

With a great loss

of capital, the owners had not kept up with technological changes.
Unable and apparently unwilling to put money into equipment, they now
operated with outdated machines.

At this point, Weldon was caught in a

downward spiral.

The Fo llowers:

Ho urly Workers

The hourly workers at the time of purchase were, as a group,
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below average in "maturity".

Because of Weldon's practice of
taking

on operators before peak periods,
and firing them immediately
afterward,
Weldon had come to be regarded as a
place of seasonal employment.

Workers would leave as soon as they could
find other jobs.

The

workers' view was summarized by a taxi driver:
It's a sweat shop. They work you like crazy
for
a couple of weeks and then throw you out
[p. 114].

Turnover and absenteeism were very high.

At the time of purchase,

half of the employees were planning to quit.
purchase, turnover was 90%.

double that in the industry.

In the four months after

The absentee rate of 12% per day ran
Workers operated in an atmosphere of job

insecurity, increased by top management's anti-union intimidation
and
threats.
In this situation, achievement motivation was low.

Even

though two thirds of the largely women workers were older and
experienced, with a core of highly skilled workers, ability to take

responsibility was generally low.
the "best" and easiest jobs.

Experienced senior operators kept

Because of the chaotic production system,

an operator often had seven to nine job changes in an eight hour shift,
preventing skill development for new operators.
Thus the general level of skill in the sewing room was below

industry strandards, and earnings for a great number of operators were

at minimum or below.

With no fringe benefits, no opportuniies to gain

skills to make more money, willingness to take responsibility was

generally low.

Thus, according to Life Cycle Theory, the hourly workers

"maturity" level at the time of purchase was low.

(See figure 58).
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As such, the appropriate
leadership style for the hourly
employees at purchase would be
quadrant one, high task and low
relationships.
(See figure 58).
This was, in fact, the leadership
style attempted by
management, but to no avail. With
one supervisor to 155 workers,
there
were simply not enough managerial
staff to go around.
In addition, the

supervisory staff were given no opportunity
to actually supervise; the
plant manager retained the authority
and control in the plant. This
resulted in the plant manager giving most
of the task leadership, and

bearing most of the managerial responsibility
in the plant.

Hence the

hourly workers lacked the direction and
assistance they needed.
We note at this point, that in spite of
their condition, the

interpersonal relations among the hourly employees was
good:
their fellow employees.

8556

liked

64$ were satisfied with their supervisor.

Situation At Purchase

The following diagram illustrates the situation and motivation
level of each of the levels of the hierarchy of the Weldon manufacturing

division at purchase.

During Change

A boss who is considerate tends to have foremen
who believe and behave the same way.

Fleishman & Harris

Kew Leader s;

T he Harwoo d Ow ners
.

According to Life Cycle Theory, the new owners, after an initial

assessment period, adopted a quadrant two high task and high relation-
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Ships style at the beginning
of the change program.

Toward the middle

Of the program they and their
consultants adopted a quadrant
three
high relationships and low task
style. Toward the end of the
change
program, they attempted a quadrant
four low task and low
relationships
leadership style, but found it to be
premature.
At the end of the
change program, they remained for
the most part, in a quadrant three
style.
Iiu t 3. a l l eadersh i p Sty le
.

.

—

;

quadrant twp.

The initial high task,

high relationships approach of Harwood was
reflected in the decision to
implement a change program at Weldon.

As the Harwood chairman of the

board Alfred Marrow stated, the Harwood executives
independently

planned the goals of the program aimed at participative
change, and

"imposed [p. 65]" it on Weldon.

High relationships was shown from the

time of purchase, when the Harwood owners made statements
of their

participative philosophy at Weldon, assured employees that the

operation would continue, and that no one would be fired.
Quadrant two style was also shown in the technical changes at
Weldon.

The change over to the unit system of production was decided

upon by Harwood, and implemented by their consulting engineers.

How-

ever, these technical and physical changes were accompanied by

supervisor and manager staff meetings, where those present tried to

open channels of communications, share problem solving, and better
interpersonal relations.
In like manner, Harwood owners saw that changes in personnel

policy were needed.

They hired a personnel manager, and consultants
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to bring about personnel policy
changes.

But rather than impose these

policy changes on supervisors and workers,
the consultants and

personnel manager gathered evidence to convince
the supervisory staff

of the need for these changes, emphasizing
joint decision making, the
opening of communications, and facilitating behaviors.
The management training program was decided upon by
Harwood,

and attendance was mandatory.

Yet the focus of the sessions was

divided between practical problems and emotional issues affecting
personal relationships.
In every facet of the change program, the Harwood owners

continued to attend to task and relationships.

The operator training

program was instituted by Harwood; throughout the engineers encouraged
the operators and supervisors, who were eventually won over by the

demonstrations of success.

So too the earnings development program,

initiated by Harwood amid initial skepticism by supervisors.

As

earnings rose, operators gained in confidence, morale improved, and

supervisors were convinced of the program's benefits.
The problem solving meetings between supervisors and operators,

again initiated by Harwood, focused on problems in the plant and areas
of interpersonal conflict between staff and workers.

After the higher

management personnel introduced and supported the meeting, they left,
leaving it in the hands of the supervisors and consultant.
way, supervisory authority was built up.

In this

Again, there was an emphasis

in these meetings on both task and relationships.
As previously discussed, the appropriate leadership style for

management at the time of purchase was quadrant two, high task and high
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relationships.

Thus the new owners initial
leadership style was appro-

priate to management’s "maturity” level
at the time of purchase.

It is

interesting to note here that whereas
Crockett attempted to use a
coercive change strategy to bring about
a participative system in the
State Department case, and failed; here,
the Harwood owners used a

coercive change strategy for the same ends,
and succeeded.
Some differences that might account for this
are:
1.

While Crockett’s leadership style was diagnosed
as being inappropriate to his staff's "maturity"
level, the Harwood owners leadership style was
diagnosed as being appropriate to their staff's
"maturity" level.

2.

Crockett had begun by making a structural change
in his organization which raised anger, hostility
and fear among his staff. The Harwood owners
had begun with an extensive program of technical
changes which had been implemented with success,
and raised worker morale.

Later leadershi p sty l e;

quadrant three

.

When changes were

well underway, the Harwood owners and their representatives began to
practice a quadrant three high relationships and low task style.

In

the earnings development program, once operators had received instruction, the consulting engineers stepped back and let the supervisors take

over the instruction and support function.

As success became apparent,

the initially skeptical supervisors would seek out the engineers for

advice and guidance.
In the problem solving meetings, the consultant was able to

take a back seat in the room and let the superior conduct the meetings.

The consultant was present for support and advice if asked.
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Thus as supervisory staff and managers
gained expertise and

bettered interpersonal relations, the
consulting staff and managers

gradually withdrew.

An attempt at

qu a drant four

-

Top management unsuccessfully

attempted to adopt a quadrant four low task and
low relationships
leadership style late in the change program.

When they left the

production of the fall line entirely in the hands of
the Weldon staff,
they were warned that things were not going well.

was overproduction of unordered merchandise.

Indeed, the result

In a meeting with top

management, requested by the Weldon staff, the staff acknowledged
they

were not ready for complete responsibility and asked for help from top
management.

Though the quadrant four attempt was premature, the

benefits of the change program were apparent in the meeting.
By the end of the change program, the Harwood leaders had

progressed to a quadrant three high relationships and low task leadership style, with brief uses of quadrant two when help was requested.

The Follower s:

Ma nageria l Staff

By the end of the change program, management "maturity" had
risen.

Because of the more equal distribution of authority and control

achievement motivation and willingness to take responsibility had
increased.

Through management training sessions and the earnings

development program, managers and supervisors had increased their

managerial competence.

Their ability to take responsibility was rising

Through the training sessions, and with the former owner-managers gone,
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morale had improved and
Interpersonal relations were
better.
I„ fact ’
greatest progress in improvement
of interpersonal relations
was made
among the managerial staff.
Thus by the end of the
change program
Harwood leaders had brought
the Weldon management to
a position of
high average "maturity".
(See figure
,

.

60).

Ihe Followers:

Hourly

Work^

As a result of the earnings
development program, the operator

training program, the problem solving
meetings, the unit system of
production, and unionization, operator
skills, earnings, proficiency,

hygiene factors, and fringe benefits increased.

This was reflected in

a lower rate of turnover (see figure
51) and absenteeism (see figure
51), a rise in production efficiency (see figure
53), and a rise in

profits (see figure 53).

Worker "maturity" gradually rose.

Leadership, which used to come from the plant manager,
now

came from several sources:
consultants.

the supervisors, assistant supervisors, and

Generally speaking, the leadership style adopted during

the change program by supervisory staff was quadrant two; high
task

and high relationships.

This style was typified by the consulting

engineers in the earnings development program, who would sit for hours

with the operator, instructing her in skills and offering constant
support and encouragement.

The engineer modeled this leadership style

to the supervisor who was constantly present during instruction, and who

ultimately took over.
According to figure 54, task oriented leadership on the part

of supervisors dropped during the change program, while their supportive

273

High Relations
High Task \
(
Ships
slr- "nfeUgh RelationLow Task /J
\
V^hips

/
i

J

-^7
/

/
/

/
/

1

f

\
\

i
1

1

i

1

\

1

j

/

/

(

j

above
a verage

Management
maturity at
end of change
program

Figure 60.

\

1

/
Maturity
Continuum

1

below

iX5t

-|-

.average

Management
maturity at
beginning of
change program

Leadership Styles of Harwood Owners
and Representatives at Beginning and
End of Change Program

274

leadership behavior remained relatively
high.

The supervisors attend-

ing more to unit problems, delegated
authority to their assistants,

who gradually took over their role with
the operators.

However, the

operators did not perceive this new behavior
on the part of their

supervisors as a quadrant three high relationships
style.

According

to the consultant’s measures, satisfaction
with supervisors dropped and

remained at a lowered level through 1969.

Workers also thought

supervisors became "less good with people [p. 208."

It appeared to be

a case of ’out of sight, out of mind'.
By 1969, five years after the change program, supervisors'
task

oriented leadership behavior had risen to its highest level ever;
higher
that it had been at the beginning of the change program.

(See figure 54).

Apparently, according to the consultants, worker turnover had again risen
in 1969, causing an influx of new employees.

Hersey and Blanchard (1972)

suggest that a leader may have to move back through the cycle, to a

leadership style he or she previously used, in order to meet the ever

changing demands upon the people for whom he or she is responsible.

In

this "project cycle", when the temporary needs of a person or group have

been met, the leader can return to his or her usual style.

In this

situation, the supervisors had to return to a quadrant two style in order
to train the new employees.

When the new employees had gained competence

and skills, the supervisors could return to their quadrant three style.

This raises an interesting question of whether, in a manufacturing situation where worker turnover is constant, supervisors can ever progress to
a quadrant four style, or whether they will arrive at a quadrant three

style, and then move between quadrant two and quadrant three.
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After Change
We s h°u ld really begin working
with leadership
attitudes at tba JtQC. so that a
favorable leadership climate will spread down
Certainly it
will not spread up in the industrial

organization.
Fleishman & Harris

The following diagram illustrates
the focus on the change
program, what was done for each level
of the manufacturing division of

Weldon, and the motivation or need level
that group was likely operating

on at the end of the change program.

Summary

May

The Weldon Change Prog ram Succeeded
1.

The initial high task and high relationships
leadership style of the new owners was
appropriate to the initial "average maturity"
level of the Weldon managerial staff. The new
owners had flexibility in their leadership
style which allowed them to shift to a high
relationships and low task style as the
"maturity" level of the Weldon managerial
staff increased.

2.

The new owners began with an extensive series
of technical changes in the plant and corresponding training programs for operators. This
raised both productivity and plant morale. It
also allowed supervisors and managers to devote
time to administration.

3.

After the technical changes were well underway,
management training programs for top management
began followed in turn by training in problemsolving at each level of the plant’s organization down to supervisors and operators. Thus
changes in management style at each level were
prepared for and supported by the level above.
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In the words of those directly
involved in evaluating the change
at

Weldon, it succeeded because "a
multiplicity of varied change

strategies and methods were employed
[p. 233]," and because "there was
unusual scope and coherence in the program
of change [p. 233]."
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VII

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the Study

This study has attempted
to answer the question,
"How useful is
the Life Cycle Theory as a
diagnostic method for determining
the most
appropriate leadership style in
any given organisational
situation"?
Life Cycle Theory postulates
that high task and low
relationships leader behavior (quadrant
one) is appropriate for working
with
people of below average "maturity",
and has the best probability of
success. As the followers progress
from below average to average
"maturity", a leader's behavior should
move in turn through high task

and high relationships (quadrant two)
to high relationships and low

task (quadrant three).

With people of above average "maturity",
a

leadership style of low task and low relationships
(quadrant four) has
the highest probability of success.

Five cases of organizational change, acknowledged
as successes
or failures by their writers, were selected for study.

In the un-

successful cases of change, the objectives of the change program
were
not achieved; in the successful cases the objectives, to a
large extent,

were achieved.
Three cases contained accounts of change programs that had
failed.

These were:

"Creating An Open School", "Change in a Newspaper"

and "Change in the State Department".

The attempt to create an open
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school was not successful.

At the end of the first
year, classrooms

became self-contained; all but eight
teachers left the school; the
superintendent went on leave of absence
and resigned afterwards, and
the curriculum director quit. The
principal resigned during the first

semester of the second year, and the
school became traditional.

The

three-year attempt to bring about a
participative management system in
a newspaper also failed.

Argyris was not asked back.

management of the newspaper system continued as
before.

The authoritarian
At the end of

the first attempt to reorganize the State
Department, the chief ex-

ecutive in charge of the change program resigned because
of active
resistance} the consultants he had hired were fired by his
successor.

His successor restored the organizational structure to its
previous

highly bureaucratic condition.
Three cases contained accounts of change programs that succeeded.

These were:

"Change in the State Department", "Change in an Automobile

Plant" and "Change in the Garment Industry".

As a result of the second

and this time successful attempt to change the State Department, 500
recommendations for change were submitted by the employees; 400 were
accepted; 75$ were implemented; praise for the program was given by the

Secretary of State, and employee morale was raised to a high level.

After Cooley’s period of leadership in the automobile assembly plant,
the plant became the best in the division.

Absenteeism, grievances,

turnover and complaints from dealers dropped to a low level; profits,
productivity and morale rose to a high level; other plants requested

staff from that plant, and plant management operated collaboratively
After Harwood’s two year program to change Weldon to a profit-making
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division With a participative
system of marcgement,
profits, productivity
and management morale rose;
turnover and absenteeism
dropped, and the
organization moved from one rated
as borderline between
systems one and
two on Likert's [1961]
scale to one rated in system
three.
Each of these cases was first
described and then analyzed
accord
ing to a theoretical framework.
The framework contained all
of the
variables of the Life Cycle Theory
and variables from other
situational
leadership theories.

Emergent Issues

Out of the analyses of these cases, several
issues emerged for
this writer.
1.

The usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a
diagnostic method.

2.

The patterns of leadership revealed in the
successful and
unsuccessful change efforts.

3.

The relationship between technical change and human
systems
change in successful change programs.
The casualty rate of outside consultants in organizational
change
programs and the predominant use of the T-group, human relations
approach to organizational change.

5.

The relationship of organizational crisis to organizational change.

The Life Cycle Theory as a Diagnostic Method

Leader Behavior

The analytic framework used to analyze the cases in this study

contained all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory.

The leadership

style of the key leaders in each case was analyzed according to the LCT
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variables of task and relationships behavior.

In order to analyze the

leader's style, all recorded evidences in the
case of the leader's

behavior were extracted and placed in one of these
two categories.

Leader behavior which, to this writer, showed the
leader developing
personal relationships between him or herself and group
members, giving

socioemotional support and psychological strokes, and engaging
in interpersonal communications and in facilitating behavior, was placed in
the

category of leader relationships-

Leader behavior which, to this writer,

showed the leader organizing and defining roles of individuals and group
members, explaining what activities to do, when, where, and how, and

endeavoring to formalize channels of communication, was placed in the
category of leader task behavior.
This Classification process was limited by the amount of information on the leader's behavior available in each case; this depended on

what information about the leader's behavior the author of the
particular case had chosen to include.

assumed more importance than in others.

In some cases this factor

One of the consultants involved

in Crockett's reorganization of the State Department expressed great

disapproval of Marrow's account of the reorganization which he
(consultant) considered extremely biased and limited.

[Seashore, 1975].

He thus felt that this writer's analysis must necessarily suffer, being

based on a partial account.
The classification process was therefore subject to two

interpretations; 1) the information that the author of each case had

chosen to include, and 2) the interpretation of that information by
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this writer.

Both conditions apply throughout
the analyses of each

case.
In spite of these two limitations,
classification of the

leader's behavior did not present
difficulty to this writer.

After

categorizing the available information under
task and relationships
behaviors, a general tendency toward one
category or other generally
emerged, at least clearly enough to make a
conclusion about the leader-

ship style in question.

Foll owers' "Maturity" LpvpI

Harder to classify, however, was the followers' "maturity" level
In order to analyze follower "maturity" with respect to a
given task,

the followers behavior was categorized under the four "maturity"

variables of the LCT:
responsibility;

3)

1) achievement motivation; 2) willingness to take

ability to take responsibility;

4)

task relevant

education and/or experience.
In order to ascertain achievement motivation, McClelland's (1961
1965, 1966, 1974) characteristics of the achievement motivated person

were used as category headings.

These included:

1) the tendency to

take moderately difficult but potentially achievable risks; 2) the

preference for non-routine jobs;

3)

the tendency to have a positive,

even over-confident attitude toward being successful;

4)

the tendency

to think ahead; 5) the tendency to work harder only when there is a

chance that personal efforts will make a difference in the outcome;
6) a

preference for constant feedback on how well one is doing;

tendency not to be motivated by money alone.

7) a

All follower behaviors
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which, to this writer, corresponded
to one or other of these
characteristics were appropriately accounted
for within the "maturity" dimension.
At this point, the writer had to
make a personal judgment on how many

characteristics must be fulfilled in order to
label the followers as
"achievement motivated".

A general rule of thumb which this
writer

adopted was that one to two of the above
characteristics, if satisfied,

would indicate low achievement motivation, three
to five would indicate
moderate achievement motivation, and if six or seven
were satisfied,
then high achievement motivation would be recorded.

Using this method,

it was not too difficult to analyze the respective
level of achievement

motivation of the followers in each case.
preceded each analysis:

Two limitations, however,

1) the information about the followers that

each author chose to address, and

2)

the classification of McClelland's

achievement motivation theory adapted by this writer as outlined above.
With respect to the other three variables of "maturity":

willingness to take responsibility, ability to take responsibility, and
task relevant education and/or experience, the writer had to make

entirely subjective decisions.

These variables have not been

operationally defined to the extent of the achievement motivation
variable.

One of the difficulties seemed to be that, at times, the

"maturity" variables did not necessarily appear mutually exclusive,

while on other occasions, discrepancies began to surface.

This being

the case, the writer had to decide upon the following questions:

behavior(s) indicates willingness to take responsibility?

indicates ability to take responsibility?

What

What

What behaviors and other
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types of information such as job qualifications,
standards, and

productivity results, would indicate that the
followers had or had not
the education or experience to carry out the
job at hand?

Therefore,

in analyzing these three variables, the writer had
to rely mostly upon

subjective interpretation.
After the follower behavior had been classified and analyzed

according to the above four variables, an overall assessment of the
followers' level of "maturity" had to be made.

In fact, the four

assessments had to be reduced to one general judgment of the "maturity"
of the followers.

Here the writer met another problem.

final assessment to be arrived at?

Was it simply a question of finding

the average of the four assessments?

more importance than the others?

How was the

Was there one variable that held

Should the interpreter follow the one

or two variables that gave more reliable data?

Whatever the slot,

(above average, average, below average) that the maturity of the

followers finally entered, some important considerations were apparently
ignored

Frequently this writer found a wide discrepancy between the
four "maturity" characteristics.

Often, for example, followers were

high in ability to take responsibility but apparently low in their

willingness to do so.

Occasionally they were high in task-relevant

education and/or experience while low in willingness.

arose at this point.

Several questions

What causes people who are educated, experienced,

and able, to be unwilling to accomplish the task?

What causes educated,

achievement
capable, and highly motivated people to sink in their

motivation?

ignore
Merely averaging out the four variables seemed to
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the weight of importance attached
to different variables.

Also, the

weight of importance of each variable
appeared to be different in
different cases and situations. Thus,
rather than merely average out
mechanically the assessment of the followers'

level in each of the four

"maturity" variables, this writer combined
the four assessments, while

attempting to acknowledge the importance of
different variables in
different cases.

In short, the analysis of the follower's
"maturity"

level in each case was subject to a great deal of
subjective interpreta-

tion on the part of this writer.

Added to this, it should be noted

that case studies limit the accuracy of analysis because they
usually

do not record sufficient or detailed data and, as such, deny the

objectivity and first-hand data available to the participant observer
or field researcher.

Becommendations for Future Study for the LCT

The "maturity" dimension within the LCT undoubtedly needs a

clearer definition.
underway).

(Currently a research project on this area is

Up until the present there has been a gap between the

conceptual and operational definitions of the "maturity" variables of

willingness and ability to take responsibility and task relevant

education and/or experience.

For the most part, analysis of these

variables is dependent upon the subjective interpretation of the
diagnostician, an interpretation which in turn depends upon the

competence and skill of the practitioner as well as the degree and

availability of relevant data.
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While the "maturity" variables
are differentiated within
the
LCT, they are not entirely
distinct measures of task maturity.
There is
much overlapping. Ability to take
responsibility seems far removed
from willingness to do the same,
yet task relevant education and/or

experience appears to correspond highly
with ability.
Task relevant education and ability
appear to depend on
technical and intellectual factors, while
willingness and achievement

motivation appear to depend on these plus emotive
factors.
that arises here is:

One question

what influence does the emotional climate,
the

interpersonal relationships among followers, have on
their achievement

motivation and willingness to do a job?

In other words, what influence

does the relationships among followers, presently not incorporated
into
the LCT, have on their "maturity” level?

It would seem that while

there is a task-relevant maturity, there is also a relationships-

relevant maturity, and that both of these will influence productivity.

Patterns of Leadership in Successful and Unsuccessful
Change Efforts

In cases describing successful change programs, the leadership

style showed flexibility; leaders of successful change programs were

able to adopt styles of both high task and high relationships, as the

situation demanded.

(See figure 62).

When he changed the systems of the automobile assembly plant,
plant manager Cooley progressed through an initial quadrant two style
to quadrant three finally ending in quadrant four.

(See figure 62).

When Harwood took over Weldon, the new Harwood owners and their

287

representatives began their change program using
a quadrant two style

and progressed to a quadrant three style by
the end of the change
program.

They were still working toward their ultimate
goal to turn

over management to Weldon staff, and adopt for themselves
a quadrant
four style of leadership.

(See figure 62).

In bringing about change

in the State Dept., deputy undersecretary Macomber began by
practicing
a quadrant two style, progressd to a quadrant three style and ended

using a quadrant four style.

(See figure 62).

In each of these cases

the change program was successful.
In these cases, too, the level of the followers' "maturity" was

assessed as average.

The former plant manager of the automobile

assembly plant, the former owner-managers of the Weldon plant, and
deputy undersecretary Rimestad had all used an exclusively quadrant one
style.

(See figure 62).

reached a crisis point.

Under these leaders, each of the organizations

These leadership profiles are in accord with

the Life Cycle Theory hypothesis that while a quadrant one style has

the best chance of success with followers of below average "maturity"

quadrant two and three styles have the best probability of success with
followers of average "maturity".
In the cases of unsuccessful change, the leader’s styles

vacillated between quadrant one and quadrant four.

Deputy undersecretary

Crockett practised a basic high task and low relationships style, with
a secondary style of quadrant four.

(See figure 63).

So too, the

prepresident of the newspaper, and principal Shelby practices a

dominantly quadrant one style.

(See figure 63).

Each of these leaders
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SUCCESSFUL CHANGE PROGRAMS

B efore

Situation

:

Automobile
Assembly
Plant

.Inadequate technicalorganizational system
•Production efficiency
worst in division
.Followers - average
"maturity"
.At crisis pojpt

Former Plant
Manager

Garment
Factory

Plant Manager
Cooley

.Inadequate technicalorganizational system
.Near bankruptcy
.Followers - average
"maturity"
At crisis point
.

Former
Management

U.S. State

p"

0
New Management

.Inadequate technicalorganizational system
.Followers - average
"maturity"
.Chan g e dem anded - withi n
an d wit h ou t

Department

Deputy
Undersecretary
Rimestad

Figure 62.

After

Deputy
Undersecretary
Macomber

Leadership Profiles of Three Successful Cases
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UNSUCCESSFUL CHANGE PROGRAMS
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U.S. State

1

Alter

.Inadequate technicalorganizational system
•Followers - average
"maturity"
Change demanded from
without only
No crisis

Department
u

Situation

1

•

OT
Deputy
Undersecretary
Crockett

“1

Newspaper

0-

Deputy
Undersecretary
Rimestad

•Adequate technicalorganizational system
•Followers - below average
"maturity"
•NQ-Srisjs

k

President X

President X

Open
School

•Inadequate technicalorganization system
•Followers - average
"maturity"
At opening - no crisis
nine months later, at
end of school year,
crisis point reached
•

-o
Principal
Shelby

Figure 63.
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'
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.

;

j

Principal
Shelby

Leadership Profiles in Three Cases of Unsuccessful Change
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were either highly visible directing all
activities, or completely withdrawn.

None practiced a leadership style involving
relationships

behaviors.

These leadership profiles are in accord with
the Life Cycle

Theory hypothesis that a leader who does not have
flexibility in leadership style and whose style does not progress in turn
through each of
the four quadrants, will have less probability of success.

These leadership profiles suggest a question for further study:

Can the leader who does not practice relationships behavior be successful in long term change programs?

This study suggests not, if the leader

has to develop the potential of his or her followers from low to high

levels of "maturity".

While most leaders who practiced quadrant one

and four styles were successful in the short run in the cases studied
here, their programs were not successful in the long run.

remains:

The question

what is the relationship between leadership styles lacking in

relationships behaviors, and successful change efforts?

Technical Change and Human Systems Change in Successful
Change Programs

In the cases of successful change, inadequate technical systems

were improved before human systems change was attempted.

Before change,

in both the automobile assembly plant and the garment factory, equipment

was outdated, plant layout poor, and technical operations inefficient.
As well, the human system functioned poorly.

Cooley’s first move as new

he
plant manager was to improve working conditions in the factory? then

introduced plant-wide meeings to improve communications.

At Weldon, the

taught operators
new owners first installed new production systems and
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how to function in them.

Then they introduced management
training

programs.
In the case of the newspaper,
the technical systems functioned

well both before and after change.

Although laced with conflict and

intrigue, those working for the newspaper
understood and accepted this

condition as a "fact of life".
before the attempt at change.

The human system functioned efficiently
It still produces an internationally

recognized newspaper.
In the cases of unsuccessful change, however,
human systems

change was attempted without corresponding improvements
of technically
inadequate systems.

The State Department was overburdened with a

multitude of administrative levels which strangled communications.

After one attempt to cut out several bureaucratic layers, no further
attempt at structural change was made; all efforts were bent towards

human systems change.
The open school attempted a non-structured organizational

system which functioned passably well at the beginning of the school
year, and produced chaos toward the end of the year when the funds ran
out.

Here all attention was paid to the human system; it was assumed

that technical and structural systems were unimportant.
In successful change programs, the leaders improved the

technical systems and provided both the means and the opportunity
for followers to take responsibility.

grow in ability.

This caused the followers to

In unsuccessful change programs the leaders tried to

'fix’ human relations in the system before they fixed the system so
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that people could take responsibility.

This suggests an issue for

further study; what is the nature
of the relationship between
technical
change and human systems change in
an organization, and how does
this
relationship affect attempts at organizational
change?

Casualty Rate of Outside Consultants and
the Use of the
T- Group Approach to Organizational
Change
The casualty rate among outside consultants
hired to assist and

advise on the process of organizational change in
these cases was high.
Out of five cases, only the reorganization of the
automobile assembly
plant used no outside consultants.

was plant manager.

Cooley, who directed the changes

Robert Guest, who wrote the account of the re-

organization, was an observer only.
In the change effort at the Weldon pajama manufacturing plant,

five teams of outside consultants were hired; two engineering teams,

one evaluation team, and two human systems teams.

The engineering and

evaluation teams were concerned with technical factors.

The human

systems teams used a T-group based approach to solve management problems.

These outside consulting teams were hired by the new owner-managers, the

Marrow brothers, who planned and spearheaded the changes.
fore, gave the consultants full support.

They, there-

Only in this case study did

the consultants survive and succeed in their task.
In the reorganization under Crockett at the State Department,

five teams of outside consultants were hired by Crockett:

one advisory

team of human systems consultants (unpaid), two human systems teams, one

technical team, and one evaluation team.

All three human systems teams
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used the T-group aproaeh to
organizational change.

All the consultants

were fired or dismissed when
Rimestad took over as deputy
undersecretar?
There was some doubt in this case
as to whether using outside consulting
teams and their approach to the
reorganization
had the full support of

Crockett’s superiors.
In the attempted change program in
the newspaper, Argyris was

brought in by the president and top management
to conduct a study of the

newspaper's human system.

He retained one other consultant to
assist

him during a training seminar for executives.
technique to facilitate organizational change.

Argyris used the T-group

After three years his

study was terminated by the newspaper’s management.
In the attempt to create an open school, one human
relations

team and one outside consultant were hired by the principal to assist
the faculty and administrators in implementing a new approach to

education.

The consulting team was hired for one week only to conduct

a T-group as the first element in the teacher's summer preparatory

workshop.

The other consultant worked with the teachers in their

meetings during the year; these meetings were conducted in the manner

of mini-T-groups with norms of no one person taking task leadership,
and considerable expression of feelings.

During the first year, as

teachers began to experience more and more difficulties, and the

experiment began to fail, the principal fired the ongoing consultant.
A summary of the survival and mortality rate of outside consultants

is presented in figure 64.
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Cases of Unsuccessfu

Consultant or team

Change in
the State
Department
(under
Crockett)

Change in
a newspaper

Change in
a School

l

Survived

Advisory Team

Cha n t™

Fired

Principal Technique
icumique
* *

X

T-group Approach

X

T-group Approach

X

?

Evaluation Team

X

Statistical
Measurement

Chris Argyris

X

T-group Approach

2 Human Systems
Teams
Technical Team

Co-trainer
(assisted during
executive training
seminar only)

X

T-group Approach

Human Systems
Team (one week

X

T-group Approach

only)

Human Systems
consultant

X

T-group Approach

Cases of Successful Organizational Chanee

Change in
an Automobile
Assembly
Plant

None

Change in
the Garment
Industry

2 Engineering
Teams

X

1) Technical changes
2) Instruction

Evaluation Team

X

2 Human Systems Teams

X

Statistical
Measurement
T-group Approach

Marrow & Levinson
(advisors only)

X

Change in
the State
Department
(under
Macomber)

Figure 64.

Advised in-house
change program

Survival Rate and Principal Technique of
Outside Consultants in Five Case Studies
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Figure 64 shows the high
mortality rate of outside
consultants
in oases of unsuccessful
organizational change, as well as
the predominating use of the T-group
approach. The above observations
suggest
several issues for further study:
1) the effectiveness of the
T-group
as a method for bringing about
organizational change. When is it

appropriate?

When isn’t it?

2)

The effect of the times on organiza-

tional development; today, the current
trend is toward efficiency in

organizations, and T-groups are no longer
the popular method for
training.

Yet, paradoxically, there is an
increased need today for

human system development.

How will it be accomplished?

3) The

relationship between successful organizational change,
and support for
change within the organization.

These case studies suggest a need for

massive support for massive change.

The Relationship of Organizational Crisis
to Organizational Change

For purposes of discussion, crisis will be defined as a period

of substantial organizational turmoil (Greiner, 1972), acknowledged by
those within and without the organization.

When a crisis occurs, people

together recognize the need for change. ^For example, in the automobile

assembly plant, a wildcat walkout, followed by the "retirement" of the
plant manager, signaled the point of crisis.

By this time, the plant

was the worst in the division, according to nearly every criteria.
The Welden garment factory was at the point of bankruptcy when purchased
by the Harwood company.

Shortly after the change program began, the
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former owner-managers left the company.

It was when the foreign officers

banded together to demand change, forming
a union, and the White House

pressured for change, that the former Deputy
Undersecretary left and

Macomber was hired to effect a reorganization.

Crisis and ChangR

Through this study, this writer observed that in each of the
cases of unsuccessful change, there was no state of organizational

crisis acknowledged by those both within and without the organization,
prior to the change program.

When deputy undersecretary Crockett was

hired to reorganize the State Department, change was being called for
by the upper echelons of government:

Branch.

the President, and the Executive

However, those within the State Department were not calling

for change.

Thus, there was a great need for change in the eyes of the

superiors, but not in the eyes of the employees.

Principal Shelby opened his innovative school well supported by

grants and enthusiasm.

During the first year, public fanfare and

journalistic attention kept the fires of enthusiasm alight for him and
the teachers.

During the major portion of the academic year, although

many parents, and some members of the superintendent’s office thought
the school was in need of reorganization, this sentiment was not shared
by the majority of the school's staff.

Through his own efforts, Chris Argyris was "invited" in to

conduct a study of the newspaper's organization.

Although the president

he nor his
felt that his executive committee was ineffective, neither

organization.
executives thought there was any overall crisis in the
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This observation suggests an issue
for further study:

what is

the relationship between successful
organizational change, and a prior

recognition of organizational crisis by both
those within and outside of
the organization?

Leadership Style and Change

Through the analyses of the cases, this writer also observed
that
inappropriate leadership did not seem to become an issue in the organization until a point of organizational crisis was reached.

In the State

Department case, both Crockett’s and Rimestad’s leadership styles were
inappropriate to their followers ’’maturity" level, according to Life

Cycle Theory.

Yet, successful organizational change did not occur until

both those within and without the State Department demanded change.
that point, Macomber replaced Rimestad.

At

It was not until funds ran out

and both public pressure and teacher resignations pressured for change,
that Principal Shelby resigned.

Not until after the plant workers

staged a walkout did top management retire the plant manager, whose

leadership style, according to Life Cycle Theory, was inappropriate,

and hire Cooley.

Not until Weldon was at a point of bankruptcy and the

union picketing stores selling its product, did the owner-managers sell.

Their leadership style was diagnosed according to Life Cycle Theory as
being inappropriate to their staff.

Shortly after Harwood began its

change program, they resigned.
In the newspaper case, executives refused to discuss the

president’s leadership style.

While his quadrant four, low task and low

inappropriate
relationships style was, according to Life Cycle Theory,
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for his executive committee, his basic
quadrant one, high task and low

relationships style was, according to his
executives, an appropriate
leadership style in a newspaper.

organizational crisis.

In this situation, there was no

Supported by a good technical system, an

efficient human system, and vast assets, the
newspaper was functioning
effectively.

As of this writing, this newspaper is continuing
to

function successfully under the same president.
In an ideal 'system four' organization of highly mature

personnel, it would be possible theoretically for inappropriate leader-

ship to be recognized and dealt with before a crisis occurs.
in none of the cases in this study did this occur.

suggest issues for further study:

However,

These observations

what is the relationship between the

recognition of organizational crisis and the recognition of, and dealing
with, inappropriate leadership?

Is crisis necessary before successful

change can occur?

Summary of the Chapter

In this chapter, the writer has drawn five issues from the

study, and raised questions associated with each issue.

From these,

this writer suggests some recommendations for future studies.
1.

As a diagnostic method, the Life Cycle Theory
is subject to individual interpretation and
the ability of the practitioner to diagnose
This writer recommends
the data at hand.
that the situational variables incorporated
in the "maturity" dimension be operationally

defined.
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2.

The most outstanding difference
between
leaders of successful and unsuccessful
change
programs was that the former were
able to use
high relationships in their behavior
towards
followers. Leaders of unsuccessful
programs
tended to use low relationships behavior
constantly towards followers. Recommendation
for future study: an examination of the
relationship between leadership styles lacking
in relationships behavior and successful
change programs.

3-

In cases of unsuccessful change, inadequate
technical systems were not improved; attention
was given only to human systems. Recommendation for future study: an examination of the
relationship between technical change and
human systems change and how this affects
attempts at total organizational change.

4.

The casualty rate of outside consultants who
employed a T-group strategy for change was
extremely high. Recommendation for future
study:
an examination of when the T-group
approach is an appropriate strategy for
bringing about successful organizational
change

5.

Successful change was preceded by recognition
of organizational crisis. Crisis brought an
awareness of inappropriate leadership which
was then dealt with.
In cases of unsuccessful
change, a state of crisis did not exist, or
was not acknowledged. Recommendation for
future study: the influence of organizational
crisis on change.

It is the writer's opinion that the Life Cycle Theory provides

a useful framework for diagnosing the appropriate leadership style in

a given situation.

In its present state of development, this model has

taken some important steps toward creating, if possible, a theory which
can incorporate the major variables of any organizational situation,

and determine the most successful style(s) of leadership for that
situation.

Much study needs yet to be done.

Since the Life Cycle
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Theory classifies both leadership
style and follower "maturity" in
general terns, further research needs
to be conducted to a) concretize
leader-follower behaviors,

of data, and
model itself.

c)

b)

to make more objective the
interpretation

to validate the basic assumptions
that underlie the
In the last analysis, the Life Cycle
Theory is a fore-

runner in situational leadership.

For the experienced practitioner,

it can be of immense help in his or her
relationship with a client

system.
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